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This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate
to competition policy.  We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between
competitors, and monopolization.  In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic
knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy.  Our objective
is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and
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I. Introduction 
In this chapter we survey the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and use these 
principles to illuminate the central challenges in formulating and applying competition policy.  
Our twin goals are to inform readers about the current state of knowledge in economics that is 
most relevant for understanding antitrust law and policy and to critically appraise prevailing 
legal principles in light of current economic analysis. 
Since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust law has always revolved around the core 
economic concepts of competition and market power.  For over a century, it has been illegal in 
the United States for competitors to enter into price-fixing cartels and related schemes and for a 
monopolist to use its market power to stifle competition.  In interpreting the antitrust statutes, 
which speak in very general terms, U.S. courts have always paid attention to economics.  Yet the 
role of economics in shaping antitrust law has evolved greatly, especially over the past few 
decades.  The growing influence of economics on antitrust law can be traced in part to the 
Chicago School, which, starting in the 1950s, launched a powerful attack on many antitrust rules 
and case outcomes that seemed to lack solid economic underpinnings.  But the growing influence 
of economics on antitrust law also has resulted from substantial theoretical and empirical 
advances in industrial organization economics over the period since then.  With a lag, often 
spanning a couple of decades, economic knowledge shapes antitrust law.  It is our hope in this 
essay both to sharpen economists’ research agendas by identifying open questions and 
difficulties in applying economics to antitrust law, and also to accelerate the dissemination of 
economic knowledge into antitrust policy. 
Antitrust economics is a broad area, overlapping to a great extent with the field of industrial 
organization.  We do not offer a comprehensive examination of the areas within industrial 
organization economics that are relevant for antitrust law.  That task is far too daunting for a 
single survey and is already accomplished in the form of the three-volume Handbook of 
Industrial Organization (1989a, 1989b, 2007).
1  Instead, we focus our attention on four core 
economic topics in antitrust: the concept of market power (Section II), the forces that facilitate or 
impede efforts by competitors to engage in collusion (Section III), the effects of mergers 
between competitors (Section IV), and some basic forms of single-firm conduct that can 
constitute illegal monopolization, namely predatory pricing and exclusive dealing (Section V).
2  
In each case, we attempt to select from the broad base of models and approaches the ones that 
seem most helpful in formulating a workable competition policy.  Furthermore, we use this 
analysis to scrutinize the corresponding features of antitrust law, in some cases providing a 
                                                 
1 Schmalensee and Willig (1989a, 1989b) and Armstrong and Porter (2007). 
2 Since the field of antitrust economics and law is far too large to cover in one chapter, we are forced to omit some 
topics that are very important in practice and have themselves been subject to extensive study, including joint 
ventures (touched on briefly in subsection III.E.2), vertical mergers, bundling and tying, vertical intrabrand 
restraints, the intersection of antitrust law and intellectual property law, and most features of enforcement policy and 
administration, including international dimensions. Antitrust, Page 2 
firmer rationalization for current policy and in others identifying important divergences.
3  For 
reasons of concreteness and of our own expertise, we focus on antitrust law in the United States, 
but we also emphasize central features that are pertinent to competition policy elsewhere and 
frequently relate our discussion to the prevailing regime in the European Union.
4 
II.  Market Power 
The concept of market power is fundamental to antitrust economics and to the law.  Except for 
conduct subject to per se treatment, antitrust violations typically require the government or a 
private plaintiff to show that the defendant created, enhanced, or extended in time its market 
power.  Although the requisite degree of existing or increased market power varies by context, 
the nature of the inquiry is, for the most part, qualitatively the same. 
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the mere possession of market power is not a 
violation of antitrust law in the United States.  Rather, the inquiry into market power is usually a 
threshold question; if sufficient market power is established, it is then asked whether the conduct 
in question—say, a horizontal merger or an alleged act of monopolization—constitutes an 
antitrust violation.  If sufficient market power is not demonstrated, the inquiry terminates with a 
victory for the defendant. 
Here, we begin our treatment of antitrust law and economics with a discussion of the basic 
economic concept of market power and its measurement.  We first define market power, 
emphasizing that, as a technical matter, market power is a question of degree.  Then we explore 
the factors that determine the extent of market power, first when exercised by a single firm and 
then in the case in which multiple firms interact.  We also consider various methods of inferring 
market power in practice and offer some further remarks about the relationship between the 
concept of market power as understood by economists and as employed in antitrust law.
5  Further 
elaboration appears in Sections IV and V on horizontal mergers and monopolization, 
respectively. 
                                                 
3 There are a number of books that have overlapping purposes, including Bork (1978), Hylton (2003), Posner 
(2001), and Whinston (2006), the latter being closest to the present essay in the weight given to formal economics. 
4 As implied by the discussion in the text, our references to the law are primarily meant to make concrete the 
application of economic principles (and secondarily to offer specific illustrations) rather than to provide detailed, 
definitive treatments.  On U.S. law, the interested reader should consult the extensive treatise Antitrust Law by 
Areeda and Hovenkamp, many volumes of which are cited throughout this essay.  On the law in the European 
Union, see, for example, Bellamy and Child (2001), Dabbath (2004), and Walle de Ghelcke and van Gerven (2004).  
A wide range of additional information, including formal policy statements and enforcement statistics, are now 
available on the Internet.  Helpful links are: Antitrust Division, Department of Justice: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/index.html; Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission: 
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/antitrust.htm; European Union, DG Competition: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html; Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/home.html. 
5 Prior discussions of the general relationship between the economic conception of market power and its use in 
antitrust law include Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin (2004, pp. 483-499), Kaplow (1982), and Landes and Posner 
(1981).  For a recent overview, see American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law (2005). Antitrust, Page 3 
A.  Definition of Market Power 
Microeconomics textbooks distinguish between a price-taking firm and a firm with some power 
over price, that is, with some market power.  This distinction relates to the demand curve facing 
the firm in question.  Introducing our standard notation for a single firm selling a single product, 
we write P for the price the firm receives for its product, X  for the firm’s output, and  () X P  for 
the demand curve the firm perceives that it is facing, with  '( ) 0 XP ≤ .
6  When convenient, we 
will use the inverse demand curve,  () PX .  A price-taking firm has no control over price: 
() PX P =  regardless of  X, over some relevant range of the firm’s output.  In contrast, a firm 
with power over price can cause price to rise or fall by decreasing or increasing its output: 
'( ) 0 PX<  in the relevant range.  We say that a firm has “technical market power” if it faces a 
downward sloping (rather than horizontal) demand curve. 
In practice almost all firms have some degree of technical market power.  Although the notion of 
a perfectly competitive market is extremely useful as a theoretical construct, most real-world 
markets depart at least somewhat from this ideal.  An important reason for this phenomenon is 
that marginal cost is often below average cost, most notably for products with high fixed costs 
and few or no capacity constraints, such as computer software, books, music, and movies.  In 
such cases, price must exceed marginal cost for firms to remain viable in the long run.
7 Although 
in theory society could mandate that all prices equal marginal cost and provide subsidies where 
appropriate, this degree of regulation is generally regarded to be infeasible, and in most 
industries any attempts to do so are believed to be inferior to reliance upon decentralized market 
interactions.  Antitrust law, as explained in the introduction, has the more modest but, it is hoped, 
achievable objective of enforcing competition to the extent feasible.  Given the near ubiquity of 
some degree of technical market power, the impossibility of eliminating it entirely, and the 
inevitable costs of antitrust intervention, the mere fact that a firm enjoys some technical market 
power is not very informative or useful in antitrust law. 
Nonetheless, the technical, textbook notion of market power has the considerable advantage that 
it is amenable to precise measurement, which makes it possible to identify practices that enhance 
a firm’s power to a substantial degree.  The standard measure of a firm’s technical market power 
is based on the difference between the price the firm charges and the firm’s marginal cost.  In the 
standard theory of monopoly pricing, a firm sets the price for its product to maximize profits.  
Profits are given by  () (() ) PX P C X P π =− , where  () CX is the firm’s cost function.  
Differentiating with respect to price, we get the standard expression governing pricing by a 
single-product firm, 
                                                 
6 For simplicity, unless we indicate otherwise, we assume throughout this chapter that each firm sells a single 
product.  While this assumption is almost always false, in many cases it amounts to looking at a firm’s operations 
product-by-product.  Obviously, a multi-product firm might have market power with respect to one product but not 
others.  When interactions between the different products sold by a multi-product firm are important, notably, when 
the firm sells a line of products that are substitutes or complements for each other, the analysis will need to be 
modified. 
7 Edward Chamberlin (1933) and Joan Robinson (1933) are classic references for the idea that firms in markets with 







=  (1) 
where MC is the firm’s marginal cost,  '( ) CX, and  F
dX P
dP X
ε ≡  is the elasticity of demand facing 
that firm, the “firm-specific elasticity of demand.”
8  The left-hand side of this expression is the 
Lerner Index, the percentage gap between price and marginal cost, which is a natural measure of 






As noted earlier, some degree of technical market power is necessary for firms to cover their 
costs in the presence of economies of scale.  For example, if costs are given by  ( ) CX F C X =+ , 
then profits are given by  PX CX F π =−− and the condition that profits are non-negative can be 
written as  / mF P X ≥ , that is, the Lerner Index must be at least as large as the ratio of the fixed 
costs, F, to the firm’s revenues, R PX ≡ . 
Before proceeding with our analysis, we note that, although anticompetitive harm can come in 
the form of reduced product quality, retarded innovation, or reduced product variety, our 
discussion will follow much of the economics literature and most antitrust analysis in focusing 
on consumer harm that comes in the form of higher prices.  This limitation is not as serious as 
may first appear because higher prices can serve as a loose proxy for other forms of harm to 
consumers. 
B. Single-Firm Pricing Model Accounting for Rivals 
To aid understanding, we present a basic but flexible model showing how underlying supply and 
demand conditions determine the elasticity of demand facing a given firm.  This model allows us 
to begin identifying the factors that govern the degree of technical market power enjoyed by a 
firm.  We also note that this same model will prove very useful conceptually when we explore 
below the impact of various practices on price.  Studying the effects of various practices on price 
requires some theory of how firms set their prices.  The building block for these various theories 
is the basic model of price-setting by a single, profit-maximizing firm.  In addition, as a matter of 
logic, one must begin with such a model before moving on to theories that involve strategic 
interactions among rival firms.  
The standard model involves a dominant firm facing a competitive fringe.
9  A profit-maximizing 
firm sets its price accounting for the responses it expects from its rivals and customers to the 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, the elasticity of demand facing the firm is endogenous, except in the special case of constant 
elasticity of demand, since it varies with price, an endogenous variable.  All the usual formulas refer to the elasticity 
of demand at the equilibrium (profit-maximizing) price level. 
9 For a recent textbook treatment of this model, see Carlton and Perloff (2005, pp. 110-119).  Landes and Posner 
(1981) provide a nice exposition of this model in the antitrust context. Antitrust, Page 5 
price it sets.
10  This is a decision-theoretic model, not a game-theoretic model, so it does not 
make endogenous the behavior of the other firms in the market or of potential entrants.  This is 
the primary sense in which the generality of the model is limited.  The model also is limited 
because it assumes that all firms in the market produce the same, homogeneous product and do 
not engage in any price discrimination, although the core ideas underlying it extend to models of 
differentiated products.  
The firm faces one or more rivals that sell the same, homogeneous product.  When setting its 
price, P, the firm recognizes that rivals will likely respond to higher prices by producing more 
output.  The combined output of the firm’s rivals increases with price according to  ( ) YP, with 
'( ) 0 YP≥ .  Total (market) demand declines with price according to  ( ) Z P , with  '( ) 0 ZP≤ .  If 
the firm in question sets the price P, then it will be able to sell an amount given by 
() () () X PZ P Y P ≡−.  This is the largest quantity that the firm can sell without driving price 
below the level P that it selected; if the firm wants to sell more, if will have to lower its price.  
The firm’s so-called “residual demand curve” is therefore given by  ( ) X P . 
If we differentiate the equation defining  ( ) X P with respect to P, and then multiply both sides by 
/ PX −  to convert the left-hand side into elasticity form, we get  
 
Pd X Pd Z Pd Y
X dP X dP X dP
−= −+. 
Next, multiply and divide the  / dZ dP term on the right-hand side by Z and the  / dY dP  term by 
Y.  This gives  
 
P dX P dZ Z P dY Y
X dP Z dP X Y dP X
−= − + . 
Define the market share of the firm being studied by  / SX Z = .  The corresponding market share 
of the rivals is 1/ SY Z −= .  Replacing  / Z X  by 1/S  and  / YX  by (1 ) / SS −  in the expression 
above gives 
 
1( 1 ) Pd X Pd Z Pd Y S
X dP Z dP S Y dP S
−
−= − + . 
                                                 
10 As with the standard theory of pure monopoly pricing as taught in microeconomics textbooks, the results of this 
model are unchanged if we model the firm as choosing its output level, with price adjusting to clear the market. Antitrust, Page 6 
Call the elasticity of supply of the rivals  R
Pd Y
Yd P
ε ≡ , and the absolute value of the elasticity of 
the underlying market demand curve D
Pd Z
Z dP
ε ≡− .  The absolute value of the elasticity of 
demand facing the firm,   F
Pd X
X dP
ε ≡− , is therefore given by  
 







= . (2) 
This equation captures the central lesson from this model: the absolute value of the elasticity of 
demand facing a single firm, given the supply curves of its price-taking rivals and the demand 
curve of the buyers in its market, is governed by three variables: (1) the underlying elasticity of 
demand for the product,  D ε , which as noted is frequently called the market elasticity of 
demand; (2) the elasticity of supply of the firm’s rivals,  R ε ; and (3) the firm’s market share, S.  
The magnitude of the firm-specific elasticity of demand is larger, the larger are the magnitude of 
the market elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply of the firm’s rivals and the smaller is 
the firm’s market share.  Intuitively, market share is relevant for two reasons: the smaller the 
firm’s share, the greater the share of its rivals and thus the greater is the absolute magnitude of 
their supply response to a price increase for a given supply elasticity,  R ε ; and the smaller the 
firm’s share, the smaller is its share of the increase in industry profits due to a given sacrifice in 
its own sales.
11 
One polar case in this basic model is that of the traditional monopolist.  With no rivals,  1 S = , so 
the elasticity of demand facing the firm is just the market elasticity of demand.  With rivals, 
however, the magnitude of the firm-specific elasticity of demand is larger than that of the market 
elasticity of demand.  The other polar case is that of the firm from the theory of perfectly 
competitive markets.  As the firm’s share of the market approaches zero, the magnitude of the 
firm-specific elasticity of demand becomes infinite, that is, the firm is a price-taker.    
We can directly translate the firm-specific elasticity of demand given by expression (2) into the 
profit-maximizing price.  As indicated in expression (1), profit maximization involves setting 
price so that the firm’s gross margin, m, equals the inverse of the magnitude of the firm’s 
elasticity of demand.  If there are no rivals,  1 S =  and this relationship simplifies to the standard 
monopoly formula,  1/ D m ε = .  For a firm with a tiny market share,  F ε  is enormous, so  0 m ≈ , 
that is, price nearly equals marginal cost.  For intermediate cases, as noted, in this model a large 
market elasticity of demand,  D ε , a high elasticity of rival supply,  R ε , and a small market share, 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that statements about the effect of market share must be interpreted carefully.  Thus, an outward 
shift in the supply curve of the rivals, which lowers the firm’s market share at any given price, will raise the 
elasticity of demand facing that firm at any given price.  However, more broadly, the firm’s market share is 
endogenous because it depends on the price the firm chooses. Antitrust, Page 7 
S, all lead to a large firm-specific elasticity of demand facing the price leader,  F ε , which in turn 
implies a small margin. 
This model provides a guide for studying the types of conduct that may enhance a firm’s 
technical market power and thus allow that firm profitably to raise its price.  Generically, such 
conduct will be that which reduces the value of the right side of expression (2): conduct that 
makes substitute products less attractive, that causes rivals to reduce their supply, and that raises 
the firm’s market share (through the two former means or otherwise).  Later we consider how 
certain types of conduct having these effects should be scrutinized under antitrust law. 
This model is quite broad when one undertakes appropriate interpretations and extensions.  For 
example, issues relating to substitute products bear on the market elasticity of demand, as will be 
noted below.  Additionally, one can account for entry by reflecting it in the rival supply 
elasticity.  One particular variant of the model involves infinitely elastic rival supply, perhaps 
due to entry, at some fixed “limit” price.   
C. Multiple-Firm Models 
The model in Section B took the behavior of all but one firm as exogenous.  In this section, we 
consider game-theoretic models that make predictions regarding the degree of market power 
exercised by interacting firms.  First we consider two standard, static, noncooperative models: 
Cournot’s model of oligopoly, for the case with homogeneous products, and Bertrand’s model, 
for the case with differentiated products.  Then we consider briefly the possibility of repeated 
games and the impact of collusive behavior on market power.
 12  
1.  Cournot Model with Homogeneous Products 
The Cournot (1838) model of oligopoly with homogeneous products is similar to the single-firm 
pricing model in that it identifies how certain observable characteristics of the market determine 
the degree of a firm’s market power, that is, the percentage markup above marginal cost that the 
firm charges.  The Cournot model goes further, however, by providing predictions about how 
market structure affects the equilibrium price, predictions that will be important for seeing how 
certain commercial practices and mergers affect price.  Specifically, the model predicts that firms 
with lower costs will have higher market shares and higher markups.  The model is frequently 
employed in markets with relatively homogeneous products, especially if firms pick their output 
or capacity levels, after which prices are determined such that the resulting supply equals 
demand.
13  However, one should bear in mind that the Cournot equilibrium is the Nash 
equilibrium in a one-shot game.  As we discuss at length in Section III, many different outcomes 
can arise as equilibria in a repeated oligopoly game, even if the stage game played each period 
                                                 
12 There is an enormous literature on oligopoly theory, which we do not attempt to cover systematically.  See, for 
example, Shapiro (1989), Tirole (1988), and Vives (2001).  We discuss models of repeated oligopoly at greater 
length in Section III on collusion. 
13 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) use a particular rationing rule to show that capacity choices followed by pricing 
competition can replicate the Cournot equilibrium. Antitrust, Page 8 
involves quantity-setting à la Cournot.  In antitrust applications, it is generally desirable to test 
robustness of results to alternative solution concepts as well as to test empirically the predictions 
of any oligopoly model that is employed. 
In a Cournot equilibrium, a single firm’s reaction curve is derived as a special case of the basic 
model of single-firm pricing: the rivals’ outputs are all taken to be fixed, so the rival supply 
elasticity is zero.  As we now show, the elasticity of demand facing a single firm is equal to the 
market elasticity of demand divided by that firm’s market share.  However, the Cournot model 
goes beyond the single-firm pricing model because it involves finding the equilibrium in a game 
among multiple firms. 
Suppose that there are N firms, with each firm i choosing its output  i X  simultaneously.  The 
Cournot equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in these quantities.  Total output is  1 ... N X XX ≡+ +.  
Industry or market (inverse) demand is given by  ( ) PP X = .  Given the output of the other firms, 
firm i chooses its output to maximize its own profits,  ( ) ( ) ii i i PXX C X π = − .  The first-order 







=  (3) 
where / ii SX X ≡  is firm i’s market share, and D ε , as before, is the market elasticity of demand. 
To explore this result, consider the special case in which each firm i has constant marginal cost 
i MC .  Adding up the first-order conditions for all of the firms gives  ( ) '( ) i
i
NP X XP X MC += ∑ , 
which tells us that total output and hence the equilibrium price depend only upon the sum of the 
firms’ marginal costs.  Moreover, the markup equation tells us that lower-cost firms have higher 
market shares and enjoy more technical market power.  At the same time, the larger is the market 
elasticity of demand for this homogeneous product, the smaller is the market power enjoyed by 
each firm and the lower are the margins at all firms.  Here we see a recurrent theme in antitrust: a 
lower-cost firm may well enjoy some technical market power and capture a large share of the 
market, but this is not necessarily inefficient.  Indeed, with constant marginal costs, full 
productive efficiency would call for the firm with the lowest marginal costs to serve the entire 
market. 
The Cournot model also predicts that total output will be less than would be efficient because 
none of the firms produces up to the point at which marginal cost equals price; they all have 
some degree of market power.  In the special case with constant and equal marginal costs, each 
firm has a market share of 1/N , and the model predicts that each enjoys technical market power 
according to the resulting equation () / 1 / D PM CP N ε −=.  In this simple sense, more firms 
leads to greater competition and lower prices.  However, this model is clearly incomplete for 
antitrust purposes: presumably, there are fixed costs to be covered (which is why there is a fixed Antitrust, Page 9 
number of firms in the first place), so adding more firms is not costless.
14  This type of analysis 
will be directly relevant when we consider horizontal mergers, which remove an independent 
competitor but may also lead to efficiencies of various types.   
One of the attractive theoretical features of the Cournot model is that it generates an elegant 






























== ∑  (4) 
where 
2
i HS ≡∑ is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration that is 
commonly used in antitrust analysis, especially of horizontal mergers. 
2.  Bertrand Model with Differentiated Products 
The Bertrand model with differentiated products is the other key static model of oligopoly used 
in antitrust.  The Bertrand equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium in the game in which the firms 
simultaneously set their prices.  With N firms selling differentiated products, we can write the 
demand for firm i’s product as 1 ( ,..., ) ii N X DP P = .  As usual, the profits of firm i are given by 
() ii ii i PX C X π =− .  The Bertrand equilibrium is defined by the N  equations  / 0 ii P π ∂∂ = .  










, firm i’s first-order condition is the 







Actually solving for the Bertrand equilibrium can be difficult, depending on the functional form 
for the demand system and on the firms’ cost functions.  In general, however, we know that a 
firm faces highly elastic demand if its rivals offer very close substitutes, so the Bertrand theory 
predicts larger markups when the products offered by the various firms are more highly 
differentiated.  In practice, notably, in the assessment of mergers, particular models of product 
differentiation are used, such as discrete choice models with random utilities, including logit and 
                                                 
14 In general, there is no reason to believe that the equilibrium number of firms in an oligopoly with free entry, that 
is, where equally efficient firms enter until further entry would drive profits below zero, is socially efficient.  See, 
for example, Mankiw and Whinston (1986).  This observation is relevant in assessing certain antitrust policies: if the 
equilibrium number of firms is “naturally” too small, then exclusionary conduct on the part of the incumbent 
oligopolists creates an additional social inefficiency.  However, if the equilibrium number of firms is “naturally” 
excessive, different implications would follow. Antitrust, Page 10 
nested logit models, or models with linear demand or constant elasticities, as we discuss further 
in Section IV on horizontal mergers. 
Here we illustrate the operation of the Bertrand model by explicitly solving a simple, symmetric, 
two-firm model with constant marginal costs and linear demand.  Write the demand curves as 
11 2 X AP P α =−+  and  22 1 X AP P α =−+ .  Note that the parameter α  measures the diversion 
ratio, that is, the fraction of sales lost by one firm, when it raises its price, that are captured by 
the other firm (assuming that the other firm’s price is fixed).  The diversion ratio, α , will be 
important when we study horizontal mergers below.
15 
Call the marginal costs per unit  1 MC  and  2 MC , respectively, and assume that there are no fixed 
costs.  Then we have  11 1 1 2 () ( ) PM CAP P π α =− − + .  Differentiating with respect to  1 P  and 
setting this equal to zero, we get firm 1’s best-response curve,  12 1 () / 2 PAP M C α = ++ .  
Assuming cost symmetry as well,  12 MCM C M C = = , in the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium we 










We can compare the Bertrand equilibrium price to the price charged by a single firm controlling 
both products.  Such a firm would set P to maximize ( )( ) PM CAP P α − −+ , which gives the 
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16  This expression tells us that the 
Bertrand equilibrium price is relatively close to the monopoly price when the two products are 
rather poor substitutes, that is, when the diversion ratio, α , is low. 
This formula will be highly relevant when studying the effect on price of a merger between two 
suppliers of differentiated products.  In that context, the formula measures the price increase 
associated with the merger, given the prices charged by other firms (and before accounting for 
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15 More generally, the diversion ratio from product i to substitute product j is defined as 















ε =  is the cross-elasticity from product i to product j.  
16 The details of these calculations are available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/unilateral.pdf.  Antitrust, Page 11 
3.  Other Game-Theoretic Models and Collusion 
Both the Cournot and Bertrand models assume that firms engage in a one-shot noncooperative 
game.  An extensive literature on repeated games explores the possibility that firms may do 
better for themselves, supporting what are more colloquially described as collusive outcomes, 
approaching or equaling the industry profit-maximizing price.  As suggested by Stigler (1964) 
and refined in subsequent work, higher prices tend to be sustainable when cheating can be 
rapidly detected and effectively punished.  For a general discussion of models of collusion, see 
Jacquemin and Slade (1989) and Shapiro (1989). 
The possibility that firms can support alternative equilibria featuring higher prices is important to 
antitrust analysis.  First, it suggests that market power may be higher than is otherwise apparent.  
Second and more important, the possibility of collusion affects the antitrust analysis of other 
business conduct.  For example, a horizontal merger may have only a minor impact on price if 
the merging firms and their rivals are already colluding, but a far greater effect if the reduction in 
the number of competitors makes collusion easier to sustain.  Also, some practices may facilitate 
collusion, in which case such practices themselves should potentially be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.  These possibilities are explored further in Section III on collusion and Section IV on 
horizontal mergers. 
D. Means of Inferring Market Power 
Assessing the extent of or increase in technical market power in a given situation is often a 
difficult undertaking.  Based upon the foregoing analysis, one can identify a number of potential 
strategies whose usefulness varies greatly by context.  The legal system has tended to rely 
primarily on a subset of these approaches, focusing mostly on market definition, as discussed 
below.  In recent years, however, it has increasingly considered alternatives when it has 
perceived that credible economic evidence has been offered.
17 
Although somewhat crude, it is helpful to group means of inferring market power into three 
categories.  First, since market power is technically defined by the extent of the price-cost 
margin, one can attempt to identify evidence that bears fairly directly on the size of this margin, 
or by measuring profits (which reflects the margin between price and average cost).  Second, 
various models, such as the single-firm price-setting model in Section B, indicate that the extent 
of market power will be a function of the elasticity of demand, a firm’s market share, and rivals’ 
supply response.  Accordingly, one can analyze information indicative of the magnitude of these 
factors.  Third, one can make inferences from firm behavior, notably when observed actions 
would be irrational unless a certain degree of market power existed or was thereby conferred. 
                                                 
17 For example, the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
460-461 (1986) (quoting Areeda’s Antitrust Law treatise) stated: “Since the purpose of the inquiries into market 
definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry 
into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”  Antitrust, Page 12 
1.  Price-Cost Margin 
a)  Direct Measurement 
Observing the extent to which price is above marginal cost indicates the degree of technical 
market power.  This direct approach is feasible if one can accurately measure price and some 
version of marginal cost, usually average incremental cost.
18  Price is often easy to identify, 
although complications may arise when multiple products are sold together, making it difficult to 
determine the incremental revenue associated with the product in question.  If different 
customers are charged different prices, it may be necessary to calculate the profit margins for 
sales to different customers (or at different points of time).  Complexities also arise when some 
sales implicitly bundle other services, such as delivery, short-term financing, and customer 
support; in principle, these factors can be accommodated by redefining the product to include 
these services (and tracking the costs associated with these services).  Marginal cost, by contrast, 
may be more difficult to measure, due both to difficulties in identifying which costs are variable 
(and over what time period) and to the presence of common costs that may be difficult to allocate 
appropriately.  In part for this reason, the empirical industrial organization literature, as surveyed 
in Bresnahan (1989), often treats marginal cost as unobservable. 
In some cases, approximate measures of price-cost margins may be sufficient and easy to 
produce, but as evidenced by disputes over cost in predatory pricing cases and in various 
regulatory contexts, direct measurement of any conception of cost can be difficult and 
contentious.  In any event, as with all measures of technical market power, it is important to keep 
in mind the distinction between the extent of market power and whether particular conduct 
should give rise to antitrust liability.  For example, as we have already noted, especially in 
industries in which marginal cost is below average cost and capacity constraints are not binding, 
nontrivial technical market power may be consistent with what are normally considered 
competitive industries. 
b)  Price Comparisons 
Another fairly direct route to assessing the magnitude of price-cost margins, or at least to provide 
a lower-bound estimate, is to compare prices across markets.  For example, if a firm sells its 
product for a substantially higher price in one region than in another (taking into account 
transportation and other cost differences), the price-cost margin in the high-price region should 
be at least as great as the (adjusted) price difference between the regions.  This inference 
presumes, of course, that the price in the low-price region is at least equal to marginal cost.  Note 
that this method can be understood as a special case of direct measurement.  It is assumed that 
                                                 
18 We use the terms “marginal cost” and “average incremental cost” interchangeably.  Both measure the extra cost 
per unit associated with increased output.  Average incremental cost is a somewhat more accurate term, since one is 
often interested in increments that do not correspond to “one unit” of output.  However, if one takes a flexible 
approach to what constitutes a “unit” of production, the two terms are exactly the same.  In practice, average 
incremental cost is used to determine gross profit margins. Antitrust, Page 13 
the low price is a proxy for (at least an upper bound on) marginal cost, and one then is measuring 
the price-cost margin directly. 
The Staples merger case illustrates an application of this method.
19  The government offered (and 
the court was convinced by) data indicating that prices were higher in regional markets in which 
fewer office supply superstores operated and that prices fell when new superstore chains entered.  
This was taken as powerful evidence that a merger of two of the existing three superstores would 
lead to price increases. 
c)  Price Discrimination 
Price comparisons often involve a special case of price discrimination, wherein a given firm 
charges different prices to different consumers, contrary to the implicit assumption in the earlier 
analysis that each firm sets a single price for all of its customers.  Accordingly, for essentially the 
same reason as that just given, the ability of a firm to engage in price discrimination implies the 
existence of market power.  If one is prepared to assume that the firm is not pricing below 
marginal cost to any of its customers, and if one accounts for differences in the cost of serving 
different customers, the percentage difference between any high price it charges and the lowest 
price it charges for the same product can serve as a lower bound on the percentage markup 
associated with the higher price.  For example, the substantial price discrimination in sales of 
pharmaceutical drugs on international markets shows that prices in the United States are very 
much above marginal cost.   
The fact that price discrimination technically implies market power is important because price 
discrimination is widespread.  Familiar examples include airline pricing, senior citizen and 
student discounts, and the mundane practice of restaurants charging steep price increments for 
alcoholic beverages (versus soft drinks) and high-end entrees that greatly exceed any differences 
in marginal cost.  For business-to-business transactions, negotiations that typically generate price 
dispersion and price discrimination are quite common. 
Once again, however, it is important to keep in mind that the technical existence of market power 
does not imply antitrust liability.
20  As is familiar, price discrimination generates greater seller 
profits yet may well be benign or even favorable on average for consumers.  Moreover, the 
                                                 
19 Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).  For further discussion, see 
subsection IV.F.1 in our discussion of horizontal mergers. 
20 Nor is it the case that price discrimination in itself implies antitrust liability, despite the existence of the Robinson-
Patman Act that regulates particular sorts of price discrimination in certain contexts.  As presently interpreted, price 
discrimination may be a violation in so-called primary-line cases, tantamount to predatory pricing, and in secondary-
line cases, such as when manufacturers offer discounts (that are not cost justified) to large retailers that are not 
available to smaller buyers.  Notably, the Act does not cover discriminatory prices to ultimate consumers (or to 
intermediaries that are not in competition with each other) that are nonpredatory.  Nevertheless, it seems that 
defendants in antitrust litigation have been reluctant to rationalize challenged practices that analysts have suggested 
were means of price discrimination on such grounds, presumably fearing that such explanations would be to their 
detriment.  Of course, one way this could be true is that the existence of some technical market power would thereby 
be conceded. Antitrust, Page 14 
resulting profit margins are often necessary to cover fixed costs, as in models of monopolistic 
competition.  If there are no barriers to entry so that the resulting margins merely provide a 
normal rate of return on capital, the presence of a gap between price and marginal cost is 
perfectly consistent with the conclusion that the market is behaving is a competitive fashion, 
given the presence of fixed costs and product differentiation.  Furthermore, in our preceding 
example of multinational pharmaceutical companies, the margins provide the reward for costly 
and risky research and development to create and patent new drugs.  The ex post market power is 
necessary to provide the quasi-rents that induce innovation (given that we rely on a patent system 
rather than a regime that gives direct rewards to innovators from the government fisc). 
d)  Persistent Profits 
A somewhat different approach to establishing antitrust market power involves looking at a 
firm’s profits, which amounts to comparing price to average (rather than marginal) cost.  Under 
this approach, persistently above-normal profits indicate a high price-cost margin and thus the 
existence of technical market power.  This method shares difficulties with any that rely on 
measures of cost.  In particular, it is often very hard to measure the return on capital earned for a 
given product, or in a given market, especially for a firm that is engaged in many lines of 
business and has substantial costs that are common across products.
21  Another problem with this 
approach is that the return on capital should, in principle, be adjusted for risk.  Frequently, one is 
looking at a successful firm, perhaps one that has been highly profitable for many years 
following some initial innovation that, ex ante, may not have turned out as well. 
In addition, average costs often differ from marginal costs.  When average costs are higher, this 
approach may mask the existence of technical market power.  In such circumstances, however, 
marginal-cost pricing may be unsustainable in any event; that is, although there may be technical 
market power, there may not be any way (short of intrusive regulation that is not contemplated) 
to improve the situation.  When average cost is below marginal cost, profits can exist despite the 
absence of any markup.  In such cases, entry might be expected.  If profits are nevertheless 
persistent, there may exist entry barriers, a subject we discuss below.  
2.  Firm’s Elasticity of Demand 
In the single-firm pricing model, the price-cost margin (Lerner Index) equals the inverse of the 
(absolute value of the) firm’s elasticity of demand, as indicated by expression (1).  Furthermore, 
as described in expression (2), this elasticity depends on the market elasticity of demand, the 
firm’s market share, and rivals’ supply elasticity.  In the Cournot, Bertrand, and other oligopoly 
models, many of the same factors bear on the extent of the price-cost margin and thus the degree 
of market power.  Accordingly, another route to inferring market power is to consider the 
magnitude of these factors. 
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a)  Direct Measurement 
One could attempt to measure the elasticity of demand facing the firm in question.
22  A possible 
approach would be to estimate the market elasticity of demand and then make an adjustment 
based on the firm’s market share.  Alternatively, one might directly observe how the firm’s sales 
have varied when it has changed its price.  As a practical matter, both of these methods may be 
difficult to implement.  However, they may nevertheless be more reliable than the alternatives.  
b)  Substitutes, Market Definition, and Market Share 
In antitrust analysis, both by agencies (notably, in examining prospective horizontal mergers) 
and by the courts, the dominant method of gauging the extent of market power involves defining 
a so-called relevant market and examining the share of a firm or group of firms in that market.  
In defining product markets, the focus is on which products are sufficiently good demand 
substitutes for the product in question to be deemed in the same market.  Likewise, in defining 
the extent of the geographic market, the question concerns the feasibility of substitution, for 
example, by asking how far patients would travel for hospitalization.  Although we have 
discussed the economic analysis of market power at some length, the concept of market 
definition has not yet appeared directly.  Hence it is useful to consider the relationship between 
the most common method used in antitrust law to assess market power and the implications of 
the foregoing economic analysis. 
The connection is easiest to see by examining expression (2), which relates the firm-specific 
elasticity of demand to the market elasticity of demand, the firm’s market share, and rivals’ 
elasticity of substitution.  Consider the case in which the firm produces a homogeneous product, 
has a high share of sales of that product, and faces a highly elastic market demand curve due to 
the existence of many close substitutes.  The firm-specific elasticity of demand and thus the 
extent of technical market power is small even though the firm’s market share is high in the 
narrowly defined market consisting only of the homogeneous product sold by the firm.  One 
could redefine the “market” to include the close substitutes along with the homogeneous product 
sold by the firm.  The market elasticity of demand in this broader market is presumably smaller, 
but since the firm’s market share in this market is also necessarily lower, we would again 
conclude that the firm-specific demand elasticity is small and thus that the degree of technical 
market power is low as well. 
Courts—and thus lawyers and government agencies—traditionally equate high market shares 
with a high degree of market power and low shares with a low degree of market power.  This 
association is highly misleading if the market elasticity of demand is ignored, and likewise if 
rivals’ elasticity of supply is not considered.  In principle, as just explained, the paradigm based 
on market definition and market share takes the market elasticity of demand into account, 
indirectly, by defining broader markets—and thus producing lower market shares—when the 
elasticity is high.  As should be apparent from the foregoing discussion, the standard antitrust 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Baker and Bresnahan (1988). Antitrust, Page 16 
approach is more indirect than necessary and, due to this fact plus its dichotomous structure 
(substitutes are either in the market or not), will tend to produce needlessly noisy conclusions.
23  
We discuss market definition at greater length in Section IV.E on horizontal mergers and 
subsection V.B.1 on monopolization. 
Frequently, it is useful to decompose the elasticity of demand for a given product into various 
cross-elasticities of demand with other products.  For example, if the price of soda rises, 
consumers will substitute to other drinks, including, perhaps, beer, juice, milk, and water.  
Naturally, the analysis in any given case will depend upon exactly how these various products 
are defined (soda could be broken into regular soda and diet soda, or colas and non-colas, etc.).  
But the underlying theory of demand does not vary with such definitions.  To illustrate, suppose 
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In words, the (absolute value of the) elasticity of demand for product 1 is equal to one plus the 
sum of the cross-elasticities of all the other products with product 1, with each cross-elasticity 
weighted by the associated product’s revenues relative to those of product 1.  If we define each 












=+ ∑ , so the cross-elasticity with each rival product is weighted by its share of 
industry revenues.
24 
This decomposition of the market elasticity of demand is instructive with regard to the standard 
practice in antitrust of defining markets by deciding whether particular products are sufficiently 
good substitutes—generally understood as having sufficiently high cross-elasticities of 
demand—to be included in the market.  The expression makes clear that even a substitute with a 
very high cross-elasticity may have much less influence than that of a large group of other 
                                                 
23 This point is elaborated in Kaplow (1982). 
24 Cross-elasticities need not be positive.  For example, when the weighted summation equals zero, we have the 
familiar case of unit elasticity—that is, as price rises, expenditures on the product in question remain constant—and 
when the summation is negative, we have an elasticity less than one, often referred to as inelastic demand. Antitrust, Page 17 
products, no one of which has a particularly high cross-elasticity.  Moreover, products’ shares of 
total revenues are not ordinarily considered in an explicit way, yet the formula indicates that a 
substitute with half the cross-elasticity of another can readily be more important, in particular, if 
its associated revenues are more than twice as high.  More broadly, this representation of the 
relationship between overall elasticity and individual cross-elasticities reinforces the point that 
the effect of substitutes is a matter of degree and thus not well captured by the all-or-nothing 
approach involved in defining antitrust markets. 
Some further comments concerning market share are in order, particularly in light of the fact that 
a persistently high market share is very frequently presented as compelling evidence that a firm 
has market power.  No doubt this inference is often valid, specifically, if the market demand 
elasticity and rivals’ supply elasticities are low in magnitude and the market conditions are 
reasonably stable.  However, a firm with only a modest cost advantage may profitably maintain 
its high share by pricing low enough to capture most of the market.  This occurs, for example, in 
the model of the dominant firm facing a competitive fringe if the fringe supply is very elastic at a 
price just above the firm’s own marginal cost.  Consider, for example, a trucking firm that 
provides 100% of the freight transportation on a particular route but would quickly be displaced 
by nearby rivals (whose costs are essentially the same but who suffer a slight disadvantage due to 
a lack of familiarity with the route’s customers) if it were to raise its price even a few percent.  
Additionally, a firm may have a 100% share in market protected by a patent, but if there are 
sufficiently close substitutes, its market power is negligible.  Conversely, even a firm with a low 
share of sales of a particular product may have quite a bit of technical market power if the 
magnitude of the market elasticity of demand and rivals’ elasticity of supply for that product is 
very low.  Gasoline refining and electricity generation are two examples of products for which 
this latter situation can arise.  In sum, the right side of expression (2) indicates that market share 
is only one factor that determines the elasticity of demand facing a firm, so the magnitude of 
market share is a relevant component of market power but not a conclusive indicator. 
c)  Rivals’ Supply Response: Barriers to Expansion, Mobility, and Entry 
In examining the right side of expression (2) for the firm’s elasticity of demand, the preceding 
section focused on the market elasticity of demand and market share.  However, the elasticity of 
supply by rivals is also relevant, as indicated by the just-mentioned contrasting examples of 
trucking, on one hand, and gasoline refining and electricity generation, on the other hand.  The 
concept of rivals’ supply should be understood broadly, to include expanded output from existing 
plants, shifting capital from other regions or from the production of other products, introducing 
new brands or repositioning existing ones, and entry by firms in related businesses or by other 
firms.  If market power is significant, it must be that the aggregate of these potential supply 
responses—often referred to as expansion, mobility, and entry—is sufficiently limited, at least 
over some pertinent time period.  Gilbert (1989) provides an extended discussion of such 
barriers, Berry and Reiss (2007) survey empirical models of entry and market power, and Sutton 
(2007) discusses the relationship between market structure and market power. 
In some cases, the elasticity of rivals’ supply may be measured directly, by measuring output 
responses to previous changes in price by the firm in question, or by other firms in similar 
markets.  Often, however, some extrapolation is required, such as in predicting whether a Antitrust, Page 18 
hypothetical increase in price to unprecedented levels following a merger would generate a 
significant supply response.  For internal expansion by existing rivals, the question would be 
whether there exist capacity constraints, steeply rising marginal costs, or limits on the inclination 
of consumers of differentiated products to switch allegiances.  In the case of new entry, timing, 
possible legal restrictions (intellectual property, zoning, and other regulatory constraints), brand 
preferences, the importance of learning by doing, and the ability to recoup fixed costs, among 
other factors, will determine the extent of restraint imposed. 
Particularly regarding the latter, it is common to inquire into the existence of so-called barriers to 
entry (sometimes taken as a shorthand for all forms of supply response by rivals).  In some 
instances, such as when there are legal restrictions, the meaning of this concept is fairly clear.  
However, in many cases, it is difficult to make sense of the notion of entry barriers in a vacuum.  
For example, there is much debate about whether economies of scale should be viewed as a 
barrier to entry.  If minimum efficient scale is large and incumbent producers have long-term 
exclusive dealing contracts with most distributors, entry may be rendered too costly, and existing 
firms might enjoy high price-cost margins (more than necessary to cover fixed costs).  If instead 
there merely exist fixed costs and marginal costs are constant, in a free-entry equilibrium there 
will be positive price-cost margins yet no profits.  The positive margins will not induce further 
entry because their level post-entry would be insufficient to recover fixed costs.  As we have 
observed repeatedly, although market power would exist in the technical sense, the situation 
should not be viewed as problematic from an antitrust perspective. 
Many structural features of markets have been identified as possible entry barriers: economies of 
scale, learning –by doing, reputation, access to capital, customer switching costs, lack of product 
compatibility, network effects, patent protection, and access to distribution channels.  Because 
the implication of so-called entry barriers depends on the context—and because some degree of 
market power is sometimes unavoidable yet many are reluctant to state or imply its existence, 
such as by deeming something to be an entry barrier in a setting where antitrust intervention 
seems inappropriate—there is no real consensus on how the term “barriers to entry” should be 
defined or applied in practice.
25  We do not see clear benefits to formulating a canonical 
definition of the concept.  It may be best simply to keep in mind the purpose of such inquiries 
into the existence of entry barriers: to assess rivals’ supply response as an aspect of an inquiry 
into the existence of market power, noting that market power is often relevant to antitrust 
liability but not sufficient to establish it.  Beyond that, it may be more helpful to defer further 
analysis until considering specific practices in specific settings. 
3.  Conduct 
In some situations, one may be able to infer the presence of market power from the challenged 
conduct itself.  If we observe a firm engaging in a practice that could not be profitable unless it 
enhanced the firm’s market power to some certain degree, we may then infer that market power 
would indeed increase to that degree.  For example, if a firm pays large amounts to retailers to 
agree not to deal with prospective entrants or spends large sums to maintain tariffs, we may infer 
                                                 
25 See McAfee, Mialon and Williams (2004), Carlton (2004), and Schmalensee (2004) for recent discussions of how 
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that these practices create or enhance that firm’s market power.
26  If one accepts the premise that 
a firm’s expertise in assessing its own market power is likely to be more reliable than that 
produced by a battle of experts before an agency or in litigation, then the firm’s own conduct 
may be a sound basis for inferring the existence of market power. 
Two caveats should be noted.  First, the amount of market power that may be inferred will 
sometimes not be very great.  A firm with billions of dollars in sales would happily spend 
millions lobbying for tariffs even if the resulting degree of market power were trivial.  On the 
other hand, if a firm engages in a plan of below-cost pricing that sacrifices hundreds of millions 
in current profits, in the absence of other explanations one might well infer that it anticipates a 
substantial degree of market power, at least sufficient to recoup its investment. 
Second, the reliability of the inference depends greatly on the lack of ambiguity regarding the 
character of the practice under consideration.  If one is certain that the conduct would only be 
undertaken if it could enhance the firm’s market power (to some requisite degree), then the 
inference is sound.  However, often it will be contested whether the conduct in question was 
designed to and will have the effect of increasing market power rather than constituting a benign 
or even beneficial practice that increases welfare.  For example, prices below cost may be 
profitable because they are predatory, or because they are introductory offers that will enhance 
future demand for an experience good, or because they stimulate the demand for other products 
sold by the firm at a healthy price-cost margin.  If pro-competitive explanations are sufficiently 
plausible, no inference of market power is warranted, at least without further investigation.   
Recognizing the possibility that the conduct at issue may be pro-competitive is especially 
important given the role that market power requirements often play in antitrust, namely, as a 
screening device.  That is, we may require a plaintiff to prove the existence of market power 
because we do not want to subject a wide range of behavior to the costs of antitrust scrutiny and 
the possibility of erroneous liability.  When the conduct that provides the basis for inferring 
market power is the very same conduct under scrutiny, and furthermore when the purpose and 
effect of such conduct is ambiguous, permitting an inference of market power from the conduct 
somewhat undermines the screening function of the market power threshold.  This concern may 
be especially great when juries serve as the finders of fact.
27 
                                                 
26 As we discuss in subsection V.D.2 in our analysis of exclusive dealing contracts with retailers, we would need to 
rule out pro-competitive justifications, such as those based on free riding.  In the case of lobbying to erect tariff 
barriers, even if the conduct enhances market power, it would not violate U.S. antitrust laws because petitioning 
government, even to restrict competition, is exempt activity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
27 This concern may help to explain the Supreme Court’s decision in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 
(1993), where the Court held in an attempted monopolization case that the plaintiff had to meet the market power 
requirement independently of proving predatory conduct.  Although the holding on its face seems illogical (if, as the 
plaintiff argued, it would have been irrational to have engaged in the conduct unless the requisite contribution to 
market power were present), the actual practice under consideration may well have appeared to the Court to be 
nonpredatory, so it wished to heighten the plaintiff’s required proof before it would allow the case to be considered 
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E. Market Power in Antitrust Law 
As noted, in antitrust law the notion of market power is frequently used as a screen: a firm (or 
group of firms) must be shown to have some level of market power as a prerequisite to 
considering whether the conduct in question gives rise to antitrust liability.  As a result, antitrust 
investigations and adjudications devote substantial attention to whether or not the requisite 
market power exists.  In rhetoric and often in reality, this legal approach of viewing market 
power as something either present or absent—a dichotomous classification—is at odds with the 
technical economic notion of market power as a matter of degree.  Because some degree of 
technical market power is ubiquitous, it is evident that the term “market power” as used in 
antitrust law has another meaning.  Nevertheless, the law’s notion of market power is quite 
closely related to that of economists.  A legal finding of market power constitutes not merely a 
declaration of the existence of technical market power, however trivial, but rather a conclusion 
that the degree of existing or increased market power exceeds some threshold, a benchmark that 
as we will see varies with the type of conduct under consideration and that in most instances is 
not clearly specified. 
This feature of antitrust law’s use of a market power requirement is well illustrated by the law of 
monopolization.  As will be elaborated in Section V.B, under U.S. antitrust law “[t]he offense of 
monopoly . . . has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
28  
The requirement of “monopoly power” is conclusory in that it merely signifies that degree of 
market power deemed minimally necessary and also sufficient to satisfy the first element of the 
offense of monopolization.  It is understood that this level of market power is higher than that 
required in other areas of antitrust law.  Notably, the market power requirement is highest in 
monopolization cases, somewhat lower in attempted monopolization cases, and lower still in 
horizontal merger cases, as will be discussed in subsections IV.D.2 and IV.B.2.  However, these 
requirements typically are not stated quantitatively, making it difficult to know very precisely 
what is the threshold in any of these areas. 
In principle, the fact that market power is a matter of degree should be recognized in designing 
antitrust rules.  A monopolistic act that is unambiguously undesirable might be condemned even 
if the incremental impact on market power is modest, whereas for conduct that is ambiguous, 
with a high risk of false positives, it may be appropriate to contemplate condemnation only when 
the potential effect on market power is substantial.  If one were minimizing a loss function in 
which there was uncertainty about the practices under scrutiny, and if the degree of harm 
conditional on the practices being detrimental was rising with the extent of market power, an 
optimal rule could be stated as entailing a market power requirement that was highly contextual. 
For practical use by agencies and in adjudication, however, a more simplified formulation may 
economize on administrative costs, provide clearer guidance to parties, and reflect the limited 
expertise of the pertinent decision-makers.  Nevertheless, some greater flexibility may be 
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warranted and is indeed increasingly reflected in antitrust doctrine.  The early emergence of a per 
se rule against price-fixing, which dispenses with proof of market power, is one illustration.  
Another is the increasing use of intermediate levels of scrutiny under the rule of reason (see 
subsection III.E.2) and the implicit reliance on different market power thresholds by the antitrust 
agencies in reviewing horizontal mergers in different industries, despite the existence of official 
guidelines that purport to be uniform. 
In addition to differences in the magnitude of market power thresholds and whether there is some 
flexibility regarding the requisite degree of market power, there is variation across contexts in 
whether the question posed concerns the extent level of market power or the amount by which 
the actions under scrutiny would increase it.  In a monopolization case, the standard question is 
often whether a firm’s past practices have improperly created or maintained monopoly power, so 
the inquiry is usually into whether significant market power already exists, as reflected in the 
previously quoted formulation.  By contrast, in examining horizontal mergers, the focus is on 
whether the proposed acquisition would significantly increase market power.
29 
We believe that this distinction is overstated and potentially misleading and that the correct 
inquiry should focus largely on contributions to market power.  Even in the typical 
monopolization case, the relevant question is how much the past practices contributed to the 
existing situation.  If the contribution is large (and if the practices are not otherwise justifiable), it 
seems that there should be a finding of liability even if the resulting total degree of power is not 
overwhelming.  (In such a case, the initial level of market power presumably will have been 
rather low.)  Likewise, even if the degree of existing market power is great, in cases in which the 
practices in question did not plausibly contribute significantly to that result, one should be 
cautious in condemning those practices, that is, they should be condemned only if they are 
unambiguously undesirable. 
As an example, consider a firm selling a relatively homogeneous product, such as in the 
chemical industry, that enjoys a significant cost advantage over its rivals based on patented 
process technology.  That firm might well enjoy a nontrivial degree of technical market power.  
Neither good sense nor existing law ordinarily condemns the discovery of a superior production 
process.  Let us assume that the firm’s technical market power was legally obtained and suppose 
further that the firm prices against a perfectly elastic rival supply at some trigger price that is 
below the firm’s monopoly price.  Antitrust issues could arise if this firm attempts to acquire its 
rivals or if the firm engages in conduct that drives its rivals out of business.  In considering such 
cases, the degree of the firm’s initial market power is of secondary importance (although if it 
were near zero, further inquiry would probably be pointless).  Instead, the central question 
should be whether and to what extent the acquisition or exclusionary conduct will augment that 
firm’s market power and thus harm consumers.  For example, however great is the initial level of 
market power, the firm would gain no additional power by acquiring (or destroying) one of its 
rivals as long as numerous others that remain still have highly elastic supply at that same trigger 
price.  However, the firm might well gain market power by acquiring or destroying a rival with 
uniquely low costs, thereby raising the price at which substantial competing supply would be 
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triggered.  We return to the question of the relevance of extant market power versus challenged 
practices’ contribution to power in subsection V.A.2 with regard to monopolization and 
exclusionary practices. 
A further possible deviation between economic analysis and antitrust law with regard to market 
power concerns the benchmark against which the height of price-cost margins is assessed.  The 
U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992) define market 
power as “the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant 
period of time,” and the Supreme Court has similarly stated that “As an economic matter, market 
power exists whenever prices can be raised above the levels that would be charged in a 
competitive market.”
30  If one understands the competitive price to refer to the price that would 
be charged in a hypothetical, textbook, perfectly competitive market in which firms have 
constant marginal costs equal to the marginal cost of the firm in question at the prevailing 
equilibrium, then the legal and economic concepts are essentially the same.  However, the 
hypothetical competitive scenario that underlies such statements is rather vague: the 
counterfactual is not explicit, and some specifications that may implicitly be contemplated may 
not yield sensible answers.  For example, what is meant by the perfectly competitive price in a 
market with fixed costs?   
Courts have struggled with these issues for many years.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
“Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.”
31  This is not a 
meaningful screen, however, since any firm with technical market power has some ability to 
control prices.  Conversely, in the European Union, the European Court of Justice has said that a 
“dominant position” corresponds to “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by 
allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and customers 
and ultimately of consumers.”
32  This test is not especially useful, either, since even a firm with 
great market power does not rationally behave independently of its competitors or customers.  
That is, there is some monopoly price, PM, which—however high it may be—implies that a price 
of, say, 2PM would be less profitable due to far greater consumer substitution away from the 
product at that higher price. 
III. Collusion 
We now turn to collusion, including price-fixing cartels and other arrangements that may have 
similar effects, such as the allocation of customers or territories to different suppliers.
33  For 
concreteness, we will ordinarily focus on price-fixing.  There is an enormous literature on the 
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32 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461 § 30. 
33 We do not explicitly address the full range of “horizontal agreements,” which includes group boycotts as well as 
arrangements among buyers, notably, to suppress the prices of inputs, the latter of which are subject to similar 
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economics of collusion that we do not attempt to review systematically.  Existing surveys 
include Shapiro (1989), Jacquemin and Slade (1989), Motta (2004, ch. 4), and of particular note 
Whinston (2006, ch. 2).  For in-depth discussion of some especially interesting price-fixing 
cases, see Borenstein (2004), Connor (2004), Elzinga and Mills (2004), Motta (2004, pp. 211-
219), and Porter and Zona (2004). 
The focus here, as in the rest of this survey, is on the intersection of economics and the law.  We 
begin by noting the core elements from each field and posing questions about their relationship.  
Next, we explore the economics of collusion, focusing on the necessary elements for successful 
collusion, lessons from game-theoretic models of oligopoly, and the various factors that bear on 
the likelihood of successful collusion.  Finally, we examine legal prohibitions in light of the 
basic teachings of economics. 
A. Economic and Legal Approaches: An Introduction 
1.  Economic Approach 
For as long as there has been commercial competition, rivals have been tempted to short-circuit it 
because self-interest favors their own profits at the expense of customers’ interest in lower prices 
and the overall social interest in allocative efficiency.  No less a champion of the free-market 
system than Adam Smith ([1776] 1970, bk 1, ch. X) considered collusion an ever-present danger.  
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”  If 
one thinks in terms of a homogeneous product, firms seek to establish and maintain the 
monopoly price, which exceeds the price that would prevail in the absence of the agreement.  
With differentiated products or price discrimination, although there is no single monopoly price, 
the same idea applies: firms seek to elevate prices and thus raise their collective profits at the 
expense of consumers.  In so doing, the firms typically increase the gap between price(s) and 
marginal cost(s) and thus raise deadweight loss and lower total welfare, defined as the sum of 
supplier profits and consumer surplus.  Thus, collusion is unwelcome, whether one is seeking to 
maximize overall efficiency or consumer welfare. 
Colluding firms use a variety of methods to achieve the basic goal of raising prices.  In some 
cases, firms agree to minimum prices.  In others, they agree to limit their production levels, since 
output restrictions translate into elevated prices.  Alternatively, firms can allocate customers or 
territories among themselves, with each firm agreeing not to compete for customers, or in 
territories, assigned to others.  These customer and territorial allocation schemes effectively grant 
each firm a monopoly over some portion of the overall market, so they lead to higher prices and 
reduced output, even though these schemes do not directly specify price or output. 
Economists studying collusion, and more generally oligopoly, tend to inquire into the factors that 
determine the market equilibrium outcome in an industry.  Economists typically focus on 
whether the outcome is relatively competitive, with prices close to marginal cost, or at least some 
measure of average cost, or relatively collusive, with prices close to the level that a monopolist 
would pick to maximize industry profits.  This approach is consistent with economists’ 
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This approach focuses on description or prediction, not on policy prescriptions regarding how the 
government should mitigate the costs of collusion.  There is a general consensus that clearly 
identifiable attempts to engage in collusive behavior should be prohibited, so explicit cartel 
agreements should not be legally enforceable and private attempts to agree upon and enforce 
supra-competitive prices should be punished.  It is widely recognized, however, that it is not 
always possible to determine whether collusion is occurring or, even when it is, which specific 
practices should be proscribed.  One approach in such settings would be price regulation, which 
is often undertaken in the case of natural monopolies but is generally thought to be inferior to 
decentralized competition when such is feasible.  In the past, there have been recommendations 
to deconcentrate certain industries in order to achieve more competitive outcomes.
34  Such 
proposals have not been implemented, except in some cases of monopolization, and have not of 
late been actively considered in the United States.  Another structural approach is more 
prevalent: enjoining horizontal mergers that make collusive outcomes more likely, a topic we 
explore in Section IV.  Finally, for cases in which collusion can be identified but the specific 
practices enabling it cannot, Posner (1969, 2001) interestingly proposes the imposition of 
monetary penalties on oligopolists if the market equilibrium outcome is collusive.
35  The idea is 
that, just as Pigouvian taxes induce firms to refrain from inefficient behavior the details of which 
might be difficult for a regulator to observe or proscribe, so too would appropriate fines or 
damage awards in private litigation lead firms to abstain from collusive behavior.  This approach 
assumes, importantly, that it is possible to measure the extent to which prices exceed non-
collusive levels, which poses both conceptual and practical challenges of a sort that are 
encountered in imposing sanctions, the magnitude of which depends on the extent of collusive 
overcharges.  However, Posner’s approach has not been embraced by the courts. 
2.  Legal Approach 
The legal approach to collusion, at least on its face, differs from the economic approach.  As just 
described, the economic approach begins with a diagnosis of the problem, then tries to ascertain 
whether and when collusion occurs, and finally assesses the efficacy of competing remedies.  
Although one would like to believe that the legal approach is at some level grounded in such 
analysis, on the surface it appears to focus instead on particular behavioral elements.  As will be 
seen in the course of our analysis in Section III, the extent to which the legal approach can 
ultimately be rationalized on economic grounds depends on how legal tests are interpreted. 
                                                 
34 Legislation was introduced repeatedly in the early 1970s that would have authorized the dissolution of firms in 
concentrated industries that had not engaged in substantial price competition over three consecutive years; see, for 
example, S.1167, March 12 ,1972.  This legislation was based on the White House Task Force Report on Antitrust 
Policy (1968), commonly known as the Neal Report.  
35 On its face, present practice appears to differ significantly from Posner’s proposal.  Although the United States 
and most other competition enforcement regimes do provide for fines or private damage remedies in cases of price-
fixing, to trigger such payment obligations, the government or private parties typically need to show that in some 
sense there is an “agreement.”  Furthermore, satisfaction of this requirement is generally understood to entail more 
than demonstrating that the observed outcome involves a “collusive price,” although as we shall discuss, just how 
much more must be shown and what constitutes an adequate demonstration is unclear.  See subsection 2 and section 
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In the United States, the European Union, and many other jurisdictions, the structure of legal 
prohibitions revolves around the distinction between unilateral and group behavior.  Unilateral 
behavior is circumscribed to a limited degree by anti-monopolization law (see Section V) and 
various other provisions but is not subject to a regime of price regulation or other forms of 
internal micro-management of firms’ dealings.
36  Thus, firms are purportedly free to set prices 
and other conditions of trade.
37  This freedom, however, is restricted to unilateral behavior.  
Independent firms are expected to compete, conferring the benefits of competition on consumers 
and on society as a whole. 
The central legal question with which we will be concerned—and will elaborate in section D—is 
how courts or other regulators are to determine when supposedly competing firms are instead 
conspiring.  Legal prohibitions are typically triggered by certain types of conduct rather than by 
outcomes themselves.  For concreteness, we will discuss the prohibition in U.S. antitrust law, 
Sherman Act §1, which makes illegal “[e]very contract, combination …, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade.”  In practice, the standard term of art is “agreement,” even though that term 
does not appear in the statute.
38  Thus, the legal question is whether firms’ pricing is a result of 
an agreement.  If not, there is no violation.  If so, there is a violation, and penalties in the United 
States include having to pay treble damages to injured customers, being subject to injunctions on 
prohibited behavior, and criminal penalties, under which firm executives convicted of price-
fixing serve prison terms and firms pay fines. 
What, then, is an agreement?  And how does this concept relate to the economic analysis of 
collusive behavior?  These questions will occupy much of the remainder of Section  III of our 
survey.  To provide some guidance in the interim,  a few preliminary observations are offered.  
First, there are clear cases.  At one extreme, if competitors meet in the proverbial smoke-filled 
room, negotiate a detailed cartel arrangement, sign it, and implement it—and, importantly, this 
all can be proved in a legal proceeding –an agreement and hence a legal violation will 
undoubtedly be found to exist.  At the other extreme, no agreement would presumably exist and 
no violation would be found due to the mere fact that competitors’ prices are equal—as one 
expects with homogeneous products and perfect competition, for example—or that they 
sometimes move together—as tends to occur when there are shocks to input prices (think of 
retail gasoline stations changing sale prices when prices from refineries change). 
The difficult cases fall at various points in between, in terms of what actually transpired and 
what can be proved before a tribunal.  Consider a simple example.  Suppose that just two firms, 
A and B, supply a particular product.  Let the monopoly price of that product be $100 and the 
fully competitive price (that is, the price at which the industry marginal cost curve crosses the 
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but the focus in this Part is on prices that are too high and thus directly harm customers rather than on prices that are 
too low and thus directly harm competitors. 
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demand curve) be only $40.  Suppose further that the actual industry price persists at $100, with 
sales split evenly between the two firms.  This is clearly a collusive outcome,  but have the firms 
entered into an agreement in restraint of trade? 
As noted, if a written agreement, negotiated and signed in a smoke-filled room, is produced as 
evidence, a violation will be found.  Suppose that no such agreement is directly in evidence.  One 
possibility is that such an agreement nevertheless exists, and if a tribunal can be convinced of 
this by circumstantial evidence, a case will have been made.  But what sort of evidence would be 
necessary to make this inference?  The answer depends importantly on the competing 
hypotheses—and on which alternative explanations are likewise deemed to involve agreements 
and hence would also constitute violations.  What interactions short of a meeting in a smoke-
filled room that results in a written document will suffice?  Is a face-to-face meeting required or 
would a conference call or an e-mail exchange be enough?  What about other forms of 
communication, such as statements relayed through third parties or in various codes?  Or 
nonverbal communication (hand signals, winks and nods, posting signs with proposed prices, 
and so forth)?  Must there be a written document?  Presumably not.  Must there be a formal 
agreement tantamount to a legally enforceable contract?  Well, since a contract would not be 
legally enforceable in any event, presumably this too is not required. 
In sum, we can be certain that agreements may be deemed to exist when something well short of 
the formal meeting and written cartel document exists.  But it is not clear how much less will 
give rise to liability, or, put in the affirmative, just what is (are) the core underlying element(s) of 
an “agreement.”  For now, we will leave this question, returning to it in section D, after we have 
surveyed some key aspects of the pertinent economic theory, which one might hope would 
illuminate the legal inquiry. 
B. Oligopoly Theory 
1.  Elements of Successful Collusion 
Economists have long recognized that there exist certain prerequisites to successful collusion.  
The classic modern reference is Stigler (1964).  Green and Porter (1984) embed these issues in a 
supergame context.  The key elements are (1) reaching consensus: some understanding must be 
reached among the otherwise-competing firms regarding what conduct is permitted under the 
terms of the collusive agreement, such as the prices that the firms will charge; (2) detection: 
some reliable means must exist by which departures from the agreement can be detected; and (3) 
punishment: some credible mechanism must be established by which such departures are 
punished if and when they are detected.  Specifically, the prospect of detection and punishment 
must be sufficient to deter individual firms’ proclivity to cheat on the agreement, typically by 
cutting prices in the short-term, hoping to reap greater profits through a higher market share, at 
the expense of the other firms, before they can respond.  Related to the need to reach an 
agreement is the problem of (4) inclusion: a means of inducing participation by a sufficiently 
large number of incumbent suppliers so that competition from non-participants does not 
undermine the profitability of the collusive agreement.  Lastly and relatedly, the incumbent firms 
must be protected by (5) entry barriers: there must not be so much competition from quickly 
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Some economists consider these requirements to be so daunting that cartels are either unable to 
form or quick to collapse, even in the absence of antitrust laws designed to stop collusion.  For 
example, when OPEC first arose, some confidently predicted its immediate demise.  However, 
the experience with OPEC and empirical evidence on price-fixing more broadly does not support 
this optimistic view.  For example, in the past decade, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice has broken up many large, international cartels that had operated for years 
(despite the fact that they were illegal under the antitrust laws) and successfully reaped hundreds 
of millions if not billions of dollars in profits.
39  For recent extensive surveys of the evidence of 
collusive activity, see Connor (2007), Harrington (2006b), and Levenstein and Suslow (2006).  
Whinston (2006, pp. 26-38) offers a more selective discussion of the empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of price-fixing conspiracies. 
2.  Repeated Oligopoly Games and the Folk Theorem 
The basic theoretical framework used to evaluate the presence, absence, or efficacy of collusion 
is that of dynamic or repeated oligopoly, that is, situations in which an identifiable group of 
suppliers offering substitute products interact over time.
40  This framework includes infinitely 
repeated oligopoly games, so-called supergames.  Cartel theory requires dynamic analysis 
because the central elements of detection and punishment inherently take place over time.  
One of the central findings in the theory of oligopoly supergames is that there are many—indeed, 
infinitely many—noncooperative equilibrium outcomes, including outcomes that maximize the 
joint profits of the oligopolists, even if one restricts attention to subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibria.
41  To give a flavor for why there are so many equilibria in supergames, consider a 
game in which each of N firms, selling the same homogeneous good and incurring a constant 
cost per unit of C, sets its price every period.  Suppose that the stage game is a classic Bertrand 
pricing game, so the firm with the lowest price in a given period serves the entire market that 
period, and if multiple firms charge the same lowest price output is shared equally among them.  
(One can also think of the firms bidding each period to serve the single large customer who buys 
that period.)  For the moment, suppose also that, as soon as a given period ends, each firm 
immediately observes all the prices charged by the other firms during that period. 
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fixing of DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory).  See “Samsung Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty, Serve Jail 
Time, for Participating in DRAM Price-Fixing Conspiracy,” 
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40 There is a very large literature on oligopoly theory and supergames.  Since our focus in on antitrust, we will draw 
on this literature but not review it in any systematic way.  See Shapiro (1989) for a survey of oligopoly theory.  
Ivaldi, et. al. (2003a), Motta (2004, ch. 4),  and Whinston (2006, ch. 2) provide recent discussions of the application 
of oligopoly theory to collusion cases in antitrust. 
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In this simple repeated Bertrand game, the competitive outcome, by which we mean the Nash 
equilibrium in the one-shot (stage) game, involves each firm setting its price equal to cost, C, 
each period.  This would be the only noncooperative equilibrium outcome if this pricing game 
were played only a single time, or indeed any finite number of times (a familiar consequence of 
backward induction).  However, if the game continues indefinitely, it is easy to construct a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the price each period is PC > , for many different values 
of P ranging from the competitive price all the way up to the monopoly price (or, in fact, higher).  
The trick is to postulate that, should any firm ever charge below P, all the other firms will set a 
price of C in all subsequent periods.  This punishment strategy thus entails reversion to the one-
shot Nash equilibrium.  Because this behavior supports an equilibrium price of P every period, 
the equilibrium profit of each firm is  ( )/ PN π  each period, where  ( ) P π  denotes the profits 
earned by a firm setting price P and serving the entire market.  Adding up over all periods and 
discounting using the one-period discount factor δ , the equilibrium profits of each firm are 
() / ( 1 ) PN π δ − .  In contrast, in any given period a single firm could defect by slightly 
discounting its price, thereby capturing the entire market that period.  This would, by hypothesis, 
condemn all of the firms—importantly, including itself—to the competitive outcome for all 
future time.  The payoff to this defecting firm is  () P π  in the current period and zero in all 
subsequent periods.  Defecting is therefore unattractive if and only if  () / ( 1 ) () PN P π δπ −> , 
that is, if and only if  11 / N δ >− .  If the periods are sufficiently short, that is, if price cuts are 
detected rapidly enough, then δ  is close to unity and this condition is met, even when N is large. 
The frequency of sales, and hence the speed of detection, is implicitly built into this simple 
model.  As expected, the faster that rivals can learn of one firm’s defection and respond by 
reducing their own prices, the easier it is to sustain collusion.  Formally, the model assumes that 
price cuts are observed after one period, but the length of time comprising one period has not 
been specified.  If one period takes time T, and if the interest rate per unit time is r, then the 
discount factor is 
rT e δ
− = .  Therefore, a longer detection lag corresponds to a lower discount 
factor, making it less likely that collusion will be sustainable, ceteris paribus. 
This highly simplified example illustrates that there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in 
which all the firms charge the same price, P, repeatedly, for any PC > , as long as detection is 
sufficiently rapid.  For example, if the length of a period is one month, and we imagine that the 
interest rate is around 1% per month, then the discount factor δ  is roughly 0.99, so the 
monopoly price can be sustained as a perfect equilibrium in the repeated oligopoly game as long 
as the number of firms is less than one hundred. 
While the specific calculations here depend upon the particular oligopoly game being played 
each period, the basic idea—that there exist perfect equilibria with high (well above competitive) 
prices even with many firms for plausible discount factors—is by no means specific to this 
example.  Consider, for example, Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous product.  On one hand, 
a firm that defects cannot gain nearly as much as in the Bertrand game.  (The ratio of profits 
from defecting to the per-period profits from following the equilibrium strategy depends upon 
the shape of the demand curve.)  On the other hand, reverting to the static Cournot equilibrium is 
not as severe a punishment as reverting to the static Bertrand equilibrium.  Shapiro (1989) shows 
that, with  0.99 δ = , the monopoly price can be sustained in a repeated Cournot oligopoly with 
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Furthermore—one might say “worse yet”—this example is hardly anomalous.  To the contrary, 
the “folk theorem” for repeated games tells us that, quite generally, there exists a plethora of 
equilibria in repeated games, including equilibria that correspond to full cooperation (the profit 
maximizing cartel outcome), as long as the players are sufficiently patient, that is, if the discount 
factor is sufficiently close to unity.  Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) provide general conditions 
under which any feasible and individually rational payoff vector in the stage game can be 
achieved as a perfect equilibrium in the repeated game if players are sufficiently patient.
42  
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) extend this result to games in which the players do not 
observe each others’ actions but only a public outcome (such as price) that signals those actions. 
These “folk theorems” pose two related and fundamental challenges for the analysis of 
oligopoly.  First, these strong results do not comport with the observation that rivals often 
compete rather than cooperate and in particular with the prevailing view that collusion is difficult 
if the number of firms is moderately large—a view that Farrell (2000) calls the “structural 
consensus.”  Clearly, some important things are missing in models of repeated oligopoly that 
predict collusive outcomes for a very wide range of market structures and industry conditions.  
Put simply, supergame theory, at least with sufficiently patient players and without further 
modifications, is of limited use because it proves far too much.  The economics literature has 
responded to this criticism by probing the assumptions underlying the folk theorem and by 
exploring equilibrium outcomes when the relevant discount factor is not very close to unity, that 
is, when the players are not “sufficiently patient.”  In particular, a large literature, some of which 
we examine in section C, explores the conditions that make it more or less difficult to support 
collusive outcomes in repeated oligopoly. 
Second, and of particular relevance to antitrust law, there is no explicit role for communications 
in the basic models of repeated games, so these models do not help us understand the impact of 
meetings and other communications among oligopolists.  Some research, however, does explore  
aspects of this limitation, as we consider next. 
3.  Role of Communications 
One of the specific shortcomings of standard models of oligopolistic supergames is that they do 
not help us understand how the firms initially determine which of the plethora of equilibria to 
play.  One interpretation of these games is that the firms engage in extensive communications 
and perhaps negotiations before the game begins, in order to agree upon the equilibrium that they 
will play.  Under this interpretation, the equilibria in oligopolistic supergames represent self-
enforcing outcomes that can arise once an agreement is reached.  The alternative explanation of 
the observed conduct is that the firms somehow find their way to a relatively collusive outcome 
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Nash equilibrium.  In the simple repeated Bertrand game, no punishment can be stronger than reversion to the one-
shot Bertrand equilibrium, since it involves zero profits, which by definition is the level of profits a firm can obtain 
by exiting.  For the repeated Cournot game, however, stronger punishments are possible by targeting the defecting 
firm and punishing again a firm that refuses to go along properly with its own punishment.  When available, these 
stronger punishments make it possible to sustain the monopoly price even if the firms are somewhat less patient. Antitrust, Page 30 
without engaging in any communications, other than through their actions in the market, such as 
their setting of prices. 
Ambiguity about the role of communications is inherent in the standard solution concept of Nash 
equilibrium (and thus perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium).  When the 
strategies are highly complex, and especially when there are multiple equilibria, the perfect 
equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium) methodology does not explain how the firms were able to 
coordinate to select an equilibrium.  Yet common sense indicates that communications can play a 
role in such coordination, and complex strategies supporting a collusive outcome would seem to 
constitute evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the firms in fact met and reached some sort of 
agreement at some point in time. 
The literature on “cheap talk” asks whether communications affect the equilibrium outcome in a 
game-theoretic setting.  Farrell and Rabin (1996) provide an excellent overview of this 
literature.
43  In general, cheap talk, that is, communications that do not directly affect payoffs, 
can affect equilibrium outcomes.
44  Farrell and Rabin give the example of one Cournot duopolist 
telling another:  “You cut your output and I’ll cut mine.”  While this might be a trick—the 
speaker gains if the listener cuts output, whether or not the speaker does so—this also might be 
an effective way of initiating output reductions that sustain collusion in repeated play.  In the 
end, Farrell and Rabin conclude that cheap talk about intended play can make a big difference 
when the players’ interests are well aligned, but the gains available from coordination can easily 
be lost due to dispute and bargaining problems. 
A different strand of the literature studies the role of communications to convey private 
information.  Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2004) permit the firms to communicate about private 
cost information in a repeated pricing game.  Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima 
(1998) study communications when firms observe private but imperfect signals about past play.  
Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) study a model with private cost shocks and publicly 
observed prices. 
Facing the rather ambiguous theoretical results in the “cheap talk” literature reported by Farrell 
and Rabin (1996), economists have conducted experiments to learn how communications affect 
the strategies adopted by players.  This literature is surveyed by Crawford (1998).  As an early 
example, Cooper et. al. (1989) find that communications in the “battle of the sexes game,” where 
the players can gain from cooperation but do not agree about which outcome is best, greatly 
increase the chance that the players will successfully coordinate.  Kuhn (2001) discusses the 
antitrust implications of this experimental literature, emphasizing the role of communications in 
achieving coordination by reducing uncertainty about what other firms will do. 
                                                 
43 Much earlier, Schelling (1960) recognized the importance of communications and discussed the role of “focal 
points” in coordinating outcomes in strategic situations. 
44 Communications also may have no effect.  There always exists a “babbling” equilibrium in which players ignore 
the statements made by others.  As emphasized by Farrell and Rabin (1996), however, many of these equilibria are 
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The critical role of communications in sustaining collusion is revealed in the fascinating study by 
Genesove and Mullin (2001) of the Sugar Institute, a trade association that operated from 1927 to 
1936.  They examine in detail how sugar refiners established a set of rules to facilitate collusion.  
The Sugar Institute experience shows how weekly meetings among sugar refiners were used to 
establish and interpret rules that enforced business practices making price-cutting more 
transparent.  In contrast to the theories described above, which involve no cheating in 
equilibrium, cheating did occur, but retaliation was carefully limited.  This example illustrates a 
number of functions served by regular communications, functions that could not be served 
simply by initial communications.  Related lessons can be found in Harrington (2006b), who 
reports on some twenty European Commission cartel cases from 2000 to 2004. 
C. Industry Conditions Bearing on the Likelihood of Collusive Outcomes 
As noted, to get beyond the folk theorem, the theoretical literature on oligopoly has extensively 
explored the conditions under which the joint profit-maximizing outcome can be achieved as a 
perfect equilibrium in a repeated oligopoly game when the discount factor is not close to unity.  
One way this question is posed is to ask how various factors affect the critical discount factor, 
* δ , such that the fully collusive outcome can be supported as a perfect equilibrium for  * δ δ ≥ .
45  
While a survey of the enormous literature on oligopoly theory is well beyond the scope of this 
chapter, we mention here selected results that are especially relevant to antitrust.  We also 
examine a number of other factors, not strictly part of the standard oligopoly supergame 
framework, that bear on the feasibility of collusion.  
In the first three subsections, we relax several extreme and unrealistic assumptions made in the 
simple model used above.  First, the simple model assumed that a defecting firm could capture 
the entire market with even a slight price cut.  Second, it assumed that even a tiny price cut 
would surely be observed by the rivals.  Third, it assumed that even the slightest defection would 
be punished severely, with all firms pricing at marginal cost in perpetuity, leading to zero profits 
for all firms.  We then consider a variety of other factors that make it more or less difficult for 
collusive outcomes to be sustained as perfect equilibria in repeated oligopoly. 
1.  Limited Growth for Defecting Firm 
There are many reasons why a firm that defects from collusive prices may not be able to capture 
the entire market, including upward sloping marginal cost (in the limit, capacity constraints), 
customer loyalty, customer switching costs, and product differentiation.  Clearly, if the gains 
from defection are limited, collusion will be easier to sustain, ceteris paribus.   
To illustrate this idea in the simple model introduced above, suppose that capacity constraints 
only permit a single firm to grow its sales by a factor 1 g +  in a single period.
46  In the simple 
model above, 1 gN += , but if a firm can only, say, double in size in one period, then  1 g = .  For 
                                                 
45 Ivaldi et. al. (2003a) take this approach in their accessible and informative overview paper. 
46 A fully specified model would relate this growth limit to underlying economic variables, such as capacity or the 
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now, we retain the assumption that all price cuts are detected by rivals and punished strongly, 
leading to zero future profits for the defecting firm.  With these assumptions, optimal defection 
involves a tiny price cut and yields profits of  ( )(1 )/ Pg N π + .  As a result, charging the collusive 






.  The smaller is g, the smaller is  * δ , indicating that 
collusion is easier to sustain.  For example, if  1 g = , then  *0 . 5 δ = , compared with  *0 . 9 δ =  in 
the case where  10 N =  and a defecting firm could capture the entire market.  However, the 
*0 . 5 δ =  calculation makes the assumption that a tiny price cut by one of ten firms, doubling its 
market share from 10% to 20%, would surely be observable to all of the other firms. 
2.  Imperfect Detection 
As emphasized by Stigler (1964), Green and Porter (1984), and much of the subsequent 
literature, when one firm cuts its price, its rivals may not be able to observe the price cut.  
Imperfect detection unquestionably makes it more difficult to sustain collusive outcomes.  In 
fact, collusion cases in antitrust law frequently revolve around whether the firms have sufficient 
ability accurately to observe price cuts so as to enforce a collusive outcome.  Additionally, many 
of the factors considered in subsequent subsections take on importance because they affect the 
ability of the firms to detect and punish those who defect from the collusive arrangement.  
To illustrate the fundamental importance of detection, consider how the calculus of defection 
changes if there is an exogenous probability, θ , that the price cut is observed by rivals.
47  
Retaining our assumption that a single firm can only grow its sales by a factor 1 g +  in a single 
period, the payoff from cutting price for a single period is 
() ()



























.  This 
expression captures a basic tradeoff: collusion cannot be sustained if detection is very unlikely 
(low values of θ ), especially if a firm can grow rapidly before detection would take place (large 
values of g).  With  1 g =  and  0.25 θ = ,  *0 . 8 δ = , far higher than  *0 . 5 δ =  when  1 θ = . 
Stigler (1964) emphasizes the role of  price transparency and secret price cutting.  Spence (1978) 
argues that uncertainty about demand conditions makes it more difficult for suppliers to 
distinguish shifts in demand from defections by their rivals, and thus makes collusive outcomes 
more difficult to sustain.  Green and Porter (1984) derive trigger strategies when prices are only 
observed with noise, in which case there is a tradeoff: entering the punishment phase more 
readily provides a stronger deterrent but can lead to price wars even when no firm has defected.  
Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) study a model in which sustaining collusion in the presence of 
                                                 
47 Immediately below, we explain how the analysis changes if the probability of detection is a function of the price 
charged by the price-cutting firm. 
48 This expression assumes, as above, that the firm earns zero profits in the future if its price cut is detected, but also 
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demand uncertainty requires asymmetric punishments if the firms observe each other’s outputs 
but not their prices. 
In the defection calculations presented so far, there was no reason for a defecting firm to cut its 
price by more than a small amount since deeper price cuts were not needed for that firm to sell 
either to the entire market (in our initial model) or to as many customers as the firm can serve 
given its capacity (in the modified model).  The defection calculations are more complex if the 
firm-specific demand curve is such that a defecting firm’s profits are decreasing at the collusive 
price, in which case the firm’s immediate profits would be higher with a discrete rather than 
incremental price cut.  This variation alone could easily be accommodated using standard pricing 
theory: the defecting firm would maximize its immediate profits by pricing at the point where 
marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal. 
The analysis becomes more complex, and more interesting, however, if we combine this idea 
with imperfect detection.  More specifically, suppose that deeper price cuts are more likely to be 
detected by rivals.  Then optimal defection involves a tradeoff: lower prices lead to higher profits 
in the immediate term but a higher probability of detection.  The lesson is that the sustainability 
of collusion may depend in a complex way on the interaction between the ability of a defecting 
firm to gain customers in the short run and the ability of that firm’s rivals to detect that the firm 
has departed from collusive behavior. 
3.  Credibility of Punishment 
The simple model effectively assumed that it was credible for the oligopolists, as a group, to 
punish any defection by reverting in perpetuity to the “competitive” outcome, defined as the one-
shot equilibrium.  In the case of a pricing game with homogeneous products, this implied zero 
profits for all of the firms.  Clearly, this is an extreme assumption, one that seems to dismiss the 
temptation of the firms to relent on their punishments and “try again” to achieve a more 
profitable collusive outcome. 
To explore the role of the punishment strategies, consider first the importance of the magnitude 
of punishment.  Suppose that, after one firm defects, instead of prices forever after being set at 
cost, the other firms respond by merely matching the initial price cut.  With this assumption, a 
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from maintaining the collusive price.  But profits 
from defection will indeed exceed the profits from continued collusion for values of  cut P  near P 
since cutting price increases the first term by a factor of N and has an effect on the second term 
that vanishes as  cut PP → .  After all, the full benefit of defection—capturing the entire monopoly 
profit—is obtained with a small price cut in the period of defection, and the future punishment is 
negligible since the price only declines very slightly from the initially collusive price.  This 
analysis illustrates that threats to merely match price cuts are insufficient to maintain collusion. 
Second, consider whether the punishment of cutting price to cost in all future periods is credible.  
One might think that it is because the strategy consists of playing the stage-game Nash Antitrust, Page 34 
equilibrium over and over again, and by construction no single firm would find it optimal to 
depart from such conduct, given the behavior of the other firms.  However, there is something 
fishy about strategies that call for smooth initial coordination followed by a perpetual price war 
if any one firm departs from the agreed-upon price, however brief the period of time.  In 
particular, would the firms not be tempted to relent on the price war at some point and return to 
cooperation?  The tension arises because the logic of perfect equilibrium does not consider 
collective departures from the punishment regime.  But ruling out collective departures is hard to 
defend in a theory that postulates from the outset that the firms can find a way to coordinate to 
select an equilibrium that is mutually beneficial. 
One simple but ad hoc way of dealing with this point is to limit the duration of punishments that 
are allowed after one firm defects by cutting its price below the initially specified level.  In the 
simple supergame above, suppose then that punishments are limited to K periods.  With this 
limitation, the payoff to a single firm from defecting is equal to 
1 () () / ( 1 )
K PP N π δπ δ
+ + − , 
where the first term represents the profits during the period when the firm defects and captures 
the entire market and the second term measures the profits this firm earns once the collusive 
outcome is restored after K periods of punishment (during which no profits are earned).  For 
collusion to be sustainable, this expression must be no larger than the profits from indefinitely 
charging the collusive price, P, which as before equal  ( )/ (1 ) PN π δ − .  Continuing to use 
0.99 δ = , for moderate values of K, this condition implies that collusion lasting K periods is 
sustainable with up to roughly  NK ≈ firms.
49  So, if we think of one period as corresponding to 
one month and if we believe that the firms can credibly enter into a price war for one year 
following a defection, collusion is sustainable so long as there are no more than twelve firms. 
A much deeper, but far more complex, way of addressing the credibility of punishments can be 
found in Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Farrell and Maskin (1989).  These papers have proposed 
refinements of the perfect-equilibrium solution concept that rule out continuation play, including 
punishment strategies, that is not collectively credible.  At the very least, a perfect equilibrium is 
rejected if the continuation play in any subgame is Pareto dominated by the continuation play in 
any other subgame.  Using the terminology from Farrell and Maskin, who study two-person 
games, an equilibrium that does not contain one subgame that is Pareto dominated by another 
subgame is called “weakly renegotiation proof” (WRP), a refinement of the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium concept.  In the example above, the continuation game after one firm defected 
involved all firms pricing at cost forever.  In this subgame, all firms earn a continuation payoff of 
zero.  This subgame is thus Pareto dominated by the subgame consisting of the game itself, in 
which each firm earns a payoff of  () / ( 1 ) PN π δ − .  Therefore, the perfect equilibrium used 
above to support the monopoly price is not weakly renegotiation proof, even though it is 
                                                 
49 Defection is unattractive so long as 
1 () () / ( 1 ) () / ( 1 )
K PP N P N π δπ δ π δ
+ + −< − which is equivalent to 
1 (1 ) 1
K N δδ
+ −+ < .  For values of δ near one,  1( 1 )
K K δ δ ≈ −− , so this expression is approximately 
(1 ) 1 ( 1)(1 ) 1 NK δ δ −+ − + −< , which can be written as  1 NK − < .  Intuitively, defecting gives the firm an 
extra  1 N −  times its profits right away, which is balanced against the loss of those profits for K periods.  For 
0.99 δ =  and moderate values of K, a good approximation for the maximum number of firms is  NK ≈ . Antitrust, Page 35 
subgame perfect.  All of the firms would prefer to resume cooperating rather than carry out the 
punishment. 
Farrell and Maskin (1989) show that the WRP condition, when applied to repeated-duopoly 
Bertrand and Cournot games, rules out highly asymmetric equilibria, even if the discount factor 
is close to unity.  However, the WRP condition does not rule out many equilibria involving the 
monopoly price, including the symmetric equilibrium in which the two firms split the monopoly 
profits.  If asymmetric punishments are specified that favor one firm, that firm will block 
renegotiations, which WRP required to be a Pareto improvement.  Therefore, the WRP concept 
alone does not successfully resolve the paradox associated with the folk theorem as applied to 
oligopolies.  Farrell (2000) suggests a further refinement, which he calls quasi-symmetric WRP, 
motivated by the notion that all innocent firms will be treated symmetrically.  This concept 
requires that all innocent firms prefer to carry through with the punishment of a defecting firm 
rather than revert back to the original equilibrium strategies.  Farrell shows that monopoly prices 
cannot be supported, regardless of the discount factor  1 δ < , for moderate numbers of firms in 
Bertrand or Cournot oligopoly, if this condition must be satisfied.  This approach is promising, 
but relies on the assumption that the firms would find it difficult to establish punishments that 
treat innocent firms asymmetrically.  Further work is required before these promising ideas can 
be put to practical use to help identify industry conditions under which collusion is most likely to 
be effective while accounting for the collective credibility of responses to defections.
50 
4.  Market Structure 
We now consider a series of factors relating to market structure that affect the incentive and 
ability of oligopolistic suppliers to sustain a collusive outcome in repeated play. 
a)  Market Concentration 
Collusive outcomes are less likely to occur in industries with more firms because greater 
numbers make it more difficult to satisfy the first four conditions necessary for successful 
collusion.  Reaching consensus is harder with more parties involved.  Detection is more difficult 
since price cutting by one small firm may be very difficult for some or all of the other firms to 
discern.  Punishment is less likely to be effective for two reasons.  First, a defecting firm is 
harder to deter because it has more to gain from cheating: its market-share gain during the period 
of initial defection is likely to be greater, and its loss from punishment smaller, the more firms 
were sharing in the collusive profits.  Second, punishment may be more difficult to coordinate 
because of the free-rider problem.  Inclusion is also harder due to free-rider problems, as each 
                                                 
50 McCutchen (1997) even suggests that the Sherman Act may help firms collude, stating (p. 348): “Government 
policies that are designed to stop price fixing may benefit firms by making it worthwhile for them to meet to set up 
collusive agreements, while making it costly enough for them to avoid undesirable future negotiations.”  However, 
this view is not supported by the Sugar Institute case reported in Genesove and Mullin (2001).  In any event,  
evidence from the past decade shows clearly that large fines and treble damage awards in price fixing cases can and 
do impose substantial penalties on firms engaged in price-fixing, not the weaker sanctions necessary for 
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individual firm may believe that the others will coordinate, whether or not it participates.
51  For 
precisely these reasons, one of the concerns underlying merger enforcement policy is that 
mergers between rivals that increase concentration can raise the likelihood that the remaining 
firms will coordinate after the merger. 
Our simple supergame model with homogeneous goods and repeated price competition 
illustrates how symmetric collusive outcomes are more difficult to sustain when the number of 
suppliers is larger.  We showed above that the monopoly price could be supported in a perfect 
equilibrium if and only if  *11 / N δ δ >= − .  The larger the number of firms, the larger is  * δ , 
meaning that the firms must be more patient to sustain the collusive outcome. 
Asymmetries in market shares tend to make it more difficult to sustain collusion.  For illustrative 
purposes, suppose that firm i has a market share of  i s .
52  The condition for this firm to cooperate 
rather than defect is  ( )/(1 ) ( ) i sP P π δπ −> , which can be written as  1 i s δ >− .  This condition 
will be most difficult to meet for the firm with the smallest market share, since this firm has the 
greatest temptation to gain share before the other firms can respond and also the least profits to 
lose from punishment that renders all firms’ profits equal to zero.
53  Defining  min s  as the market 
share of the smallest firm, we get  min *1 11 / sN δ = −> −, so the firms must be more patient to 
sustain the collusive outcome.
54  The smallest firm plays the role of the maverick, that is, the 
firm most prone to defection from the collusive outcome. 
While instructive, this simple model is unable to capture the other factors noted above, which 
tend to be even more important in practice.  Of particular note is the temptation of one relatively 
small firm to decline to participate in the collusive arrangement or secretly to cut prices to serve, 
say 4% rather than 2% of the market.  As long as price cuts by a small firm are less likely to be 
accurately observed or inferred by the other firms than are price cuts by larger firms, the 
presence of small firms that are capable of expanding is especially disruptive to effective 
collusion. 
                                                 
51 This point assumes that due to capacity limits, rising marginal cost, or other factors that some degree of collusion 
is possible even if some firms do not participate. 
52 The analysis here is incomplete because it does not explain the underlying sources of the differences in market 
shares.  We address that below when we consider cost asymmetries among the firms. 
53 The analysis assumes that the smallest firm is nevertheless able to capture the market; if, however, capacities are 
proportional to existing shares, the conclusion may not follow. 
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b)  Cost Asymmetries 
The calculation just given with  min s  is incomplete because it does not explain why the firms have 
different market shares.  A common explanation is cost asymmetries, and these also make it 
more difficult for firms to sustain collusive outcomes.
55 
Reaching consensus is clearly more difficult with cost asymmetries since there is less likely to be 
a focal point for pricing and since the firms may well disagree about the price they would like to 
see prevail.  Furthermore, if collusion is to maximize potential industry profits, production 
efficiency requires that the low-cost firms be allocated a greater share of sales, but this may 
require contentious negotiations and/or side payments, thereby limiting somewhat the potential 
gains from collusion.  These problems are exacerbated if cost information is private, since each 
firm may have an incentive to represent to the others that its costs are low in order to receive a 
higher allocation of output or other more favorable treatment.
56 
The conventional wisdom states that enforcement of the collusive outcome is also more difficult 
with cost asymmetries.  For example, Ivaldi et al. (2003) argue that cost asymmetries hinder 
collusion, stating (p. 36): “even if firms agree on a given collusive price, low-cost firms will 
again be more difficult to discipline, both because they might gain more from undercutting their 
rivals and because they have less to fear from a possible retaliation from high-cost firms.”  Ivaldi 
et al. show in a simple duopoly example that a higher  * δ  applies to the lower-cost firm than to 
the higher-cost firm, if the firms divide the market equally, because the lower-cost firm earns 
positive profits in the punishment phase.  Assigning a larger share of the market to the lower-cost 
firm is one way to overcome this obstacle and restore the collusive outcome.  However, 
allocating a lower share to the higher-cost firm necessarily makes it more attractive for that firm 
to deviate from collusion.  Colluding firms thus face a tradeoff: lower-cost firms can be assigned 
larger market shares, which reduces their incentive to defect, but doing this increases the 
incentive of the higher-cost firms to defect. 
These issues are explored in greater detail in Vasconcelos (2005), who studies repeated quantity 
competition among firms with heterogeneous quadratic cost functions, where firms differ in their 
ownership of an underlying asset that lowers the cost function.
57  He shows that, in the optimal 
collusive equilibrium, output is shifted away from the less efficient firms and towards the more 
efficient firms.  In this equilibrium, the less efficient, smaller firms have the greatest incentive to 
depart from the collusive outcome, while the more efficient, larger firms have the greatest 
incentive to depart from the punishments specified by the equilibrium strategies.  His results are 
relevant for the analysis of horizontal mergers since he shows how a merger affects the scope for 
collusion by changing not only the number of firms but also the distribution of holdings of the 
underlying asset and thus the distribution of costs among the firms.   
                                                 
55 See Mason, Phillips, and Nowell (1992) for experimental results showing that cooperation is more likely in a 
duopoly if the firms have symmetric costs. 
56 Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2004) study repeated oligopoly with private cost information.  
57 See also Rothschild (1999). Antitrust, Page 38 
Firms also may differ in their cost of capital and hence in the discount rate they use to compare 
current and future profits.  A firm that is under financial pressure, for example, may have a high 
discount rate (low discount factor) and be especially tempted to defect.  Harrington (1989) 
studied collusion among firms with different discount factors, showing again how market shares 
must be allocated to support a collusive outcome.  As another example, a firm may believe it 
“deserves” a greater market share than it has historically enjoyed, perhaps because it believes it 
would greatly increase its market share under competitive conditions.  Such maverick firms may 
be especially disruptive to collusive pricing. 
c)  Buyer Concentration and Auction Markets 
Collusion is generally thought to be more difficult to sustain in markets where the buying side is 
highly concentrated.  Apart from the fact that larger buyers may have a more credible threat to 
vertically integrate upstream than smaller buyers, buyers who purchase a large share of the 
output of the colluding firms can act strategically and internalize many of the benefits of 
disrupting collusion.  For example, Snyder (1996) shows how a large buyer can strategically 
accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders to create a bulge in demand that can undermine or 
destabilize collusion.  More generally, a large buyer can strategically create variations in demand 
over time.  For example, by curtailing purchases in one period, the buyer may lead some or all of 
the suppliers to suspect that others have cheated on the pricing agreement. 
Additional strategies are available for a buyer who is setting up the rules by which the suppliers 
will bid for business.  Klemperer (2002) reports enormous variations in the prices received in 
auctions of third-generation mobile telephone licenses across different European countries, 
arguing that some auction designs facilitated collusion and thus led to far lower prices being paid 
for these licenses than was paid for other, comparable licenses.  Marshall and Meurer (2004) 
discuss some of the unique issues that arise when considering collusion in a bidding context, 
including a discussion of spectrum and timber auctions, arguing that collusion is much more 
difficult in sealed-bid, first-price auctions than in oral ascending-bid auctions, a point proven 
more formally in Robinson (1985). 
d)  Collective Market Power Including Entry Barriers 
If the firms have little collective market power, so they collectively face rather elastic demand 
for their products, their incentive to collude is correspondingly low.  Collective market power 
may be small because the colluding firms are just a subset of the incumbent suppliers, because of 
low barriers to entry into the sale of the products the firms offer, or because the products they 
sell face competition from close substitutes sold by other firms.  The smaller is the collective 
market power of the firms that are allegedly colluding, the closer will be the firms’ price to the 
competitive price, and the smaller the damages imposed on consumers by effective collusion. 
e)  Multi-Market Contact 
Multi-market contact refers to situations where firms interact in more than one market at the 
same time.  Much of the literature suggests that multi-market interaction tends to make it easier 
for the firms to sustain collusion. The standard reference here is Bernheim and Whinston (1990).  
Bernheim and Whinston first prove an irrelevance result: when identical firms with constant Antitrust, Page 39 
marginal cost meet in identical markets, multi-market contact does not aid in sustaining 
collusion.  While defection in one market can be punished in other markets, a firm can simply 
defect in all markets simultaneously.  However, Bernheim and Whinston go on to show how 
multi-market contact can sustain collusion in many other settings.  For example, multi-market 
contact can mute market level asymmetries, for example, if each firm has a major competitive 
advantage in one market (which could include one geographic area of a single product market).  
Suppose, for example, that Firm A is the leader in Market A and Firm B is the leader in Market 
B, but both firms compete in both markets.  Firm A will be especially tempted to defect in 
Market B, where Firm A has a smaller share, but may be deterred if Firm B would respond in 
Market A.  Mutual forbearance may well result.  Furthermore, multi-market contact increases the 
frequency of interaction, permitting one firm to discipline another more rapidly than would 
otherwise be possible. 
There is some evidence to support the proposition that multi-market contact makes it easier for 
firms to sustain collusive outcomes.  In the airline industry, Evans and Kessides (1994) find that 
fares are higher on routes for which the carriers interact on multiple routes.  In the mobile 
telephone industry, Parker and Röller (1997) find higher prices in markets where carriers have 
multi-market contact.  Cramton and Schwartz (2000) look at signaling to support collusion in 
FCC spectrum auctions, where multiple auctions for licenses were conducted simultaneously. 
The value of multi-market contact in sustaining collusive outcomes is less clear, however, once 
one accounts for the noisiness of the signals that the firms receive regarding possible defections 
by others.  Green and Porter (1984) show that, with noisy signals, limited punishments are 
optimal; in their model, the firms revert to cooperation after a limited period of time.  With 
multi-market contact, spreading punishment across markets may simply not be desirable, just as 
engaging in a longer price war, while feasible, may not be optimal in the Green and Porter 
model.  After all, in models where punishments actually occur in equilibrium, stronger 
punishments are costly.  This important idea is absent from the many supergame models in 
which punishment never takes place in equilibrium.  Thus, in more realistic models in which 
defections and/or punishments actually occur, multi-market contact may have no effect on the 
ability of the firms to collude.  This view is supported by the Sugar Institute case described by 
Genesove and Mullin (2001); the Sugar Institute was very careful to calibrate punishments to the 
violation and certainly did not employ the maximum possible punishment.  Had they done so, the 
cartel would have collapsed early on.  In fact, the Sugar Institute steered away from multi-market 
linkages, carefully limiting punishment to the same geographic region where the violation 
occurred. 
5.  Product Differentiation 
The traditional view in antitrust circles has been that collusion is easier to sustain among firms 
selling homogeneous products rather than highly differentiated products.  Reaching consensus 
should be easier when agreement only requires that one price, not many, be established.  
However, there is no compelling theoretical reason to believe that detection and punishment are 
more difficult if the products are more differentiated.  On one hand, with highly differentiated 
products, a single firm that cuts its price is likely to gain relatively few sales, since many 
customers will still prefer the other brands.  Therefore, defecting is less attractive.  On the other 
hand, punishments are weaker, since price cuts by the other firms have a smaller effect on the Antitrust, Page 40 
profits of the defecting firm if products are highly differentiated.  Ross (1992) presents two 
models of oligopolistic supergames with differentiated products that capture these ambiguities. 
Another reason that collusion is more difficult to maintain when products are differentiated is 
that dimensions of competition other than price and cost cutting can take center stage.  Collusion 
along such dimensions as product design and marketing can be very difficult to establish and 
sustain.  Even if an initial agreement is reached, the most tempting way to defect from a 
collusive agreement may be to improve one’s product or to expand one’s marketing budget 
rather than to cut one’s price.  The firms may find it very difficult to restraint competition on 
marketing because of the difficulty in drawing the line between permissible and impermissible 
marketing activities.  Likewise, collusion on product design may be hard to sustain due to the 
difficulties of defining what types of product improvements are permissible and the fact that 
product improvements include an element of commitment, tempting firms to preempt their rivals 
to capture more market share on a sustained basis. 
6.  Capacity Constraints, Excess Capacity, and Investment in Capacity 
In many industries, certainly including traditional manufacturing, capacity constraints are an 
important aspect of the competitive environment.  In fact, capacity investment decisions can be 
the most important dimension along which competition occurs in the long run.  We now address 
capacity decisions and their interaction with pricing and output decisions.  We begin with a 
short-run analysis, which takes capacities as fixed, and then go on to the long-run analysis, which 
includes capacity investment decisions. 
a)  Collusion on Prices with Capacity Constraints 
We have already observed that collusion on prices is easier to sustain if any single firm could 
only gain limited sales by cutting its price.  As we noted, one reason a firm may not be able to 
increase its sales much by cutting price is that the firm may face capacity constraints.
58  
Therefore, it would appear that collusion on prices is very easy to sustain if the firms all have 
little excess capacity. 
This argument, however, is seriously incomplete.  Most fundamentally, if all firms are producing 
at capacity, it is hard to say that they are effectively colluding on prices.  Full-fledged price 
competition could not cause prices to be lower than the level at which demand and supply would 
be equated given full capacity utilization.  Effective collusion on prices must, therefore, go hand-
in-hand with some degree of output restriction, that is, excess capacity.  With this clarification, 
one can ask how the presence of capacity constraints affects the analysis already provided in 
which such constraints were absent.  Put differently, does the presence of excess capacity make it 
easier or more difficult to sustain collusion? 
Following the literature, we frame this discussion in terms of firms that can produce at constant 
marginal cost up to some well-defined capacity level and not beyond that point (in the short run). 
More generally, one could study models in which each firm has a smoothly increasing marginal 
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cost curve.  The resulting analysis would be considerably more complex but lead to similar 
tradeoffs and conclusions. 
The effects of symmetric capacity constraints on collusion are theoretically ambiguous.  The 
greater is the excess capacity at each firm, the more each firm can gain by defecting.  However, 
by the same token, greater excess capacity means that the other firms can expand output more to 
punish the defecting firm.  In a price setting supergame with capacity constraints, Brock and 
Scheinkman (1985) show that collusion is more difficult to sustain in the presence of capacity 
constraints than in their complete absence, but the relationship between  * δ  and the per-firm 
excess capacity at the monopoly price is not monotonic.  Lambson (1987) generalizes these 
results to optimal cartel punishment strategies.  Abreu (1986) obtains similar results for repeated 
quantity-setting games with capacity constraints. 
Notwithstanding these theoretical ambiguities, in practice symmetric capacity constraints may 
well facilitate collusion, at least in comparison with a situation in which all firms can produce at 
constant marginal cost.  After all, a far greater percentage expansion of output is likely to be 
needed for a lone defecting firm fully to benefit from price cutting than is needed for all of the 
firms to meet the expanded demand at the lower competitive price (especially if N is not very 
small).  Plus, expansion for the latter purpose can take place over time. 
Asymmetries per se in capacity constraints are likely to hinder collusion.  More precisely, for a 
given level of total capacity, collusion is more difficult if capacity is distributed unevenly across 
the firms.  If one firm has greater excess capacity, that firm has a greater incentive than others to 
cut its price, and its rivals have less of an ability to discipline that firm.
59 
b)  Capacity Investment Decisions 
In the longer run, the firms can adjust their capacities.  One can think of these capacity choices 
much like quantity choices and thus interpret the results from quantity-setting supergames as 
applying to capacity choices over time.  This approach is most reasonable if capacities are 
relatively short-lived, so there is little commitment value associated with capacity, or if the 
market is growing, so that firms are routinely adding capacity.  With this interpretation, the 
discount factor reflects the time over which one firm can observe other firms’ capacity choices 
and respond with its own.  Since it takes longer to change capacity than to change price, the 
discount factor relevant for capacity decisions is lower than that for pricing decisions, making 
collusion on capacities more difficult to sustain, ceteris paribus.  On the other hand, the initial 
capacity expansion by the defecting firm can itself take time and may be difficult to hide, making 
it hard for one firm to gain much of an edge on its rivals before they are able to respond. 
However, treating capacity decisions just like output decisions may fail to reflect accurately 
some of their distinctive aspects: capacity investments tend to be lumpy and involve significant 
sunk costs.  The irreversible nature of capacity choices is emphasized by the literature on 
preemptive capacity investment, which predicts outcomes that are more competitive than the 
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static Cournot equilibrium.
60  The commitment aspect of building capacity tends to make 
collusion on capacity more difficult: after one firm adds capacity, it may not be credible for the 
other firms to add capacity as well, or not as much as would be needed to deter the initial 
expansion. 
Capacity choices can interact with pricing choices over time in complex ways.  Benoit and 
Krishna (1987) show that firms will choose to build and maintain excess capacity to support a 
collusive pricing outcome.  Davidson and Deneckere (1990) study a “semi-collusive” 
equilibrium in which the firms first pick capacities and then play a repeated pricing game, setting 
prices at the highest sustainable level. 
7.  Market Dynamics 
a)  Demand Growth, Demand Shocks, and Business Cycles 
In the simple models of repeated pricing competition, demand growth makes collusion easier 
because a defecting firm sacrifices more in future profits in exchange for a short-term increase in 
its market share.  Likewise, if demand is declining, defection is more tempting.  One can easily 
incorporate these ideas into the simple model presented above by adding a market growth factor. 
However, these results rely on several assumptions that may not be justified in the presence of 
market growth or decline.  First, they assume that defection today will forever disrupt collusion 
and lead to highly competitive outcomes in perpetuity.  We already observed that the firms will 
be tempted to renegotiate to avoid this unpleasant outcome.  The incentive to renegotiate is 
greater if the market is growing.  We have also emphasized that applying very strong 
punishments is not optimal in the presence of imperfect detection and that punishments 
proportional to the deviation are attractive.  The lack of proportionality between today’s 
defection and perpetual punishment is even greater in the presence of growing demand.  Second, 
the results ignore the possibility that growing demand will induce new firms to enter the market.  
The prospect of future entry makes it more tempting to defect in the present and less valuable to 
maintain cooperation among the current incumbents.  Third, the simple model of repeated price-
setting does not account for the fact that growing demand may tempt the firms to engage in 
preemptive capacity additions. 
The logic of collusion implies that the temptation to defect depends upon the relative size of 
current versus expected future demand.  This has implications for short-term demand shocks, 
which are distinct from secular growth or decline in demand.  Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
study a model in which demand shocks are independently and identically distributed, so demand 
today conveys no information about demand in the future.  A positive demand shock thus makes 
defection relatively more attractive.  This same logic can be applied to collusion over the 
business cycle.  Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) show that collusion is more likely to break 
down during the portion of the business cycle during which demand is declining.  Bagwell and 
Staiger (1997) generalize these results to a model in which demand alternatives stochastically 
between boom and recession phases.  Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994) apply some of these ideas 
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to the Joint Economic Committee, a railroad cartel from the 1880s.  In a nice empirical 
application, Borenstein and Shepard (1996) find that retail gasoline margins are higher when 
future demand is expected to be higher or future costs are expected to be lower.  Lastly, we stress 
that when demand is unpredictable, as in Green and Porter (1984), collusion is more difficult to 
sustain because the firms have greater difficulty distinguishing demand fluctuations from 
cheating on the collusive agreement. 
b)  Disruptive Innovation 
The more likely it is that the market will experience a disruptive innovation, the harder it is to 
sustain collusion.  To see this, suppose that each period there is some probability, ψ , that a 
major new technological innovation will be introduced into the market, disrupting the collusive 
agreement.  (A similar analysis applies to other factors that might disrupt the agreement.)  For 
example, a major innovation may disrupt the collusive agreement because it is introduced by a 
new entrant or because it introduces such a sharp asymmetry among the existing firms that 
cooperation is no longer sustainable.  Suppose that the innovation ends the profit flows for the 
incumbent suppliers.  Under these conditions, the payoff from defecting remains at  ( ) P π  but the 
payoff from cooperating is reduced because future profits must also be discounted by the 
probability that disruption occurs.  Formally, this is equivalent to changing the discount factor 
from δ  to  (1 ) δ ψ − , making collusion more difficult to sustain. 
c)  Switching Costs, Network Effects, and Learning by Doing 
Defection is more tempting if the defecting firm can gain a lasting advantage over its rivals, 
either in terms of market share or cost.  With consumer switching costs, at least some of the 
customers gained today from a price cut will remain in the future even if prices fall once the 
defection has been observed.  Capturing customers today has lasting value for the defecting firm: 
in models of competition with switching costs, a firm’s installed base is a valuable asset, even if 
the firms compete vigorously to gain new customers.  The logic here is similar to that of cutting 
price when customers’ demand is high: the defecting firm captures more sales by cutting its price 
today.  On the other hand, in the presence of customer switching costs it can be more difficult to 
attract customers in the first place. 
Collusion also can be difficult to sustain in the presence of strong network effects, at least if the 
firms sell incompatible products.  In the clearest case, where the market is bound to tip towards 
one product standard or another, collusion between incompatible products is difficult to maintain 
since the firm that is losing the standards battle may be very tempted to engage in price-cutting, 
or some other tactic, to avoid entering a downward spiral. 
A similar dynamic arises in the presence of learning by doing.  If learning is based on cumulative 
output, a firm that expands its production today will experience lower costs tomorrow, thereby 
gaining a lasting advantage.  Due to the commitment and preemption aspects of higher current 
production, a firm that is more aggressive today captures more profits in the future, making 
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D. Agreements under Antitrust Law 
1.  On the Meaning of Agreement 
As described briefly in Section A, there seems to be a contrast between the economic and legal 
approaches to the regulation of collusive behavior.  Under the economic approach, one first 
attempts to determine the existence of collusion and the magnitude of its effects and then 
considers which if any remedies is appropriate.  Under the legal approach taken by antitrust, the 
first step is the determination of whether there exists an agreement, and, if there is, certain legal 
sanctions apply: in the United States, these are treble damages to injured customers, criminal 
penalties on perpetrators including fines and imprisonment, and possibly injunctions against 
particular practices. 
The extent to which these approaches diverge depends importantly on the legal concept of 
agreement.  One standard definition—found in dictionaries and common usage in many 
contexts—is that an agreement signifies harmony of opinion or action.
61  Under that 
straightforward notion, collusion seems nearly synonymous with agreement.  Indeed, a typical 
dictionary definition of collusion is a secret agreement or cooperation, suggesting further that the 
terms have the same meaning.
62 
It seems, however, from legal materials—court opinions, agency pronouncements, and 
commentary—that the law’s notion of agreement is different, in particular, narrower.  
Nevertheless, it has remained somewhat mysterious just what more is required.  Return to the 
classic example of an undoubted agreement: the secret meeting in a smoke-filled room at which 
competing firms suggest prices to each other, settle on a particular price, and indicate their assent 
to adhere to that price.  Suppose we remove the smoke from the room, and then the room itself—
for example, the firms might use a conference call or e-mail (or, as in one antitrust case, entering 
fares and symbols on a common electronic airline reservation system).  Now, let us dispense 
with the secrecy: perhaps the firms might speak to each other through sequential press 
conferences.  At the conclusion of this sequence, we have a sort of behavior that is often 
observed and is generally considered to be legal (that is, not to constitute an agreement).  But 
why?  Which step has anything to do with whether or not the firms agreed to anything?
63  (As 
already mentioned, it is the economist’s term, collusion, not the legal term, agreement, that often 
denotes secrecy.) 
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As one reads legal statements on the subject, it appears that communication is central to the 
inquiry.  Again resorting to common definitions, communication refers to a process by which 
information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or 
behavior.  By that standard, press conferences surely involve communication.  So does virtually 
any other means of effective collusion. 
Consider another simple example.  In a somewhat remote area, there are two retail gasoline 
stations located on opposite corners of an intersection.  Each posts its price on huge signs readily 
visible from the road—and, of course, from the other station.  The competitive price is $2.00 and 
the monopoly price $3.00.  One can easily construct a sequence of interactions—wherein each 
station owner posts various prices, waits to see the other’s response, then adjusts his or her own 
price, and so forth.  We would predict that, even if neither benefited from a formal course in 
game theory, they might readily settle on a price near $3.00.  The time during which a defector 
could reap profits without response might be a matter of minutes, not months.  Hence, successful 
collusion seems quite likely. 
The legal question is whether the two owners have “agreed” to price at $3.00.  Suppose, as 
suggested, that the legal system gives content to the term agreement by asking whether the 
parties communicated with each other.  Well, they did not speak to each other; they may not 
even speak the same language.  However, in the relevant sense, they did speak to each other in a 
common language, that of price.  The absence of words may have slightly lengthened the time it 
took to settle (agree?) on the price of $3.00.  And, should one station cut its price to $2.90 (in the 
absence of any change in market conditions, such as a drop in the price of fuel from refineries), 
the other station owner’s quick response, cutting its price, say, to $2.80, will be pretty 
unambiguous; it will be understood as an invitation to raise prices, an invitation that would be 
accepted by posting a $3.00 price. 
Examples like these seem to suggest that there is little, if any, difference between the legal 
requirement of agreement and the economist’s notion of collusion.  Yet it also seems that few 
think that this is actually the case.  Surely, it is believed, the law requires more: more evidence of 
agreement, usually through more evidence of communications.
64  Yet, as should now be clear, it 
is hard to tell what more is being sought.  It seems that some different sort of evidence is 
required, but evidence of what? 
 Some legal utterances distinguish between “express” agreements and “tacit” agreements.  Tacit 
ordinarily means that the communication does not use words or speech (which, by contrast, is 
what is meant by express).  By that definition, the press conferences, being conducted using 
words, would constitute express rather than tacit agreements, but the gasoline station owners, 
using signs, would not be express agreements—unless, of course, one pointed out that a sign 
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showing “$3.00” is functionally equivalent to a sign showing “three dollars,” the latter, 
containing words rather than numerals, constituting an express rather than tacit communication.  
Likewise, one could consider sign language, other hand signals, winks and nods, and so forth.  
Indeed, it is hard to believe that a sensible legal regime would make legality—and heavy 
consequences—turn on subtleties of modes of expression and taxonomic disputes over which 
constitute “expressions” or “communications.”
65 
Official legal pronouncements, although sometimes seemingly clear, are not that helpful either.  
U.S. Supreme Court opinions include famous statements such as the following:
66 “‘[C]onscious 
parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.”
67  But this merely 
indicates that purely independent action—such as different gasoline stations raising their prices 
in parallel when the price of oil rises—does not constitute an agreement.  Or consider: “The 
essential combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of 
dealing or other circumstances as well as in an exchange of words. . . . [A conspiracy may be 
found where] the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or 
a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement. . . .”
68  This (partially question-begging) 
expression aligns substantially with the idea that successful collusion is sufficient.  More recently 
(and more commonly quoted in modern cases), the Supreme Court has stated that evidence must 
be presented “‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted 
independently. . . [that is,] that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing 
inference[] of independent action. . . .”
69  Here, the interpretation depends on the meaning of 
“independent.”  If taken to mean “without regard to others,” then collusive behavior is not 
independent action and thus is sufficient to trigger liability.  Yet another pronouncement (in a 
more recent case, but not one directly addressed to the agreement question) is that “[t]acit 
collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism [is] not in 
itself unlawful.”
70  Tacit collusion, however, is undefined and is not generally understood to be 
the same as conscious parallelism.  What all of these court decisions and most other statements 
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have in common is that key terms are not defined, the subject is not directly discussed in any 
depth (that is, for more than a paragraph), and no rationale is offered for deeming one set of 
scenarios to be legal and another illegal. 
A further important complication is that it is well accepted that, whatever is required to establish 
an agreement, it is allowable (and typical) for the demonstration to be indirect, through 
circumstantial evidence.  So-called “smoking guns” are not required.  For example, if the law 
demands proof of direct verbal communications on the specific price and pattern of punishment, 
it might be argued that near-simultaneous price increases, and then declines in response to 
defections, are evidence of such communications and hence sufficient to establish a violation.  
The implicit logic is, “How else could this behavior be explained?”  This perplexing question 
and some of the earlier discussions on the possible meanings of agreement require further 
attention to the role of communications in the economic theory of collusive behavior. 
2.  Agreement, Economics of Collusion, and Communications 
Suppose, as seems to be believed by most, that the legal requirement of an agreement is satisfied 
only by certain types of communication: perhaps verbal statements or close equivalents, 
sufficiently directed at competitors, that relate closely to pricing behavior, and that may be 
responded to reasonably promptly, precisely, and directly.  What, then, is the relationship 
between these more explicit sorts of communication and the economic theory of collusion? 
Reviewing the economic theory of collusion as summarized in Sections B and C, communication 
may be relevant at a number of points.  First, the nature of communications may bear on the ease 
of reaching consensus.  In the example with two gasoline stations, rather simple communications 
seem sufficient.  But if there are more firms, greater heterogeneity (in costs, products, or other 
features), more uncertainty about buyer behavior, or other complicating factors, greater 
negotiation may be required, which in turn might be facilitated by more explicit (direct, head-to-
head, simultaneous, prolonged) communications.  This view is not entirely obvious, however, for 
if all parties knew that they were limited to a few rounds of simple price suggestions, after which 
they must have reached agreement, it is possible that agreements would be reached more quickly 
and with greater likelihood (although they perhaps would also be less durable, due to 
misunderstandings).  While  this discussion is largely outside simple models of repeated 
oligopoly, which typically ask whether a price P can be sustained, these questions are addressed 
in the literature on “cheap talk,” cited above. 
Second, in the detection of cheaters, explicit, detailed communication might also be helpful.  If 
firm A’s cheating is noticed by firm B, firm B could tell others.  Compte (1998) and Kandori and 
Matsushima (1998) address this possibility in a model where firms observe and can 
communicate their private information about past play.  Alternatively, if other firms suspect that 
firm A is cheating, discussions with firm A (perhaps supported by firm A presenting original 
invoices or other information) might help clear up the matter, avoiding price wars due to 
mistaken inferences.  The Sugar Institute operated very much in this manner, as described by 
Genesove and Mullin (2001).  Oligopoly theory is slowly moving more in the direction of 
modeling these types of issues, at least by exploring the role of communications about private 
cost information.  See Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2004). Antitrust, Page 48 
Third, punishment might better be coordinated with more explicit communication.  Determining 
the magnitude of the price cut and its duration, perhaps focusing punishment when firms’ 
product lines and regions of operations vary, and other aspects of strategy might be worked out 
better.  As with reaching consensus, however, greater opportunity for detailed communication 
may be a double-edged sword.  As noted, the opportunity for renegotiation can also undermine 
punishment.  In any case, it is generally assumed in formal models that some particular 
punishment strategy has been chosen and will be pursued; the question explored is whether the 
strategy, if pursued, would deter cheating ex ante, or whether the strategy is credible, not what 
communications may be necessary to select or effectuate the strategy. 
Fourth, inclusion might be enhanced through detailed negotiations.  This consideration is based 
on similar reason to that of reaching consensus and is likewise outside standard formal analysis. 
In all, there are many reasons to believe—and it generally is believed—that greater opportunity 
for freer, more detailed, explicit communication tends to facilitate collusion (although there are 
some countervailing factors).  If this is indeed the case, it follows that it is more important to 
prohibit more explicit forms of communication.  Still, the question remains, why not prohibit all 
communication?  The answer must be that various forms of communication—such as making 
price information available to customers—serve other, legitimate purposes, and that less explicit 
communications—such as sharing aggregated and lagged sales information through a trade 
association—are more likely to promote socially valuable functions than to facilitate collusion.  
This statement, too, is not obvious, for many socially valuable functions, such as the setting of 
compatibility standards for emergent technologies or the sharing of information about industry 
conditions, require highly explicit communication.  Furthermore, as the case of the two gasoline 
stations illustrates, in some instances facilitating collusion requires very little explicit 
communication. 
Additionally, directing the legal inquiry at the nature of communications—which themselves 
often cannot be observed by the tribunal but must be inferred from circumstantial evidence—
raises what might be called a paradox of proof.  Suppose available evidence indicates that, in the 
situation under scrutiny, collusion is especially easy and the danger of supra-competitive pricing 
is accordingly very high.  Moreover, evidence conclusively demonstrates that we have 
experienced a collusive outcome—at roughly the monopoly price—for years.  Who wins?  
Arguably, the defendants.  They could argue that, precisely because collusion is so easy, they 
were able to achieve monopolistic results—and, they gleefully concede, will be able to continue 
to do so for the foreseeable future—without any meetings in smoked-filled rooms, elaborate 
negotiations, and so forth.  Just a few public pricing signals and they were off.  Moreover, since 
all have taken courses in strategy at business school and all are advised by the leading consulting 
firms and their affiliated game theory experts, coordinating punishment with only minimal, 
indirect communications is a snap.  Hence, the very strength of the evidence of the ease and 
success of collusion makes it implausible to infer that the defendant firms actually met and had 
long discussions about price-fixing. 
Reflecting on this case and other possibilities, it would seem that the relationship between the 
ease of collusion and the likelihood that there were sufficiently explicit communications to 
trigger liability under the agreement requirement (whatever it turns out to be) is not monotonic. 
Put differently, we are asking just how should the factors listed above, which make it more or Antitrust, Page 49 
less difficult to sustain collusive outcomes, be incorporated into a price-fixing case in which the 
existence of an agreement is proved through circumstantial evidence. 
Beginning at one end of the spectrum, suppose that industry conditions are such that it is 
extremely difficult for the firms to sustain a collusive outcome, for example, because there are 
many firms, low entry barriers, price-cutting by one firm is very difficult for rivals to observe, 
and demand and cost are highly variable.  Under these industry conditions, we would not expect 
the firms to have engaged in unobserved meetings that meet our explicit communication 
requirement simply because such meetings would likely be futile.  Moreover, if it is nevertheless 
asserted that collusion occurred, we just will not believe that an effective price fixing agreement 
was reached.  The evidence on pricing and cost could not have been certain, and any uncertainty 
is naturally resolved against an inference of collusion because it would be nearly impossible 
under the observed industry conditions. 
Consider next an industry in which conditions are such that collusion is somewhat easier to 
sustain, perhaps because the industry is more concentrated, has moderate entry barriers, pricing 
is more transparent, and demand and cost are less volatile.  These industry conditions make it 
more likely, but still far from inevitable, that a collusive outcome could arise.  Under these 
circumstances, if collusion indeed seems to have occurred, its very difficulty (but not such high 
difficulty as to blend toward impossibility) suggests that explicit communications may well have 
been employed to carry it off. 
Toward the opposite end of the spectrum, consider an industry in which the conditions are highly 
conducive to collusion: highly concentrated, no prospect of entry, transparent pricing, and stable 
demand and cost.  Think of the two gas stations.  We now have the case with which we began, 
presenting the paradox of proof: the very ease of collusion negates the inference that there must 
have been elaborate, explicit communications. 
In sum, as industry conditions move from those that make collusion nearly impossible to those 
that make it incredibly easy, the inference that there must have been highly detailed 
communications first becomes stronger and then weaker.  It is rather hard to say where on this 
continuum the maximum inference arises, or in what intermediate range some given proof 
standard is satisfied.
71 
How does this paradox of proof square with the law and what we observe in practice?  U.S. 
courts typically insist upon the presentation of various so-called “plus factors.”  Yet these factors 
are often little more than indicators that collusion rather than purely independent behavior is 
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example, in the region in which collusion is moderately difficult, a slight increase in the ease of collusion makes it 
more likely that collusion was attempted, which raises the likelihood of a given type of explicit communication, but, 
conditional on collusion having been attempted, reduces the likelihood that communication was more explicit 
because, by hypothesis, collusion is becoming easier.  The depiction in the text, which assumes a single peak, may 
be overly simplistic.  Moreover, one supposes that different industry conditions in different combinations that 
contribute to the ease or difficulty of collusion may have varying effects on the need for more explicit 
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likely to have occurred.
72  As just explained, such factors indeed favor the inference of an illegal 
agreement if but only if we are on the “difficult” side of the maximum, where additional 
evidence indicating the ease or benefits of collusion makes the likelihood of the requisite 
communications higher.  On the other side of the maximum, they make collusion more likely but 
explicit communications less likely. 
We are unaware of any cases (nor have we ever heard anyone suggest the existence of any cases) 
in what we are referring to as the paradox region, that is, past the peak, such that evidence that 
collusion is more feasible makes the inference of detailed communications less likely.  How can 
one explain this one-sidedness?  One possibility is that, even though the law has had this 
character for over half a century in the United States (and for shorter, although significant, 
periods in many other jurisdictions), no one has really understood the nature of the legal 
requirement. 
Another possibility is that all cases are in fact at the difficult side of the maximum.  That is, there 
are no industries where successful collusion is at all likely in the absence of highly explicit 
communications.  Observe, however, that if this were true, the agreement requirement would be 
superfluous.  That is, if there exists collusion, there must have occurred the requisite 
communications to trigger the agreement requirement.  Were this always true, nothing would 
need to be proved beyond the mere existence of collusion.  (This would suggest that Posner’s 
aforementioned prescription would be implied by existing law, and thus not constitute a 
significant departure from it.) 
Yet another possibility is that there are cases past the maximum, in the paradox range, but 
defendants are reluctant to advance the argument that the proof against them implies the absence 
of any agreement and hence victory.  The reason is that, in conceding that collusion is easy, 
likely, and probably in fact has occurred and will continue, they fear that they will hurt their 
case.  Defendants may suffer in the determination of liability because, as a practical matter, a fact 
finder (whether a jury, judge, or expert tribunal) is more likely to condemn them if they in fact 
operate in a situation inherently conducive to collusive outcomes and are likely taking advantage 
of it.  They win on the formal law but lose because they show themselves to be greedy and 
behaving in an antisocial manner.  In that event, it may be that de facto, the greater the danger of 
                                                 
72 Some of the most common factors seem to go little beyond requiring interdependent rather than independent 
behavior.  For example, prominent plus factors seem to include various sorts of evidence showing that the firms’ 
actions are “against self-interest” in the absence of collusion.  For a survey and critical commentary, see Areeda and 
Hovenkamp (2003, vol. 6, 241-250).  Courts also frequently rely on evidence that purports to directly indicate the 
existence of an agreement.  For example, Judge Posner in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 
F.3d 651, 662 (7
th Cir. 2002) offers, among others, the following quotations from the alleged conspirators as 
evidence of the existence of the requisite agreement:  “We have an understanding within the industry not to undercut 
each other’s prices.”  “[O]ur competitors are our friends.  Our customers are the enemy.”  A competitor’s president 
is called a “friendly competitor” and mention is made of an “understanding between the companies that . . . causes 
us to . . . make irrational decisions.”  As the above discussion explains, however, there can exist such an 
“understanding” and firms can view competitors cooperatively as a result of education about collusion, good advice, 
common sense and experience, and open communications (such as the gas stations’ posting of prices), so it is 
difficult to discern in what sense more than the existence of consciously interdependent, collusive interaction is 
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collusion, the greater the likelihood of liability, without regard to any inference that does or does 
not follow about explicit communications and the satisfaction of the agreement requirement.  
Additionally, if there is a sufficient prospect that liability will be found, defendants may be 
worried about penalties.  The more they argue that collusion is easy, the more plausible will be 
high estimates of overcharges (in amount and duration) and thus the greater will be fines and 
damage payments. 
This discussion may raise more questions than it answers, but we believe that it is, ultimately, 
clarifying.  The economic analysis of collusion, although quite complex, is at least fairly 
straightforward in stating the question it addresses and the motivation for the inquiry it 
undertakes.  Upon examination, the same cannot be said about the law’s requirement of an 
agreement and the role of industry conditions in inferring that such an agreement exists.  We 
hope to have advanced understanding in two ways: by being more precise about what agreement 
might mean, and, for a given definition, by being more explicit about the relationship between 
the economics of collusion and whether such agreement requirement is satisfied. 
Two additional observations about the interplay between the economics of collusion and antitrust 
law are in order.  First, under antitrust law it is possible for there to be a violation even when it is 
clear that no successful collusion occurred.  If competitors meet formally, enter into a written 
agreement, but ultimately fail miserably in executing it, most legal regimes would find a 
violation.  If fines or damage awards were limited to a multiple of the overcharge, this finding 
would be moot.  However, other sanctions may be employed; notably, those engaged in the 
attempt may be put in prison.  It is sometimes efficient to punish unsuccessful attempts 
(especially when detection is difficult and limits on sanctions may make it impossible to punish 
violators sufficiently to achieve effective deterrence), and examining direct communication may 
help to identify unsuccessful attempts.  Of course, evidence about pricing patterns of the sort that 
might be deciphered by economic experts may also aid in the task, especially if there were 
efforts to put the agreement into effect. 
Second, separate from the agreement requirement, penalties may depend substantially on the 
extent and duration of overcharges.  Undertaking these measurements requires expert economic 
analysis.  The greatest difficulty, of course, is in determining what would have been the price but 
for the collusion.  It is necessary both to specify conceptually the nature of the equilibrium that 
would otherwise have prevailed (perfect competition? monopolistic competition in price with 
differentiated products?) and to calculate just what price would have prevailed in that 
equilibrium.
73  This inquiry is very closely related (in some respects, identical) to that necessary 
to identify whether collusion existed in the first place. 
E. Other Horizontal Arrangements 
Our analysis has focused almost entirely on collusion that involves arrangements purely 
concerned with the fixing of prices.  Simple price-fixing, in turn, is unambiguously—“per se”—
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also on losses of consumer surplus regarding units not purchased, information on the entire relevant segment of the 
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illegal in the United States and subject to similar prohibitions elsewhere.  There exists, however, 
a variety of  horizontal entities—partnerships, trade associations, joint ventures, standard-setting 
bodies, to name a few—and such entities engage in myriad forms of conduct. 
Certain horizontal arrangements can serve as substitutes for direct price-fixing.  As noted, firms 
might agree to divide territories or customers, so as to eliminate competition.  Although no 
particular price has been set, each firm is left to act as a monopolist with respect to its portion of 
the market, so the result is similar to that of a price-fixing cartel.  The economic analysis is 
analogous: firms must be able to agree on the market allocation (instead of the price), cheating 
(selling to other firms’ allotted customers) must be detectable and subject to effective 
punishment, firms with significant capacity need to be included in the agreement, and entry must 
be limited.  Likewise, legal scrutiny tends to be similar: pure horizontal divisions of the market 
among competitors are also per se illegal in the United States. 
Not all horizontal arrangements involve pure schemes to fix prices or divide the market (often 
called “naked restraints”).  Nevertheless, many horizontal arrangements pose some risk to 
competition.  Accordingly, antitrust laws need to draw distinctions.  Under the law in the United 
States, this is done under the rubric of the “rule of reason”: reasonable schemes are permissible; 
unreasonable ones are prohibited.  Obviously, this concept needs to be fleshed out and related to 
economic analysis, and this task will be our central focus in this Section.  But first we will 
consider a particular class of horizontal arrangements that is closely related to our foregoing 
discussion of collusion and the legal prohibition on price-fixing. 
1.  Facilitating Practices 
In our consideration in Section C of conditions bearing on the likelihood of successful collusion, 
we largely took such conditions to be exogenous.  Some factors, however, are within the firms’ 
control, individually or collectively.  Antitrust scrutiny has focused primarily on the latter.
74  In 
this regard, two lines of attack must be distinguished.  First, is horizontal agreement on some 
practice that facilitates collusion itself an illegal agreement in restraint of trade and thus an 
independent basis for liability?  Most challenges, and our own discussion, emphasize this 
inquiry.  Second, does the use of facilitating practices constitute evidence of the existence of an 
underlying agreement directly to fix prices?  In some respects, the distinction may be immaterial, 
notably if both agreements on the facilitating practice itself and agreements on price-fixing are 
illegal and if the remedy is the same.  (A remedial difference is that a facilitating practice might 
independently be enjoined.)  Nevertheless, in the context of evaluating the evidence in a 
particular case, it clarifies thinking to keep this difference in mind. 
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unsuccessfully challenged what it asserted to be facilitating practices that were unilaterally adopted (although 
employed by all four firms in the industry), claiming authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
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An important facilitating practice that has long been the subject of antitrust regulation concerns 
information exchanges among competitors, sometimes in the context of trade association activity 
and other times conducted independently.
75  For example, in the American Column & Lumber 
case, a violation was found where firms exchanged information on prices in individual 
transactions and this information was subject to audit for accuracy.
76  Such information greatly 
eases the detection of cheaters, whereas such details do not have an obvious and substantial 
productive use.  In Container Corporation, firms were deemed to have violated the antitrust laws 
when they called competitors to verify the accuracy of buyers’ assertions of having been offered 
lower prices elsewhere.
77 
Another class of interest involves firms’ contracts with their customers.  For example, a firm’s 
use of a most-favored customer clause—under which it agrees to give all customers under 
contract the benefits of any price cut extended to a subsequent customer—may greatly reduce its 
incentive to defect from a collusive price since it must sacrifice profits on its existing customer 
base that was otherwise locked in for a period of time at a higher price.  (This disincentive would 
be immaterial for an infinitesimal price cut, but if as previously discussed greater price cuts are 
necessary to attract substantial new business, the disincentive could be substantial.)  Some firms 
employ price-matching (meeting competition) clauses, under which they promise to lower their 
price if the buyer can find a competitor that charges less.  (Some clauses promise to equal the 
price, perhaps even retroactively, that is, on previous sales, and others promise to exceed the 
competitor’s price reduction.)  This arrangement deters other firms from lowering their prices.  
Moreover, it facilitates detection because buyers offered lower prices are more likely to reveal 
otherwise secret price cuts.  Observe that under these arrangements buyers as a whole are 
disadvantaged—if effective, the market price is sustained at a higher level—but individual 
buyers are subject to the free-rider problem: each may well gain (if there is any chance that some 
seller will lower price), but its contribution to a higher market price will be negligible if it is a 
small purchaser.
78  These cross-currents are explored in the economic literature on most-favored 
customer clauses and meeting competition clauses.
79 
Other types of practices are directed at coordination problems caused by product heterogeneity 
and competition along dimensions other than price.  Quality or grading standards may promote 
uniformity—or at least reduce variety to manageable proportions—facilitating agreement on 
price.  Agreements may limit credit (and other) terms, lest firms cheat on the price by offering 
favorable interest rates. 
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Bellamy and Child (2001, §4-042). 
76 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). 
77 United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). 
78 This type of free-riding problem also arises when a monopolist employs exclusive dealing provisions with its 
customers, as discussed in Section V below.  
79 See Cooper (1986), Edlin (1997), Edlin and Emch (1999), and Salop (1986).  Borenstein (2004) applies this idea 
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More broadly, any factor that may inhibit collusive pricing is potentially subject to firms’ 
creativity in devising means of avoiding its detrimental effect.  There are, of course, limits on 
what is feasible.  Furthermore, to the extent that the use of facilitating practices itself requires 
collusion, firms must overcome any difficulties of coordination, detection, and enforcement with 
regard to the facilitating practices themselves, as illustrated by the Sugar Institute case.  Some 
facilitating practices may be readily formulated and observed; others may be complex or hidden.  
Accordingly, the successful use of facilitating practices will vary greatly. 
There remains another important consideration with many facilitating practices: they may have 
redeeming virtues.  Some information exchange enhances planning.  Forcing trading into formal 
markets (which was permitted in Chicago Board of Trade
80) produces benefits that flow from 
public prices.  Contractual arrangements with buyers regarding the sellers’ and competitors’ 
prices reduce search costs.  Exchange of cost information may enhance productive efficiency by 
shifting output to more efficient firms; see Shapiro (1986).  Even what may seem literally to be 
price-fixing will often be efficient, such as when productive partnerships or joint ventures are 
formed and the resultant entity fixes a single price for its common product.  Likewise, many 
other arrangements that may seem beneficial may also have effects on the feasibility of 
collusion.  Accordingly, it is necessary to formulate a means of balancing the costs and benefits, 
which is the subject of the next subsection. 
2.  Rule of Reason 
In the United States, the “rule of reason” was formally announced nearly a century ago, in the 
monopolization case of Standard Oil.
81  Shortly thereafter, it was given more content in Chicago 
Board of Trade in language that is routinely quoted (or paraphrased) to this day: “The true test of 
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby 
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”
82  
Although more specific than the almost-completely question-begging inquiry into 
“reasonableness,” the meaning of this test is hardly self-evident.  Just what is meant by 
“competition”?  Is it valued purely as a means or as an end unto itself?  It is useful to begin with 
a few modern invocations of the rule of reason’s promoting competition test, followed by some 
reflection on the broader question of interpretation and its relationship to economic analysis.
83 
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81 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
82 Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  The Court continued: “To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
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otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences.” 
83 In the European Union, conduct may be deemed exempt from the prohibition in Article 81(1) on anticompetitive 
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In National Society of Professional Engineers, the society had an ethics rule prohibiting 
engineers from bargaining about price until after they were selected for a project.
84  The 
proffered justification was that otherwise customers might be induced to focus excessively on the 
price of professional services at the expense of concerns about quality and safety.  The Supreme 
Court found a violation.  Safety was not deemed unimportant, but rather something that 
ultimately was for customers to decide.  They could employ the society’s approach if they 
wished, but the society could not impose this choice on all customers.  Competition meant free 
and open choice, not one side of the market dictating terms to the other. 
In Indiana Federation of Dentists, cost-conscious insurance companies employed an internal 
procedure for reviewing submissions for reimbursements.
85  The dentists objected (to non-
dentists passing professional judgment on their work, so they claimed) and agreed as a group not 
to supply the necessary documentation.  They too lost.  Once again, it was for the customer—or, 
in essence, the customer’s agent, the insurance company—to make whatever judgments it 
wished.  Any individual dentist was free not to deal with any insurer if the dentist thought the 
insurer’s practices inappropriate (or for any other reason or for no particular reason), but dentists 
could not agree, as a group, to impose the judgment. 
Consider also National Collegiate Athletic Association, involving agreements among universities 
regarding college football.
86  The Supreme Court was not bothered by their agreements on rules 
of the game (size of paying field, scoring, and so forth)—rules that were not challenged—but did 
find their restrictions on schools selling television rights independently of the Association’s 
scheme to constitute a violation.
87 
For the most part, cases such as these seem to view competition as a process.  The view seems to 
be that competition consists of buyers and sellers each deciding for themselves—or, more 
precisely, in individual buyer-seller pairs—with whom they will deal and on what terms.  
Independent decisions are a central feature of competition, whereas groups (typically of sellers) 
who attempt to impose some regime regarding the proper terms of dealing are subverting the 
process.  They may or may not be right, but that is not the question.  Put another way, what is 
right is essentially taken to be whatever is the outcome of the competitive process, much like 
how one accepts the equilibrium price in a competitive market as “reasonable.” 
Perhaps competition is viewed as good in itself.  Or instead the view may be that competition is 
valued for its results, whether those understood by economists, in terms of allocative efficiency, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commission has issued Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperative 
Agreements (European Union 2001). 
84 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
85 Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
86 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
87 This case also nicely illustrates what is sometimes referred to as the “ancillary restraints” doctrine.  Namely, an 
anticompetitive restraint is not deemed permissible merely because it is associated with an otherwise legitimate 
venture; however, the restraint may well be allowed if it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate 
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or other notions concerning freedom of choice.  Under this second, instrumental view of 
competition, the antitrust laws are nevertheless interpreted to relate only to the process: perhaps 
the integrity of the competitive process is much easier to assess than the outcome of that process, 
and benefits are assumed to flow as long as competition is assured.  In cases where it is alleged 
that the competitive process is not providing the expected benefits, courts in the United States 
repeatedly state that the appropriate remedy is to seek legislative or regulatory action.  Even 
when there are market imperfections, it is plausible to distrust the collective schemes of self-
interested market actors, schemes that they allege to be correctives in the public interest—Adam 
Smith’s warning being apropos. 
This process view, however, is problematic.  Although economists routinely use the term 
“competition,” it does not readily bear the weight it must in judging industry practices.  Is the 
formation of a joint venture between two firms that might otherwise compete with each other, 
although less effectively or with a somewhat different product, an enhancement to or detraction 
from competition?  How about a partnership or a horizontal merger?  What of curing a market 
failure?  Even if the result of coordinated action is unambiguously more efficient, is it more 
competitive?  Does the competitive process include competition among institutional forms, 
including various forms of cooperation among groups of firms that operate in the same industry?  
More broadly, when the conditions for perfect, textbook competition fail (that is, pretty much 
always), is there an unambiguous way to describe one or another arrangement or outcome as 
more competitive?
88 
Economists do not traditionally answer such questions.  Instead, they undertake positive analysis 
of behavior and outcomes under various market arrangements.  For normative purposes, the 
ordinary metric is welfare, or efficiency, or perhaps utility to each party or class of parties, not 
the degree of competition according to some competition index.  Yet, if the rule of reason is 
legally defined in terms of competition itself—that which promotes competition is legal, that 
which suppresses competition is illegal, end of story—then economics cannot directly address 
the legal test. 
As it turns out, no matter how often the promote-versus-suppress-competition test is invoked, it 
is not adhered to uniformly, and legal authorities seem to depart from it fairly readily in many of 
the cases in which its application seems problematic.  As noted, in National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, the Supreme Court finds horizontal agreement on rules of the game to be 
unproblematic.  There is a sense in which this flexibility may have benefited from a fortuitous 
play on words, in that such rules were seen as creating competition—sports competition, that is.  
But even the case that first announced the now-canonical language on competition, Chicago 
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Board of Trade, was one that condoned restrictions on individual players’ freedom of action to 
produce a greater good, trading in the public market.
89 
Other modern cases reinforce a more complex interpretation.  Notably, in Broadcast Music, there 
were two large entities (BMI and ASCAP) that, between them, licensed the rights to nearly all 
domestic copyrighted music to various users (for example, radio and television stations).
90  The 
entities set a single fee for block licenses, which was challenged, among other reasons, as 
constituting illegal price-fixing.  And in fact, each of these two entities did set single prices for 
bundles of millions of musical compositions that otherwise might be priced independently.  Yet, 
economies of scale in contracting and copyright enforcement (that is, monitoring the illegal use 
of the entities’ portfolios of music by unlicensed parties) induced the Court to find no violation.  
The result in the market was nothing like atomistic competition under which individual 
composers paired voluntarily with individual buyers, an alternative the Court found to be 
cumbersome.  Instead, huge collections of otherwise-competitors used a sales agent to dictate 
price and other terms of dealing.  Supposing one accepts that the permitted arrangements were 
on-balance desirable on efficiency grounds, there remains the question of whether the 
arrangement involved more or less “competition.” 
One device employed in Broadcast Music and in some other cases is to treat the venture as a 
single entity: once viewed in this manner, there is no longer a horizontal agreement and thus no 
violation of Sherman Act Section 1.  Looking ahead to Section IV, horizontal mergers are not 
themselves viewed as price-fixing cartels—even though the merged firms presumably fix a 
common price—but rather as single entities.  In such cases, however, there remains the question 
whether the agreement creating what is subsequently viewed as a single entity constitutes a 
violation.  Carte blanche would authorize formal cartels, say, incorporated as a single firm.  Of 
course, jurisdictions do not freely permit formal cartel arrangements or horizontal mergers.  Nor 
do they automatically approve even loose trade associations, if for example member firms 
engage in information exchanges of a sort that facilitate collusion and generate little offsetting 
benefit.  That is, when trade association activity has been challenged successfully, no single-
entity defense has been recognized.  Thus, the single-entity characterization is more of a 
conclusion than a reason to decide one way or the other. 
What, then, is the underlying meaning of the rule of reason?  On one hand, antitrust law does not 
insist on pure atomistic competition, prohibiting all combinations from small partnerships to 
trade associations to joint ventures to mergers.  On the other hand, horizontal arrangements are 
not freely permitted.  Instead, they are subject to some sort of balancing test, whether under the 
rule of reason in the United States or under other rubrics elsewhere.  When the arrangement 
looks like little more than a pure interference with ordinary competition, it is likely to be 
condemned with little further inquiry.  In many cases in the United States, for example, market 
power need not be demonstrated, and adverse effects need not be proved (although for an award 
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respects, but rather to indicate that the pure, atomistic, hands-off process view of competition was never the 
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of damages these considerations will be important).  Examples include National Society of 
Professional Engineers, Indiana Federation of Dentists, and the television marketing restrictions 
in National Collegiate Athletic Association—in addition to naked price-fixing and related 
practices.  When, however, there appear to be benefits—from combining production, conducting 
research, setting standards, or otherwise—condemnation is not guaranteed, as demonstrated by 
Broadcast Music.  And some horizontal arrangements, like partnerships and mergers that do not 
produce substantial market power, are routinely allowed. 
The primary area of ambiguity concerns the many practices that fall in between the extremes.  
Economists can analyze the arrangements’ effects and assess their efficiency.  But how do such 
assessments relate to the legal test?  Most modern antitrust rule-makers and adjudicators seem to 
pay substantial attention to economic considerations, at least in many settings.  But under 
formulations like the rule of reason, the conception of reasonableness—whether or not 
concretized as a determination of promotion versus suppression of competition—is not well 
specified.  We know from cases like Broadcast Music that pros and cons will sometimes be 
balanced, but what counts as a benefit or cost of an arrangement, what metric is employed for 
measurement and conversion to a common denominator (if this is done at all), and what is the 
ultimate decision rule remain somewhat a mystery.
91  A purely economic criterion has not been 
explicitly embraced; nor has it been rejected.
92 
F. Antitrust Enforcement 
We close this section by commenting briefly on some of the law and economics issues that arise 
in antitrust enforcement.
93 
1.  Impact of Antitrust Enforcement on Oligopolistic Behavior 
The workhorse model of oligopoly used to study collusion, namely the model of repeated price- 
or quantity-setting, does not explicitly include any antitrust enforcement.  At first blush, this 
seems rather peculiar, at least from the perspective of law and economics.  However, if this basic 
model captures conduct that is believed by the parties to be beyond the reach of the antitrust 
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laws—repeated price-setting without any other communications—then the omission is justified.  
This is another reminder that economic theory may be most relevant in determining the existence 
of price-fixing when it helps us understand whether additional conduct, such as communications 
or facilitating practices, significantly increases the likelihood that a collusive outcome will occur. 
In contrast, wherever antitrust law is applicable, it is important to consider the influence of 
expected sanctions on firms’ behavior.  Harrington (2004a, 2004b, 2005) introduces enforcement 
policy into oligopoly supergames.  He posits that a newly formed cartel will be more likely to 
attract the attention of antitrust enforcers (perhaps based on complaints by customers) if it 
rapidly raises price from the competitive level to the cartel level.  He shows how the price path 
adopted by the cartel and the steady-state cartel price are affected by antitrust enforcement.  He 
also studies the relationship between damages rules in price-fixing cases and cartel pricing.  In 
the process, he identifies some complex and even perverse effects of antitrust enforcement on 
cartel pricing. 
2.  Determinants of the Effectiveness of Antitrust Enforcement 
A number of other aspects of antitrust enforcement have recently been illuminated by economic 
analysis.  One increasingly active approach to enforcement is the government’s attempt to 
strategically induce some colluding firms to turn on their peers.  Enhanced lenience toward 
cooperating firms (as well as increased international cooperation) led to successful prosecutions 
in a series of major international price-fixing cases during the 1990s.  Harrington (2006a) 
discusses the impact of corporate leniency programs on collusion.  See also Motta and Polo 
(2003) and Motta (2004, p. 194) on the European Commission’s newly adopted leniency policy, 
and Litan and Shapiro’s (2002) discussion cartel enforcement during the 1990s. 
Another important enforcement supplement that is particularly important in the United States 
involves private lawsuits for (treble) damages.  When the Department of Justice brings a price-
fixing case, there typically are immediate follow-on private actions brought by parties claiming 
to have been overcharged.  Frequently, these cases are brought as class actions, and many have 
resulted in large payments.  Although only direct purchasers can claim damages under U.S. 
federal antitrust laws, many states allow indirect purchasers to recover damages as well.  In all of 
these settings, economists are relied upon to estimate damages for overcharges.  As previously 
noted, the challenge they confront—determining what prices would have existed but for the 
illegal collusion—is closely related to the underlying analysis of collusive behavior. 
There is also a growing economic literature on cartel detection—addressing what patterns of 
pricing, or bidding, are indicative of collusion—that is important for setting enforcement 
priorities, determining liability, and assessing damages.  Porter (2005), Harrington (2007), and 
Whinston (2006, pp. 38-52) provide highly informative recent surveys on cartel detection.  Bajari 
and Summers (2002) discuss the detection of collusion among bidders in an auction setting. 
IV. Horizontal Mergers 
The primary concern about horizontal mergers—that is, mergers between direct competitors—is 
that they may lead to anticompetitive price increases, either because the merged entity on its own Antitrust, Page 60 
will find it profitable to raise prices from pre-merger levels (so-called unilateral effects) or 
because the increase in concentration enhances the prospects for successful collusion 
(coordinated effects).
94  Accordingly, we begin by offering an economic analysis of these 
possibilities, drawing on our analysis in Sections II and III.  Next, we briefly review empirical 
evidence on the actual effects of horizontal mergers.
95 
Antitrust enforcement plays an active role with regard to horizontal mergers because in the 
United States nontrivial mergers must be reviewed by one of the two federal authorities with 
overlapping jurisdiction, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  (Similar merger review takes place in other jurisdictions, 
such as the European Union.)  These reviews are governed by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
the current version of which was (mostly) promulgated in 1992 by the DOJ and FTC.
96  We 
describe the pertinent procedures, from initial filing to the agencies’ analysis to court challenges 
and remedies.  Although our focus is on the Merger Guidelines due to their current centrality, we 
also discuss the pertinent antitrust statutes and the evolution of horizontal merger doctrine in the 
courts.  We pay particular attention to the role of prospective merger synergies, usually referred 
to in antitrust discussions as merger efficiencies.  These benefits are important in determining the 
threshold of anticompetitive effects that must be present to challenge a merger—that is, the law 
implicitly presumes mergers to be advantageous to some degree—and also in offering a possible 
affirmative defense to a merger that otherwise would be prohibited.  Furthermore, in assessing 
the role of efficiencies in justifying horizontal mergers, it is necessary to specify more precisely 
the goals of the antitrust laws, in particular, whether the objective is to maximize total economic 
welfare or instead just consumer surplus. 
Finally, we consider in greater depth the economics underlying the analysis dictated by the 
Merger Guidelines, particularly with regard to market definition, relating the Guidelines 
approach to the economic analysis of market power presented in Section II.  In this regard, we 
also discuss the growing body of empirical methods for predicting the effects of particular 
horizontal mergers.  Part of the challenge is theoretical: given that there are a number of theories 
of oligopoly, with rather different predictions, which one should be used in a given merger?  
Presumably, the one that best fits the facts of that merger.  But all of these theories are highly 
simplified in comparison with the inevitable complexity of real world competition, so picking the 
most suitable model of oligopoly is far from straightforward. 
                                                 
94 A price increase often serves as a proxy for other possible anticompetitive effects, such as a reduction in product 
quality or service or a decrease in the pace of innovation. 
95 A subject related to horizontal mergers that we do not consider here is the tendency of partial cross-ownership to 
soften competition and thus increase price.  See Bresnahan and Salop (1986), Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Farrell 
and Shapiro (1990a), O’Brien and Salop (2000), and Gilo, Moshe, and Spiegel (2006). 
96 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (April 2, 1992) (as 
revised April 8, 1997 with respect to Section 4, relating to Efficiencies).  See also the enforcement agencies’ detailed 
commentary on the guidelines.  DOJ and FTC (2006). Antitrust, Page 61 
A. Oligopoly Theory and Unilateral Competitive Effects 
The basic idea underlying theories of unilateral effects is that the merged firm will have an 
incentive to raise its price(s), in comparison with the pre-merger price(s), because of the 
elimination of direct competition between the two firms that have merged.  The examination of 
specific oligopoly models makes it possible to quantify the effects, which is important for merger 
enforcement.  First, quantification can help to identify the mergers that are most likely to have 
significant price effects and thus cause significant harm to consumers.  These are the mergers 
that presumably warrant further scrutiny, if not prohibition.  Second, quantification allows us to 
estimate the merger efficiencies necessary to offset the loss of competition and thereby allow the 
merger to pass muster according to the consumer surplus or total welfare standard. 
1.  Cournot Model with Homogeneous Products 
We begin by studying the effects of mergers in the Cournot oligopoly model described in the 
subsection II.C.1.  The Cournot model seems like a good starting place since it generates a 
number of sensible predictions relating market structure to the equilibrium outcome.  In 






=  that relates a firm’s price-cost margin to its 
market share and the market elasticity of demand.  In the special case with constant and equal 
marginal costs, each firm has a market share of 1/N , and the Cournot model predicts that the 
margin of each firm will be given by () / 1 / D PM CP N ε −=.  We also derived an expression for 
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i HS ≡∑ is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration. 
The idea that a firm with a large share will have more market power, and thus will charge a 
higher price (but still less than the monopoly price) has been very influential in horizontal 
merger enforcement.  So has the idea that margins are higher in more concentrated industries.  In 
fact, based partially on the expression for the PCM, the Merger Guidelines measure market 
concentration using the HHI.  At the same time, it is recognized that the margins of all firms in a 
given market are lower if the elasticity of demand in that market as a whole is large, a subject to 
which we will return in discussing market definition in Section E below. 
While all of these expressions accurately characterize the Cournot equilibrium, none of them 
actually tells us what happens to price, consumer surplus, profits, or total welfare as a result of a 
merger between two firms in a Cournot oligopoly.  To answer those questions, which are central 
to the analysis of horizontal mergers, it is necessary to compare the Cournot equilibria before and 
after the merger and, in particular, to specify what is involved when two formerly independent 
firms become one. 
Salant et al. (1983) address this question, emphasizing the peculiar result that mergers in a 
Cournot oligopoly can be unprofitable.  The reduction in the number of firms raises price.  Antitrust, Page 62 
Initially, the merging firms reduce their output because they internalize more of the effect of 
their output on price than they did previously.  In turn, non-merging firms raise output 
somewhat, leading the merging firms to cut output further.  At the new equilibrium, price is 
higher.  (Indeed, this is why price is ordinarily higher in Cournot equilibrium when there are 
fewer firms.)  But the merged firm’s combined share of total industry profits is lower; after all, 
other firms’ quantities rise and the output of the merging firms falls.  Salant et al. focus on the 
symmetric case with constant marginal costs; in this setting, a merger of any number of firms is 
equivalent to all but one of the merging firms shutting down.  As a result, the cost due to the 
smaller profit share will exceed the benefit from a higher industry price unless, in their example, 
the merging firms constitute 80% or more of the industry!  In this simple model, a merger does 
not lead to a “stronger” firm in any sense—as noted, it is as if the acquired firm simply exits.  If 
this story depicts how mergers work, few mergers (short of mergers to monopoly) would be 
observed.  Accordingly, a theory that plausibly explains mergers that actually occur requires that 
the merging firms own assets that can be usefully combined in some way. 
Perry and Porter (1985) pursue this point using a model in which each firm owns a certain 
amount of capital.  In their model, each firm’s marginal cost increases linearly with that firm’s 
output, and the slope of the marginal cost curve is lower, the larger is the firm’s capital stock.  
Thus, firms that own more capital are larger in the resulting Cournot equilibrium.  Perry and 
Porter assume that when two firms merge, the merged entity owns their combined capital stock 
and thus has a lower marginal cost curve than either of the constituent firms.  In addition, since 
the marginal cost of each rival firm rises with its output, the ability of rival firms to expand in 
response to the merger is not as great as in the prior example in which marginal cost is constant.  
As a result, horizontal mergers are much more likely to be profitable in this model.  Levin (1990) 
generalizes the Salant et al. model in a different direction by allowing the firms to differ in their 
(constant) marginal costs.
97  McAfee and Williams (1992) further explore models with quadratic 
cost functions where the marginal cost of a firm is proportional to the ratio of its output to its 
capital stock, showing how the magnitude of the price increase resulting from a merger depends 
on the capital stocks of the merging and non-merging firms. 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990b) significantly generalize these results and provide an analysis of the 
price and welfare effects of horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly.  They start with a Cournot 
equilibrium among N firms, where the cost function of firm i is given, as before, by  ( ) ii CX.  A 
merger in Cournot oligopoly can be modeled as the replacement of two existing firms with cost 
functions  11 () CX and  22 () CX by a single merged firm with its own, new cost function, 
12 12 () CX. 
Farrell and Shapiro say that a merger generates no synergies if the merger simply allows the 
merging firms to rationalize output between their existing operations or facilities, that is, if 
12
12 12 1 1 2 2 , () m i n [ ( ) ( ) ]
XX CX C X C X =+  subject to  121 2 X XX + = .  Define the pre-merger outputs of 
                                                 
97 Levin also allows the merged firm to behave other than as a Cournot oligopolist, for example, as a Stackelberg 
leader. Antitrust, Page 63 
the two merging firms as  1 X  and  2 X , and the pre-merger price as P .  Label the two merging 
firms so that firm 2’s pre-merger output is at least as large as firm 1’s pre-merger output, 






= , we know 
that larger firms have higher markups, so firm 1’s marginal cost in the pre-merger equilibrium, 
11 1 () MCM C X = is at least as large as firm 2’s,  22 2 () MCM C X = . Denote the merged firm’s 
marginal cost at the combined output by  12 12 1 2 () MCM C X X =+ . 
Using this framework, Farrell and Shapiro prove generally the important result that mergers 
generating no synergies raise price.  Without synergies, the merged firm’s ability to rationalize 
production between its existing operations (by equating the marginal cost of production in the 
two operations) is not sufficient to offset the incentive to raise price that results from combining 
the ownership interests of the two operations. 
Farrell and Shapiro also ask about the magnitude of synergies necessary for a horizontal merger 
to lead to a reduction rather than an increase in price.  This is an important question in practice 
because, as discussed in subsection D.3, mergers tend to be judged based on their impact on 
consumers.  Farrell and Shapiro provide a very general necessary and sufficient condition: a 
merger reduces price if and only if  21 2 1 MCM C P M C −> − .  That is, the merger will reduce 
price if and only if the marginal cost of the merged firm (at the pre-merger combined output) is 
less than the marginal cost of the more efficient firm (at its own pre-merger output) by an 
amount that exceeds the difference between the price and the marginal cost of the smaller, less 
efficient firm prior to the merger.  This inequality can be expressed in proportion to the pre-
merger price as 
 
21 2 1 1
D
MCM C P M C S
PP ε
−−
>=  (6) 
where we have added the pre-merger relationship between firm 1’s margin and its share.  This is 
a very demanding condition in an industry with moderate to large pre-merger margins.  For 
example, consider a Cournot industry in which the market elasticity of demand at the pre-merger 
price is  1.0 D ε =− , normalize the pre-merger price at  100 P = , and suppose that the pre-merger 
market shares of the two firms are 10% and 30%, so  1 0.1 S =  and  2 0.3 S = .  Using the pre-
merger Cournot equilibrium conditions, the pre-merger marginal costs of the two firms must be 
90 and 70 respectively.  The inequality above tells us that the merger will lower price if and only 
if the marginal cost of the merged firm, at the combined output of two merging firms, is less than 
60. 
Using these general results, Froeb and Werden (1998) provide calculations that relate the 
required magnitude of the synergies to the pre-merger shares of the merging firms.  In the 
symmetric case, they show that the proportionate reduction in marginal cost necessary for price 
not to rise is equal to  /( ) D SS ε − , where S is the pre-merger market share of each merging firm.  Antitrust, Page 64 
Analyzing the welfare impact of such mergers is more complex, in part because welfare effects 
depend heavily on the cost function of the merged entity in comparison with the cost functions of 
the two constituent firms, which captures any synergies resulting from the merger.  However, 
Farrell and Shapiro are able to obtain general results about the “external” effect of the merger, 
that is, the combined effect of the merger on consumers and rivals.  If we are prepared to 
presume that a proposed merger raises the combined profits of the merging firms (for otherwise 
they would not choose to merge), then any merger than generates positive external effects must 
raise total welfare.  For a range of demand and cost conditions, Farrell and Shapiro provide an 
upper bound on the combined share of the merging firms such that their merger must generate 
positive external effects.  If the combined share of the merging firms is small, they will not find 
it profitable to restrict output much, if at all, and when they do restrict output the larger firms are 
likely to expand, and shifting output towards larger firms actually boosts welfare, since the larger 
firms have lower pre-merger marginal costs.  This approach has the significant virtue that it does 
not involve an inquiry into the efficiencies generated by the merger, which can be difficult to 
quantity and verify, as we discuss below. 
Until now, we have examined the effects of mergers on price and welfare but have not related 
this analysis to the effect of the merger on industry concentration, a typical focus of horizontal 
merger enforcement policy (as reflected in the Merger Guidelines).  Specifically, concern is 
typically thought to be greater, the higher is pre-merger concentration and the greater is the 
merger-induced increase in concentration, notably, as measured by the HHI.  Farrell and Shapiro  
show, however, that increases in the HHI may well increase total welfare.  In particular, they 
show that, starting from a Cournot equilibrium, an arbitrary small change in the outputs of all of 






+ > , where X, as before, is industry output.  
Naturally, an increase in output raises welfare, since price is above marginal cost for all of the 
firms.  More surprisingly, for a given change in total output, welfare is higher the greater is the 
change in concentration.  Why?  Each firm’s price-cost margin is proportional to its market 
share, so the larger firms have higher margins and thus lower marginal costs.  As a result, 
shifting output towards them, which raises concentration, raises welfare as well.  This 
observation tells us that an increase in concentration cannot serve as a proxy for a decrease in 
total welfare when studying horizontal mergers.
98  (It should be noted in this regard that, 
ordinarily, when enforcement agencies and courts consider increases in concentration, this is 
viewed diagnostically and prospectively under the maintained assumption that the share of the 
merged firm will equal the combined pre-merger shares of the merging firms.) 
The applicability of the Cournot model is limited to industries where competition is accurately 
modeled as a quantity-setting game, or perhaps as a capacity-setting game followed by pricing 
competition, with fairly homogeneous products, and where the predictions of the one-shot 
Cournot model (rather than a model of repeated Cournot) fit the industry reasonably well.  The 
Cournot model is not suitable for industries with highly differentiated products, especially if 
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capacity constraints are unimportant in the medium to long run.  In those industries, a Bertrand 
model with differentiated products fits better.  We now study mergers in that model. 
2.  Bertrand Model with Differentiated Products 
A very extensive literature has developed to explore the effects of horizontal mergers in models 
of Bertrand competition with differentiated products.
99  These models are extensively used in 
practice to estimate and simulate the effects of proposed mergers, particularly in markets with 
branded products, ranging from consumer goods such as breakfast cereal to computer software. 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) provide a nice entrée point into this literature.  In contrast to the 
results of Salant et al., they find that mergers are always profitable and will always involve price 
increases.  Prior to the merger, the price of each product was set to maximize the profits earned 
on that product, given the prices of all other products.  Now consider what happens if the price of 
one of the merging products, say product 1, is raised slightly.  This will lower the profits earned 
on product 1, but the first-order effect will be zero since the price of product 1 was already 
optimized.  The higher price for product 1 will, however, increase sales of product 2, thus raising 
the profits of the merged firm (a positive externality that firm 1 ignored prior to the merger).  
The increase in profits from product 2 will be larger the greater is the increase in sales of product 
2 that results from the increase in the price of product 1 and the larger is the price-cost margin on 
product 2.  What about changes in the prices set by the other firms?  In Bertrand equilibrium, 
best-response curves slope upwards, so the other firms will find it optimal to raise their prices in 
response to the higher price for product 1 (and for product 2, the price of which it will also be 
profitable to increase).  These higher prices increase the demand for products 1 and 2, further 
adding to the profits of the merged firm, which prospectively makes the merger even more 
attractive.
100  Note also that each non-merging firm welcomes the merger since it earns higher 
profits because, as explained, the merged firm charges higher prices for both of its products, 
which increases the demand for the rival products. 
These ideas are very general: in models with differentiated products and Bertrand competition, 
mergers that involve no synergies are profitable for the merging firms, raise the prices charged 
by the merging firms, and raise the price and profits of the non-merging firms as well.  Clearly, 
such mergers lower consumer surplus; they also tend to lower welfare.  It is possible that such 
mergers raise welfare, however, if they involve significant synergies or if the merging firms are 
inefficient, so shifting output away from them and toward the other firms is efficient. 
To apply these ideas in practice, where the emphasis tends to be on whether, and how much, a 
proposed merger will raise price, it is helpful to understand what economic variables tend to 
make the price effects of a merger between two suppliers of differentiated products large or 
                                                 
99 See Ivaldi et al. (2003b), Motta (2004, pp. 243-265), and especially Werden and Froeb (2007) for more extensive 
reviews of this literature.   Baker and Bresnahan (1985) is an important early contribution. 
100 The logic in the Cournot case is different because best-response functions slope down in that case.  When the 
merged firm optimally reduces its output, the other firms expand output, which reduces the profits of the merged 
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small.  We return to this issue below, where we discuss the sophisticated simulation methods 
now used to estimate the price effects of such mergers. 
A good sense of the basic forces at work can be gleaned by comparing the prices in a Bertrand 
duopoly with two differentiated products, each sold by one firm, with the price charged by a 
single firm selling both products.  Focusing on just two products is not as restrictive as it might 
appear: one can interpret the demand functions for the two products in this model as demand in a 
general oligopolistic market, taking as given the prices of the all of the other products.  In the 
absence of any efficiencies, the logic of Deneckere and Davidson (1985) tells us that the merged 
firm will have an incentive to raise its price, given the prices of the other firms, and that the 
optimal price for the merged firm, given those other prices, is less than the new Bertrand 
equilibrium price once one accounts for the price increases by the other firms.  Therefore, the 
price increases calculated using a duopoly model will (somewhat) underestimate the price 
increases in the full oligopoly model. 
We derived a formula in subsection II.C.2 for the difference between the monopoly price and the 
Bertrand equilibrium price in a simple, symmetric Bertrand duopoly model with linear demand 
and constant marginal cost.  Following Shapiro (1996), we showed that the percentage gap 


















α ≡  is the diversion ratio, that is, the fraction of the lost unit sales of product 
1, when the price of product 1 is raised, that are captured as unit sales of product 2, as previously 
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This price increase is proportional to the pre-merger price-cost margin, m .  This comports with 
intuition: since the profits gained on the sale of product 2, when the price of product 1 is raised, 
are proportional to the margin on product 2, the magnitude of the margin on product 2 is 
proportional to the incentive to increase the price of product 1 (and conversely).  Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, mergers between firms selling differentiated products are likely to raise price 
more, the greater are the pre-merger margins on their products. 




, which is 
increasing in the diversion ratio and which is zero if the diversion ratio is zero.
101  This, too, is 
intuitive: the greater is the diversion ratio, the greater is the share of the lost sales from product 1 
that are captured by product 2 and thus internalized after the merger.  Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
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mergers between firms selling differentiated products are likely to raise price more, the closer is 
the degree of substitution between their products, as measured using the diversion ratio.  Note 
that a high gross margin is consistent with a high diversion ratio; this pattern arises if the demand 
for product 1 is not very elastic and if a significant fraction of the (relatively few) sales lost when 
the price of product 1 rises are diverted to product 2. 
As shown by Shapiro (1996), however, a rather different formula applies with constant-elasticity 
(rather than linear) demand.  In this case, the percentage price increase predicted from the merger 







102  This ratio is larger than in the case of linear demand, and 
possibly much larger for plausible parameter values.  To illustrate, suppose that the pre-merger 
gross margin is  0.35 m = , not an uncommon number for branded products, and that one-quarter 
of the sales lost when the price of product 1 is raised are captured by product 2 (and vice versa), 
so  0.25 α = .  With these parameters, the post-merger price increase with linear demand is about 
6%, while the post-merger price increase for constant-elasticity demand is nearly 22%. 
Suppose that one observed the pre-merger margin of 35% and was able to estimate the diversion 
ratio of 25% between these two products.  Both of these models—one with linear demand, one 
with constant elasticity of demand—can be parameterized to be consistent with these 
observations.  Yet the two models give significantly different predictions for the price increase 
associated with a merger because the two demand systems diverge somewhat as prices depart 
from their pre-merger equilibrium levels.  This should not be totally surprising: mergers are 
discrete events, and if nontrivial price changes are possible, their magnitude must in fact depend 
upon demand at prices distinctly different from the pre-merger prices. 
All of this tells us that, in a merger involving differentiated products, making reliable predictions 
of unilateral price effects based on a model of Bertrand oligopoly requires an accurate structural 
model of the demand system, and that the shape of the demand system at prices some distance 
away from the pre-merger equilibrium affects the post-merger price increase.
103  If a structural 
model can be estimated that fits industry demand, then, with luck, the post-merger equilibrium 
can be simulated using that model, thereby predicting the magnitude of post-merger price 
increases.  This promising approach has been explored analytically and applied in practice in 
recent years, as we discuss in subsection F.2.The logit model for differentiated products, 
championed by Werden and Froeb (2007), is especially tractable and has been used extensively 
to estimate the effects of horizontal mergers.  In this model, each consumer picks one unit of a 
single brand from a set of choices that includes the differentiated products,  1,..., iN = , along 
with the alternative of an outside good, which can simply be interpreted as picking none of these 
products.  The consumer’s utility from selecting brand  1,..., iN =  is the sum of a “systematic” 
component associated with that brand,  i V , and an unobservable idiosyncratic component.  Under 
suitable assumptions about the distribution of the idiosyncratic terms, the probability that a 
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= ∑ , where the index zero corresponds to the 







Φ=∑  as the probability that the consumer will pick one of the N 
brands (rather than the outside good), then firm i’s market share is  / ii S φ = Φ , so the market 
shares are proportional to the choice probabilities  i φ . 
In the simple specification described in Werden and Froeb (2007), the systematic component of 
utility for brand  1,..., iN =  is given by  ii i VP γ β = − , where  i γ  reflects the underlying quality or 
average attractiveness of brand i,  i P  is the price of brand i, and β  is a constant that determines 
the degree of substitutability among the different products.  For large values of β , the competing 
brands are very close substitutes, and price-cost margins are low.  Differentiating the demand for 
brand i with respect to the price of brand i gives / (1 ) ii i i dd P φ βφ φ = −− .  Transforming this 
expression into elasticity form, the own-price elasticity for brand i is given by  (1 ) ii P β φ −− .  
Differentiating the demand for brand i with respect to the price of brand j gives  / ij i j dd P φ βφφ = .  
Transforming this expression into elasticity form, the cross-price elasticity of demand for brand i 
with respect to the price of brand j is  jj P β φ .  Therefore, the diversion ratio from brand j to brand 












This model has the attractive, but restrictive, property that the diversion ratio from brand j to 
brand i is proportional to firm i’s market share.  In this important sense, the logit model is the 
antithesis of spatial models in which some products are very close substitutes, others are distant 
substitutes, and proximity need not bear any particular relationship to popularity.  The logit 
model is a good starting point in a situation where all of the brands compete against one another 
and it is not clear which are “close” to each other.  Nested logit models can be used when 
additional information about proximity is available. 
Werden and Froeb (2007) show that, in the Bertrand equilibrium with single-product firms, the 









.  This 
expression tells us that the firms with more attractive products, and thus larger market shares, 
have higher markups, much like firms with lower costs and thus larger shares have higher 
margins in a Cournot equilibrium.  In the Bertrand equilibrium that results after the merger of 
brands 1 and 2, the equilibrium gap between price and marginal cost for each of the merging 








.  (Remember, in interpreting this 
equation, that the market shares of the merging brands are not constants; they will fall as a result 
of the merger.)  To illustrate, consider the situation in which product 2, say, is inherently more 
attractive, that is, in which  21 γ γ > .  For simplicity, suppose that both products are produced at 
constant and equal marginal cost.  Prior to the merger, product 2 would have a larger market Antitrust, Page 69 
share and a larger gap between price and marginal cost than would product 1.  After the merger, 
the prices of both products would be higher than their pre-merger levels, and the gap between 
price and marginal cost for the two products will be equal, which in this case further implies that 
the prices will be equal; product 2 would have a larger market share than product 1.  Therefore, 
the post-merger price increase will be larger for product 1 than for product 2.  This fits with 
intuition: the incentive to raise the price of product 1 is greater since a relatively large fraction of 
its sales will be diverted to product 2, due to that product’s popularity.  Furthermore, the pre-
merger gap between price and marginal cost for product 2 is larger than that for product 1, so any 
diverted sales are actually adding to the profits of the merged entity. 
The symmetric logit model with constant marginal cost can readily generate predictions about 
the price effects of mergers, given an estimate of the elasticity of demand for the market as a 
whole and an estimate of the pre-merger gaps between prices and cost.  As an example, Werden 
and Froeb (2007) report that with six (symmetric) firms, a market elasticity of demand of  0.5 − , a 
normalized pre-merger price of $1, and a pre-merger gap between price and marginal cost of 
$0.40, so marginal cost is $0.60 (all this corresponding to  2.9 β ≈ ), the merger of any two 
brands causes their prices to increase by about 6%.  As they note, the logit model, with its lack of 
localization in competition, shows that a merger between two brands can easily raise price 
significantly even if the merging brands are not each other’s next closest substitutes in any 
market-wide sense.  Prices rise because, with only six firms, there are a nontrivial fraction of 
consumers for whom the merging brands are the first and second choices.  In this model, the 
merged firm cannot identify and price discriminate against those consumers, so the merged firm 
raises price somewhat to all consumers.
104 
Until now, the analysis has focused on the price effects of mergers that involve no production 
synergies.  The consideration of efficiencies is facilitated by a convenient feature of models of 
Bertrand competition with differentiated products: the magnitude of the efficiencies necessary 
for a merger to reduce rather than raise price depends only upon the shape of the demand system 
(the diversion ratio between the merging products) at prices in the immediate neighborhood of 
the pre-merger equilibrium prices.  A reduction in marginal cost of product 1 at the merged firm 
increases the gap between the firm’s price and marginal cost on that product, giving the firm an 
incentive to lower its price.  Price will in fact fall if this incentive is stronger than the incentive to 
raise the price of product 1 based on internalizing the diversion to product 2, now owned by the 
same firm.  The direction of the price effect of the merger depends upon which of these effects is 
stronger.  Since both of these effects are evaluated at the pre-merger prices, no information is 
required about the shape of the demand system at other prices.  
Based on this logic, Werden (1996) derives an expression for the cost reductions necessary to 
prevent a merger from raising price.
105  In the symmetric case, where the two merging firms have 
                                                 
104 If price discrimination were possible, the merged firm would raise price much more to the identifiable customers 
who ranked product 1 and product 2 as their first and second choice, and not at all to other customers.  Effectively, 
one can compute a new post-merger equilibrium for each identifiable customer or group.  
105 This is the analogue in a Bertrand model of the necessary and sufficient condition for a merger to reduce price in 
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equal market shares and gross margins prior to the merger, he shows that a merger will reduce 



















≡  is again the pre-merger margin.  This is a rather stringent condition in 
mergers between close rivals.  Using our previous numerical example of  0.35 m = and  0.25 α = , 
the merger must reduce marginal cost by about 18% to lead to a price reduction rather than a 
price increase.  Note that reductions in fixed cost have no bearing on (short-run) price effects. 
3.  Bidding Models 
In the Bertrand model, each firm sets a price, and buyers make their purchasing decisions given 
these prices.  Bertrand models are especially well-suited for markets with differentiated 
consumer products in which there are a large number of relatively passive consumers.
106  In 
many other settings, however, there are large buyers who behave strategically, designing their 
procurement procedures so they can obtain the best price from their suppliers.  In these settings, 
competition typically takes the form of bidding to win the business of a single customer who has 
designed a procurement procedure. 
Many purchasing situations fit this pattern, including procurement auctions.  The precise manner 
in which competition takes place depends upon the auction rules established by the customer.  
Klemperer (2004) provides an excellent overview of the enormous literature on auctions.  
Werden and Froeb (2007) discuss merger analysis in a situation where a seller is auctioning off 
an item using an ascending oral auction and the bidders have private values for the item.  
(Precisely the same ideas would arise in a situation where a buyer is running a procurement 
auction and the bidders are suppliers who differ in their costs of serving the buyer.)  This auction 
format is equivalent to a second-price sealed-bid auction; it is a dominant strategy for each 
bidder to bid up to its value, and the price ultimately paid, P , is equal to the second-highest 
valuation among the bidders. 
In this context, consider a merger between bidder 1 and bidder 2, and label the two bidders so 
that bidder 1’s valuation,  1 B , is at least as large as bidder 2’s valuation,  2 B .  Label bidder 3 as 
the one with the highest valuation,  3 B , among the other bidders.  A merger between bidder 1 and 
bidder 2 (which is equivalent here to collusion between these two bidders) will have no effect on 
the price paid for the item unless  23 B B > , that is, unless the two merging bidders have the two 
highest valuations on the item.  If they do, price will fall from  2 B  to  3 B .  Viewed statistically, 
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merger effects depend on the joint distribution of the valuations of the bidders, including the 
merging bidders.  Waehrer and Perry (2003) show how the price effect of a merger can be 
estimated for certain cumulative distributions of valuations. 
B. Oligopoly Theory and Coordinated Effects 
Mergers also can pose a risk to competition by increasing the likelihood that a collusive outcome 
will prevail.  Such coordinated-effects theories of harm from horizontal mergers are featured in 
the Merger Guidelines, which state in §2.1: “A merger may diminish competition by enabling the 
firms selling in the relevant market more likely, more successfully, or more completely to engage 
in coordinated interaction that harms consumers.”  Merger enforcement based on coordinated 
effects is more important, the more one believes that increased concentration contributes to 
coordinated outcomes and the less one believes that collusive behavior is readily deterred by 
antitrust law. 
As discussed in Section III, collusion is generally thought to be easier to achieve and sustain 
when there are fewer suppliers in the industry.  Therefore, at the simplest level, reducing the 
number of competitors by one tends to increase the likelihood of collusion.  This idea underlies 
what is referred to as the structural presumption— that increases in concentration lead to less 
competitive interactions—that has long played a central role in antitrust.  The heyday of the 
structural presumption corresponded with a time when industrial organization economists 
devoted substantial efforts to validating empirically the core idea of the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm: markets that are highly concentrated tend to have higher prices and 
higher profits, and thus tend to serve consumers less well, than do markets with more 
competitive structures, ceteris paribus. 
Demsetz (1973) mounted a strong attack on those who claimed that a positive cross-sectional 
relationship between concentration and profits was indicative of market failure or the need for an 
interventionist antitrust policy.  Demsetz pointed out that a positive correlation would also arise 
if some firms were more efficient than their rivals, and if the more efficient firms had large 
market shares.  Market concentration would then result from the presence of large, efficient 
firms.  Under this hypothesis, small firms in concentrated market would earn normal profits, with 
the large, efficient firm earning profits due to Ricardian rents.  If margins are associated with a 
firm’s market share, not overall market concentration, this may well reflect the greater efficiency 
of larger firms, at least in the short run.  The implications for merger policy are profound: if a 
large firm seeks to buy a smaller rival, the resulting increase in concentration might go along 
with lower prices and consumer benefits if the large and efficient firm is able to improve the 
efficiency with which the assets of the smaller acquired firm are used.  Bork (1978) is also well 
known for attacking the presumptions under merger policies of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Reviewing the enormous literature on the cross-sectional industry relationships among 
concentration, prices, margins, and profits in order to distinguish among these competing 
hypotheses is beyond the scope of this Chapter.  Schmalensee (1989) and Salinger (1990) are 
good starting places for readers interested in learning more.  Pautler (2003) provides a more 
recent summary of the literature, which has made progress in distinguishing effects on a firm’s 
profits that are related to market concentration, the firm’s market share, or the firm’s identity 
(looking across multiple markets).  Overall, economists have grown less confident over the past Antitrust, Page 72 
several decades in stating that there is a systematic relationship between market concentration 
and market performance, at least over the range of market structures in which there are more 
than two or three firms.  Even so, the cautionary statement made by Salinger in 1990 (p. 287) 
bears repeating today:  
First, despite the well-known problems with this literature, it continues to affect antitrust 
policy.  The inappropriate inferences used to justify an active antitrust policy have given 
way to equally incorrect inferences that have been used to justify a relaxed merger policy.  
Second, the alternative to cross-industry studies is to study specific industries. . . . [I]t is 
important to realize that it was the failure of studies of individual industries to yield 
general insights that made cross-industry studies popular. 
Whatever one thinks of this literature, one should bear in mind that these cross-industry studies 
do not directly measure the effects of horizontal mergers, which we take up in Section C.  The 
primary variation studied is across industries, not within an industry over time.  Furthermore, 
through the early 1980s, highly concentrating horizontal mergers would simply not have been 
allowed.  So, to the extent that one sees efficient larger firms in certain industries, through at 
least the early 1980s these firms largely arose through internal growth, non-horizontal mergers, 
or horizontal mergers involving relatively small market shares, not through highly concentrating 
horizontal mergers. 
The key question regarding coordinated effects in merger analysis is whether a given merger will 
significantly increase the likelihood that a collusive outcome will arise.
107  In Section III, we 
explored in considerable detail how various industry conditions affect the likelihood of effective 
collusion.  All of that theory and evidence can be brought to bear when considering coordinated 
effects in horizontal mergers.  While we lack methods, such as we just discussed regarding 
unilateral effects, to quantify these effects, we know quite a lot about how a change in market 
structure resulting from a merger will affect the likelihood of effective collusion.  In principle, 
then, one can trade off the increased costs from potential collusion against any efficiencies 
associated with a merger. 
Some highly relevant and robust lessons emerged from the analysis of collusion in Section III.  A 
horizontal merger between two significant suppliers, by reducing the number of players by one,  
can significantly increase the likelihood that the remaining firms will be able to reach a collusive 
agreement.  One possibility is that a merger may establish a clear market leader who can play the 
role of price leader, serving the function of establishing and adjusting collusive prices, with the 
other firms following.  Perhaps most important, when a firm that would have been reluctant to 
join in a collusive scheme (which, as previously noted, is sometimes termed a maverick) is 
acquired by another supplier who is larger or otherwise more inclined to participate, collusion 
can be greatly facilitated.  Beyond these points, a merger reduces the number of bilateral links 
between firms in a market, which is some measure of the difficulty of reaching an agreement.  
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price wars.  For simplicity, in our discussion below we use the shorthand of talking about the likelihood that a 
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With N suppliers, the number of such links is  ( 1)/2 NN − .  A 5 to 4 merger reduces the number 
of links from 10 to 6; a 4 to 3 merger reduces the number of links from 6 down to 3. 
For similar reasons, horizontal mergers also can make it easier to sustain a collusive outcome.  A 
firm with a larger market share tends to have less to gain from cheating and more to lose if a 
price war erupts than do smaller firms.  As a result, the merger of two smaller firms may increase 
the price at which collusion can be sustained.  In general, a merger that significantly increases 
concentration will tend to make cheating on the collusive price less attractive, at least for the 
merging parties. 
These observations are surely important for merger enforcement policy, even if our knowledge 
about the relationship between industry conditions and the likelihood of collusion does not give 
us a specific quantitative procedure to weigh the increased danger of collusion in, say, a 4 to 3 
merger against efficiencies promised by that merger.  However, the “paradox of proof” that we 
noted in subsection III.D.2 can present some problems when one seeks to apply collusion theory 
to horizontal mergers.  To illustrate with an overly sharp example, suppose that one concludes in 
a given industry that effective collusion is quite unlikely if there are five or more firms, possible 
but not likely if there are four firms, and quite likely if there are three or fewer firms.  Concerns 
about coordinated effects would therefore be minimal for any merger that left at least five firms 
in the industry.  A merger from 5 to 4 firms would be a cause for concern, as would be a merger 
from 4 to 3 firms.  But even more concentrating mergers, from 3 to 2 firms, and perhaps even a 
merger to monopoly, would cause fewer concerns: collusion is hypothesized to be likely with or 
without these mergers.  While this is surely too strong a conclusion—even with only two firms, 
there probably is a nontrivial chance that collusion will break down—this logic at least 
undermines the standard presumption that mergers become more worrisome as the number of 
firms declines.  This additional paradox is avoided only if one believes that probability of 
successful collusion is not just declining in the number of firms but also is a convex function of 
the number of firms. 
There is relatively little formal theory exploring the implications for merger policy of the 
relationship between collusion and market concentration, apart from the papers already discussed 
in Section III.  But several of the them are especially pertinent for evaluating coordinated effects 
in horizontal mergers.  Notably, Compte et al. (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005) ask how the 
distribution of capacities affects the ability of the firms to sustain collusion in price-setting and 
quantity-setting supergames, respectively.  And Davidson and Deneckere (1984) point out that 
reverting to the static Nash equilibrium typically is a less severe punishment when there are 
fewer firms (in a quantity-setting supergame or a price-setting supergame with capacity 
constraints), making for a complex relationship between market concentration and the likelihood 
of collusion. 
Kovacic et al. (2006) propose an interesting new way to quantify the dangers associated with 
coordinated effects in a situation where a number of suppliers are bidding for the customer’s 
patronage.  They propose measuring the effects of incremental collusion, that is, collusion that 
only involves two firms, before and after the proposed merger.  They show how this calculation 
can be performed in a particular bidding model.  While a large number of calculations are 
necessary to implement their method, these calculations are all well rooted in oligopoly theory, 
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Baker (2002) has emphasized the important role of maverick firms in disrupting or preventing 
collusion and thus the particular dangers that arise when a merger eliminates such a firm (an idea 
embraced in the Merger Guidelines as well).  Collusion theory indicates that reaching an 
agreement and sustaining an agreement may be difficult if one of the firms expects to gain 
significant market share in the absence of collusion.  Therefore, firms with strategies, products, 
or costs that are distinct from those of their rivals, and firms that are optimistic and growing 
rapidly, perhaps because they recently entered the market, are obvious candidates to be 
mavericks.  Accordingly, Baker advocates an approach to merger enforcement policy that goes 
beyond the measurement of increases in market concentration by emphasizing the identification 
of mavericks.  He argues that placing the focus on identifying maverick firms will reduce judicial 
errors by allowing the enforcement agencies and the courts to identify more accurately those 
mergers that are likely to have coordinated anticompetitive effects for any given level and 
change in market concentration.  Plus, a merger may actually create a new maverick. 
C. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Horizontal Mergers 
Given the large number of mergers that are consummated every year, including many horizontal 
mergers, one might think that there would be extensive, definitive evidence regarding the effects 
of these mergers.  Under what circumstances have horizontal mergers been found to raise or 
lower prices, or more generally to benefit or harm consumers?  And what has their impact been 
on the profits of the merging parties and on the profits of their rivals? 
Sadly, there is no such clear and definitive body of evidence.  To some extent, this reflects a lack 
of data: even in those relatively uncommon cases where one can accurately measure the prices 
charged before and after a merger, it may be hard to attribute price changes to the merger rather 
than to other changes in industry conditions.  Also, the effects of a merger may arise in non-price 
dimensions such as product quality, customer service, or innovation.  Furthermore, if merger 
enforcement policy is working well, the mergers most likely to have large adverse price effects 
are never proposed or are blocked on antitrust grounds.  We do not mean to suggest that it is 
impossible to identify the effects of horizontal mergers; but nor is it easy.  See FTC (2002) for 
some recent evidence. 
Pautler (2003) offers an extensive review of empirical work on the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions.  Readers interested in exploring this literature in greater detail should turn to his 
paper, which contains a treasure trove of information on the subject.  Whinston (2006, pp. 110-
127) also provides a valuable discussion of the evidence.  We examine here several distinct 
methods for identifying and measuring the effects of mergers.  In evaluating this evidence, one 
should bear in mind that over the past 25 years, only about 2% to 4% of the mergers reported 
every year under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act were considered to raise sufficient antitrust issues to 
warrant a second request from the FTC or the DOJ, so data on the effects of all mergers may not Antitrust, Page 75 
reflect the effects of the major horizontal mergers that are most likely to be scrutinized by 
antitrust authorities.
108 
1.  Stock Market Prices 
One way to measure the effects of mergers is to study the stock market performance of the 
merging firms.  Usually, this is done using an event study around the time of the announcement 
of the merger.  This approach has been extensively explored in the finance literature.  Andrade et 
al. (2001) provide an excellent introduction.  The advantage of this approach is that it relies on 
detailed and accurate stock market data.  However, by its nature, this approach cannot 
distinguish between favorable stock market returns based on efficiencies versus market power.
109  
In addition, this approach measures the expectations of investors about merger effects, not the 
actual effects of mergers.  Furthermore, this literature is not focused on horizontal mergers.  
Thus, the finance literature is best seen as addressing a more general question: do mergers and 
acquisitions produce wealth for shareholders or do they reflect managerial hubris?  Finally, event 
studies do not readily disentangle predicted effects of the merger and other information that may 
be signaled by the announcement. 
Andrade et al. (2001) report abnormal negative returns for acquiring firms, based on 1864 deals 
from the 1990s: 1.0% during a three-day windows around the announcement and 3.9% during a 
longer window from 20 days prior to the announcement through closing of the deal.  However, 
target firms showed a 16% abnormal positive return during the three-day window.  The 
combined firms gained about 1.5% over the short or longer window.  They also report several 
studies that found negative abnormal returns over the three to five years following the 
completion of mergers, stating (p. 112): “In fact, some authors find that the long-term negative 
drift in acquiring firm stock prices overwhelms the positive combined stock price reaction at 
announcement, making the net wealth effect negative.”  However, Andrade et al. are skeptical of 
these results, disputing the reliability of these longer-term studies, in part since it is hard to know 
what the “normal” return should be over these longer periods of time.  
In the end, Andrade et. al. state (p. 117) : “We are inclined to defend the traditional view that 
mergers improve efficiency and that the gains to shareholders at merger announcement 
accurately reflect improved expectations of future cash flow performance.  But the conclusion 
must be defended from several recent challenges.”  One of these challenges arises from the fact 
that the source of the stock market gains to the combined firms from mergers has not been 
                                                 
108 Pautler (2003) provides data on FTC and DOJ second requests.  See FTC and DOJ (2003) and DOJ (2006) for 
more detailed recent data on merger challenges.  Leary (2002) also provides some data on merger enforcement 
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109 In principle, a merger that would lead to synergies and lower prices would depress the stock market value of 
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would boost the stock market value of rivals.  Pautler (2003) reviews studies that attempt to measure the impact of 
horizontal mergers on the stock price of rivals.  Such effects are more difficult to measure reliably than are effects 
on the stock market value of the merging parties, especially if the rivals are diversified companies with a relatively 
small share of their revenues coming from the sale of products in markets where the merging firms are significant 
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identified.  In the case of horizontal mergers, at least, those gains could well come from 
enhanced market power.  Another challenge arises because acquiring firms do not appear to 
benefit from mergers, which at the least is an uncomfortable fact for those who believe in a 
reasonably efficient stock market (unless one attributes many such mergers to managerial hubris 
or empire building).  This will be important below when we consider merger synergies: if there 
truly are unique synergies resulting from the merger, why do acquiring firms fail to capture any 
of these gains from trade? 
2.  Accounting Measures of Firm Performance 
A second method for measuring the effects of mergers is to study accounting data for the firms 
involved to look for changes in various measures, such as rates of return, cash flows, or profit 
margins.   Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989), using widely cited FTC Line of Business Data, 
reach rather negative conclusions: many of the mergers and acquisitions they study were 
unsuccessful, leading to a decline in the post-merger profitability of the acquired line of business.  
Their study supports the view of excessive managerial zeal about acquisitions.  However, they 
mostly examine conglomerate mergers, not horizontal mergers, so much of their evidence is not 
directly relevant to horizontal merger control policy.  Also, they find that horizontal mergers 
tended to be more profitable than conglomerate mergers (although, again, this result does not 
distinguish market power from the possibility of greater synergies in horizontal mergers).  Healy 
et al. (1992) examine post-merger operating performance for the fifty largest mergers that took 
place from 1979 to 1984.   They find that the merged firms exhibited improved operating 
performance, as measured by operating cash flows, relative to their industry peers.  They 
attribute these gains to increased operating efficiency.  Along similar lines, Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1987) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) find plant level productivity gains associated 
with mergers in manufacturing industries, using the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Establishment 
Data for 1972-1981.   This was not a period, however, when highly concentrating horizontal 
mergers were permitted by antitrust enforcers. 
3.  Case Studies 
A third approach is to study specific mergers, tracking the firms or industries involved, looking 
at such measures as prices, output, product quality, or R&D intensity.   In principle, one can also 
try to measure the impact of a merger on rivals or customers.  Kaplan (2000) provides a useful 
collection of case studies of mergers in a diverse set of industries, including hospitals, tires, 
banks, pharmaceutical drugs, airlines, and oil field services.  The cases studied were not selected 
specifically to shed light on major horizontal mergers.  These studies illustrate the great variety 
of fact patterns that arise in merger analysis, the important role of mergers as a means by which 
industry participants adjust to changing market conditions (making it especially hard to 
distinguish the effects of mergers from other changes taking place in the industry, especially 
once one recognizes that firms self-select to participate in mergers), and the risks as well as 
opportunities associated with mergers. 
For antitrust purposes, it is most useful to study horizontal mergers that raised serious antitrust 
concerns when proposed but ultimately went forward.  This approach has the virtue of focusing 
attention on the very small fraction of all mergers that are most relevant for assessing merger 
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Airline mergers have received a great deal of attention, in no small part because good data on 
fares are available and one can use fares on other routes as a good benchmark when measuring 
the effects of mergers on fares.  Borenstein (1990), Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1991), and 
Peters (2003) study two airline mergers from the mid-1980s that were approved by the 
Department of Transportation over the objections of the Department of Justice: the merger of 
Northwest Airlines with Republic Airlines, and the merger of Trans World Airlines with Ozark 
Airlines.  These mergers raised significant antitrust issues because they combined directly 
competing hubs: Northwest and Republic both had hubs at Minneapolis, and TWA and Ozark 
both had hubs at St. Louis.  Borenstein (1990) found significant fare increases following the 
Northwest/Republic merger but not following the TWA/Ozark merger.  Werden, Joskow, and 
Johnson (1991) found that the Northwest/Republic merger raised fares by about 5% and the 
TWA/Ozark merger raised fares by about 1.5%, and that both mergers led to significant service 
reductions.  Kim and Signal (1993) examine fourteen airline mergers from the mid-1980s.  They 
compare price changes on the routes served by the merging firms with price changes on other 
routes of the same distance and conclude that any efficiency gains in mergers between rival 
airlines were more than offset by enhanced market power, leading to fares that averaged 10% 
higher after six to nine months.  Fare increases were especially large for mergers involving 
airlines in bankruptcy, which had unusually low (perhaps unsustainably low) pre-merger fares. 
The banking industry is another industry in which good price data are available and many 
horizontal mergers have occurred, making it possible to measure the price effects of horizontal 
mergers.  Prager and Hannan (1998) study the effects of major horizontal mergers in the U.S. 
banking industry during the early 1990s.  They look at changes in interest rates paid on deposits  
for several types of deposit accounts, using monthly data.  They define “substantial horizontal 
mergers” as those that increase the HHI by more than 200 points to a post-merger value greater 
than 1800.  They find that substantial horizontal mergers reduce the deposit interest rates offered 
by the merging banks.  
Mergers have also been extensively studied in the hospital industry.  The price and quality 
effects of hospital industry mergers have been examined in a number of studies, as described in 
Pautler (2003).  For example, Vita and Sacher (2001) find large price increases, not reflecting 
increases in service quality, following a hospital merger in Santa Cruz, California. 
Recent papers look at other industries as well.  Pesendorfer (2003) studies the effect of horizontal 
mergers in the paper industry on capacity choices.  Hastings (2004) looks at pricing in the retail 
gasoline market in Southern California.  
One natural way to gain information to inform horizontal merger policy would be for the 
antitrust enforcement agencies to perform retrospective studies on the deals that they have 
investigated closely but ultimately allowed to proceed without significant divestitures.  Neither 
the FTC nor the DOJ has officially reported results from any such study, at least in recent 
years.
110  Barton and Sherman (1984) do report price increases from a highly concentrating 
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merger that was challenged by the FTC several years after it was consummated.
111  In addition, 
the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, in conjunction with the Department of Trade and Industry and 
the U.K. Competition Commission, sponsored a study of ten mergers that took place during 
1990-2002.  These were mergers that the Office of Fair Trading had reviewed and found to raise 
sufficient competition issues that they were worthy of referral to the Competition Commission 
but that the Competition Commission had subsequently cleared.  See Office of Fair Trading 
(2003).  Based on interviews with customers of the merging firms, this study did not find a 
significant lessening of competition in eight of the ten cases studied.  In the other two cases, a 
short-term loss of competition was found to have been corrected by subsequent entry into the 
market. 
D. Antitrust Law on Horizontal Mergers 
This section outlines current antitrust law on horizontal mergers.  We start with a brief statutory 
background and an explanation of procedures, emphasizing pre-merger notification and analysis 
by enforcement agencies.  We then discuss the substantive law regarding requisite 
anticompetitive effects and whether merger synergies may be offered to defend otherwise 
anticompetitive mergers. 
Throughout the discussion, it is useful to keep in mind the relationship between merger law, on 
one hand, and the law concerning price-fixing and monopolization, on the other hand.  Because 
collusion is difficult to detect and prosecute (and, depending on the means of collusion, is of 
uncertain illegality), as discussed in Section III, it makes sense to some degree for merger policy 
to adopt a prophylactic approach toward mergers that threaten greater cooperation among firms.  
Likewise, because the law on monopolization does not regulate price-setting once a merger has 
been validated and imposes only modest constraints on exclusionary practices, as will be 
discussed in Section V, there is also reason to be wary of approving a merger that threatens 
unilateral effects or exclusionary conduct. 
1.  Background and Procedure 
As elsewhere, our discussion will focus on antitrust law and procedures in the United States; 
there is a growing but incomplete convergence in how horizontal mergers are treated across 
jurisdictions.
112  Relevant U.S. law has three primary, overlapping provisions: Sherman Act 
Section 1’s prohibition on any “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in restraint of trade” 
(the focus in Section III on collusion), Clayton Act Section 7’s prohibition on acquisitions of 
stock or assets whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
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monopoly,” and the Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5’s prohibition on any “unfair 
method of competition.”
113  In spite of diverse histories and statutory language, a largely unified 
approach to enforcement of these provisions has emerged.  Notably, the DOJ and FTC in their 
most recent Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992) have promulgated a single policy statement 
applicable regardless of the statute involved.  Commentators and courts have largely taken a 
similar approach.
114 
Most challenges to mergers are brought by one of the two federal agencies, although mergers 
may also be challenged by states and private parties.
115  Since 1976, the federal procedure has 
taken its current form, which is similar to procedures in many other jurisdictions.
116  Firms 
intending to merge are required to file specified information with the pertinent agencies.  Each 
deal is cleared to either the FTC or the DOJ.  In mergers for which there is any serious prospect 
of a challenge, the parties usually submit substantial supplemental material.  They hire a team of 
lawyers and economic experts (often associated with consulting firms) that typically have 
substantial experience in merger filings; indeed they may have handled numerous prior mergers 
in the same or related industries.  This team gathers and analyzes information and produces an 
often-elaborate study document defending the merger with regard to competitive effects and 
anticipated efficiencies.  The goal is to persuade the agencies to approve the merger, and to do so 
promptly.   
An important aspect of the procedure concerns the effects of agency delay—which arises when 
the agency feels that it needs additional information or must undertake more substantial 
independent investigation and analysis—or of an ultimate agency challenge.  Even if the parties 
anticipate eventual approval, whether from the agency or after litigation in court, the prospect of 
delay will kill many deals and impose substantial costs on others.  Keeping financing in line, 
making interim investment decisions in plant and equipment, deciding on strategic matters such 
as launching new products or terminating old ones, maintaining customer loyalty in the presence 
of uncertainty about product support, retaining talented employees who may fear job loss, and so 
                                                 
113 Observe that none of the statutes is limited to mergers per se; other forms of combination, notably including 
acquisitions of some or all of another firm’s assets, are included.  (Thus, for example, if the only two products in a 
market are patented, the acquisition of one of the patents by the owner of the other would be analyzed similarly to a 
horizontal merger.)  EU regulations have a similar reach. 
114 See, for example, Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow (1998, vol. 4, revised ed., pp. 42-43). 
115 One might think that competitors would frequently challenge mergers.  However, under the doctrine of “antitrust 
injury,” this is not ordinarily possible: competitors tend to be injured by pro-competitive mergers that lead to lower 
prices (deemed not the sort of injury that the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent) but helped by anticompetitive 
mergers (recall from Section A, for example, that unilateral effects tend to benefit non-merging parties).  Relatedly, 
when agencies are investigating proposed mergers, they are less likely to give weight to the views of competitors on 
overall effects (for fear of manipulation) and more commonly seek the reactions of large purchasers (for example, 
health insurers, in the case of hospital mergers).  In this regard, Coate and Ulrick (2005) find that the probability that 
the FTC takes action against mergers is higher, ceteris paribus, when there are customer complaints about the 
merger.  In recent commentary, the agencies affirm that “Consumers typically are the best source, and in some cases 
they may be the only source, of critical information….”  DOJ and FTC (2006, pp. 9-10).  
116 Indeed, there has been some explicit international cooperation, motivated by the fact that many substantial 
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forth may present significant challenges to merging firms, especially those being acquired, that 
do not know if or when their deal may be approved.  Accordingly, great energy is devoted to 
obtaining a quick and successful conclusion to the antitrust agency’s deliberations.  If the agency 
challenges the deal and no settlement is reached, the merging parties must either abandon their 
transaction or confront considerable further delay in the process of litigating the matter in federal 
court. 
To give some sense of the level of merger review activity, during the years 2001-2005 for the 
Department of Justice there were about 1000 to 2400 pre-merger notifications annually, of which 
70 to 106 resulted in decisions to investigate further, and 2 to 7 led to cases being filed, 
depending on the year.
117  As already suggested, however, these latter statistics can be 
misleading because some mergers will be dropped along the way either because the parties are 
insufficiently confident of success or simply because they cannot tolerate the anticipated delays.  
Also, no doubt, some potential mergers are deterred; the more predictable are the agencies, due 
in part to the Merger Guidelines and years of experience under them, the more one would expect 
there to be few proposed mergers with a high likelihood of being challenged. 
Another important outcome is settlement, most frequently through the parties spinning off plants, 
other operations, or lines of business in areas of significant competitive overlap.
118  That is, some 
mergers may be found to pose a serious competitive threat but only in certain geographic 
markets or only with respect to some of the many products the firms produce.  In such cases, 
appropriate divestiture of pertinent assets will ordinarily satisfy the enforcement agencies. 
For challenges that do proceed to court, the agencies often attempt to obtain a preliminary 
injunction requiring the merging firms to continue to operate independently pending a final 
outcome, and in the end successful challenges produce permanent injunctions against the merger 
(or subsequent negotiations leading to asset divestitures).  This approach contrasts dramatically 
with the course of proceedings in earlier years, before the pre-merger notification regime was in 
place.  Then, mergers were promptly consummated, and final decrees against challenged mergers 
ordinarily took many years, sometimes more than a decade, at which point the two firms were 
often sufficiently integrated (plants closed, brands discontinued, new joint operations well 
underway) to make practical divestiture difficult or impossible. 
The remainder of this section focuses on the substance of the legal restriction on horizontal 
mergers, first examining the core inquiry into anticompetitive effects and then considering the 
role of efficiencies in justifying mergers that would otherwise be proscribed.  As will be seen, the 
                                                 
117 DOJ (2006). The FTC’s merger enforcement activity is comparable to that of the DOJ.  In the European Union, 
from 1990 until May 2002 (and thus before the promulgation of the new 2004 regulations and guidelines), 86% of 
notified mergers were approved unconditionally, 5% were approved subject to undertakings (such as spin-offs) by 
the end of the one-month initial investigative period, an additional 3% after further investigation, and 1% (18) were 
prohibited.  (Another 1% were withdrawn during in-depth investigations; various others were found to be outside the 
Commission’s jurisdiction.)  See Walle de Ghelcke and van Gerven (2004, § 5.01). 
118 During the past decade, the combined number of transactions that were restructured or abandoned after a formal 
challenge was announced but before a case was filed in court usually exceeded the number of cases filed.  And those 
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approach toward both issues has evolved a great deal over time.  Furthermore, throughout this 
evolution these two issues have not been entirely independent.  In particular, the central question 
of the likelihood and extent of anticompetitive effects required to condemn horizontal mergers—
the threshold for a successful challenge—seems to be answered in a manner that substantially 
reflects underlying views about the typical probability and magnitude of merger synergies. 
2.  Anticompetitive Effects 
In the 1960s (in the wake of the strengthening of Clayton Act Section 7 in 1950), the U.S. 
Supreme Court, following the lead of the federal enforcement authorities, adopted a restrictive 
view toward horizontal mergers.  The Court condemned a number of mergers where the parties’ 
combined market shares were under 10%, for example, in Brown Shoe and Von’s.
119  The first 
government merger guidelines, promulgated in 1968, adopted similarly stringent thresholds for 
challenging mergers.  Likewise, they endorsed the structural presumption that concentration 
implies anticompetitive effects, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia Bank: “a 
merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and 
results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely 
to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly 
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”
120  A shift was 
signaled by the 1974 decision in General Dynamics.
 121  The specific holding—that the prima 
facie case established by market share statistics could be rebutted by showing that the figures 
gave a misleading depiction of competitive effects—was not itself truly novel (Brown Shoe had 
suggested as much).  However, the acts of subjecting the government’s case to heightened 
scrutiny and ultimately rejecting it were taken as a signal of a new direction. 
Since the mid-1970s, there have not been further merger opinions by the Supreme Court.
122  
Nevertheless, a confluence of three factors has made clear that the law has moved substantially: 
changing views toward competition and the effectiveness of market forces (both broadly and in 
the academy), a change in the composition of the Supreme Court and in the nature of its opinions 
                                                 
119 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 
(1966).  Indeed, in Von’s, after pointing out that the combined share was 7.5% of the Los Angeles market for 
grocery stores, that the number of independent stores had fallen from 5365 to 3590, that half of the top 20 chains had 
acquired stores from smaller firms, and similar facts, the Court proclaimed: “These facts alone are enough to cause 
us to conclude . . . that the Von’s-Shopping Bag merger did violate §7.”  384 U.S. at 274.  The dissent criticized the 
majority for attempting to “roll back the supermarket revolution” and asserted that “[t]he sole consistency that I can 
find is that under §7, the Government always wins.” 384 U.S. at 288, 301. 
120 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).  The Court cited prominent economic 
and legal authorities in support of this view, although the market share levels in Philadelphia Bank and proposed by 
most of the commentators were substantially higher (20% or more) than the levels deemed sufficient in many of the 
other cases of the period and in the 1968 guidelines. 
121 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
122 This apparent anomaly is largely explained by two procedural changes: the new requirement of pre-merger 
notification reduced the flow of questionable mergers into the courts, and the elimination of special rules permitting 
automatic appeal in some cases directly to the Supreme Court greatly reduced the proportion of antitrust cases 
reaching that court. Antitrust, Page 82 
on other antitrust subjects, and a new direction from the government as embodied in the 1982 
merger guidelines.  The current (1992) Merger Guidelines are a successor to the 1982 version, 
which differed in many key respects from those issued in 1968.  Details of the current 
methodology for evaluating horizontal mergers will be examined throughout the remainder of 
this section.
123  Perhaps the most notable change, however, was in the thresholds for challenge: 
they were notably higher, sufficiently so that a number of the famous cases of the 1960s (that the 
government won) would not have been brought had the new guidelines been in effect. 
The presumptive thresholds in the Merger Guidelines (once the market is defined; see Section E) 
are as follows.  If the post-merger HHI is below 1000, the market is regarded as unconcentrated 
and ordinarily no further analysis will be undertaken.  If the post-merger HHI is between 1000 
and 1800, significant concerns are raised if and only if the merger increases the HHI by more 
than 100, in which case further analysis is undertaken.
124  And if the post-merger HHI exceeds 
1800, significant concerns are deemed to exist when the merger raises the HHI by more than 
50.
125  This air of certainty is misleading.  In actual application of the Merger Guidelines, it has 
become apparent that, in certain industries, the de facto thresholds are much higher.  For 
example, most of hundreds of hospital mergers subsequent to the 1982 guidelines (which had the 
same thresholds as those just described) have gone unchallenged even though post-merger HHIs 
and HHI increases were greatly above 1800 and 50, respectively, presumably reflecting a view of 
typical efficient scale in this industry.
126  Even so, the lawyers and economists who specialize in 
merger practice are generally aware of such patterns, which themselves probably reflect 
successful persuasion in prior merger filings in particular industries.
127 
                                                 
123 For further elaboration on how the guidelines are implemented in practice, see the enforcement agencies’ 
commentary, DOJ and FTC (2006). 
124 Further analysis involves consideration of entry, efficiencies, and the possibility that one of the firms may be 
failing. 
125 The new 2004 EU guidelines (European Union 2004a) are strikingly similar: 2000 replaces 1800, and the 
increases must be 250 and 150 rather than 100 and 50, respectively.  As noted in the text and notes to follow, 
however, actual practice under the U.S. Merger Guidelines indicates the use of higher de facto thresholds (to an 
extent that varies by industry).  Likewise, the additional factors considered in the new EU guidelines are largely the 
same as in the United States—notably, they include efficiencies as a defense—and they even appear in the same 
order. 
126 See also DOJ and FTC (2003) which gives statistics on the post-merger HHI and change in HHI for merger 
challenges in a number of industries.  The tables strongly suggest that the thresholds for challenges vary greatly by 
industry.  Coate and Ulrick’s (2005) analysis of merger enforcement at the FTC finds that, for given HHIs and other 
factors, enforcement actions are more likely in the oil, grocery, and chemical industries.  In addition, they find that, 
holding both the HHI and change in HHI constant, the probability of enforcement rises as the number of leading 
rivals falls from 5 to 4 and from 4 to 3. 
127 Leary (2002) emphasizes that, since the Merger Guidelines have now been followed for years, current merger 
policy exhibits a good deal of stability.  Furthermore, in order “to provide greater transparency and foster deeper 
understanding regarding antitrust law enforcement,” the DOJ and FTC recently issued a document, “Commentary on 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines” in 2006.  The agencies also held a Merger Enforcement Workshop in 2004; 
extensive materials from that workshop are available at 
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Even though the Merger Guidelines are formally just a public statement by the federal agencies 
of how they intend to proceed internally, they have to a substantial degree dictated parties’ 
practices in litigation and courts’ analyses of mergers regarding the methodology for assessing 
market definition, anticompetitive effects, and other factors as well as the thresholds for 
condemnation.  The courts undoubtedly welcome the guidance.  Moreover, as noted, even 
though the most on-point Supreme Court opinions (from the 1960s) are much stricter, there has 
been a sufficient shift in understandings and in behavior of the Supreme Court on other issues 
that lower courts have followed the new approach rather than adhering to older precedents.  The 
most direct indicator of this fact is that, in this more recent era, the government loses a good 
proportion of the cases it brings even though the government’s threshold for challenging mergers 
is much stricter than in the past (when they won nearly every case). 
3.  Efficiencies 
Merger synergies play an important role in competition policy toward horizontal mergers, and 
one that has changed substantially over time.  In this subsection, we first describe that role and 
its modern development and then consider how it relates to the goals of competition policy more 
generally. 
Although efficiencies are usually discussed as a possible defense, advanced by the merging 
parties to justify a merger that might otherwise be condemned as anticompetitive, efficiencies 
have long had another, more significant influence on merger policy: in setting the threshold for 
antitrust scrutiny.  Consider trivial combinations, say, when two individuals form a partnership 
or two small stores join forces.  These combinations as well as some substantially larger mergers 
have never been subject to challenge.  But they could have been.  First, as noted in the discussion 
in subsection III.E.2, such combinations literally involve price-fixing, going forward, which is 
automatically condemned, supposedly without proof of market power.  Yet productive 
combinations, under the rule of reason, are permissible, presumably because they often create 
synergies (despite the fact that, once formed into a single entity, prices will be determined jointly 
rather than independently).  Second, even when the number of firms is large, mergers in Cournot 
or Bertrand oligopoly tend to raise prices (slightly).  Nevertheless, nontrivial anticompetitive 
effects must be demonstrated before a merger will be challenged.
128 
Viewed more broadly, setting the threshold of anticompetitive effects significantly above zero 
may be rationalized by the view that mergers typically generate some synergies, so they should 
not be prohibited unless the reduction in competition is sufficiently great.  In the 1960s and 
1970s when U.S. anti-merger policy was strict, many fairly large mergers were nevertheless 
routinely permitted.  Currently, as described in subsection 2, the thresholds are much higher; 
moreover, they are raised further in industries where synergies are thought to be unusually large 
relative to the size of the market (hospitals, for example). 
                                                 
128 Although the language of the Clayton Act demands a substantial effect, that of the Sherman Act does not.  
(Historically, the Clayton Act, passed in 1914 to remedy perceived weakness in the Sherman Act and amended in 
1950 to strengthen it further, has been viewed as stricter than the Sherman Act.  As noted in subsection 1, however, 
the enforcement agencies and, increasingly, the courts apply a more unitary approach.) Antitrust, Page 84 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to understand an efficiencies defense to a merger whose 
suspected anticompetitive effects exceed the threshold as implicitly involving a claim that the 
merger synergies are not merely substantial but are large enough to notably exceed the level 
ordinarily presumed to exist.  After all, they must be enough to justify the merger in light of what 
would otherwise be substantial, not merely trivial, anticompetitive effects.  This framing of the 
question may help explain why courts and enforcement agencies are cautious in accepting 
efficiency defenses (in addition to the obvious reason that merging parties have every incentive 
to assert the existence of synergies when there are few and the merger is in fact anticompetitive). 
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court exhibited a somewhat schizophrenic but ultimately hostile 
attitude toward merger synergies.  Most famously, in Brown Shoe, the Court viewed the 
efficiencies resulting from the vertical aspects of the merger as problematic because they would 
give the combined entity an advantage against competitors.  On one hand, the Court stated: “It is 
competition, not competitors, which the Act protects.”
129  However, the passage continues: “But 
we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned businesses.  Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.  It resolved these 
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.  We must give effect to that decision.” 
Over time, the first statement—“competition, not competitors”—has continued to be among the 
most-quoted passages from all Supreme Court antitrust opinions, by courts and commentators 
alike, whereas the latter clarification (contradiction) is not usually appended anymore.  Lower 
courts in the last couple of decades (recall, there have been no recent Supreme Court 
pronouncements on mergers) have varied in their approaches, some expressing uncertainty about 
an efficiencies defense but most accepting it, at least in principle.
130  
The Merger Guidelines are now unequivocal.  In 1997, amendments to the 1992 version added a 
new section on efficiencies.  They state: “Indeed, the primary benefit of mergers to the economy 
is their potential to generate such efficiencies.  Efficiencies generated through merger can 
enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, 
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”  Two main conditions are imposed: only 
merger-specific efficiencies are recognized, and those efficiencies must be sufficiently verifiable.  
Cognizable efficiencies also must be sufficiently large to prevent the merger from being 
anticompetitive.
131 
Which efficiencies are merger specific?  Under the agencies standard approach, economies of 
scale from, say, building larger plants, are likely to be accepted.  Efficiencies from some other 
functions, like combining payroll operations, are less likely to be credited because of the option 
of contracting out for such services, achieving benefits of scale short of merger.  And if two 
hospitals demonstrate a need to share modern imaging equipment due to high fixed costs, they 
                                                 
129 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
130 See, for example, the cases cited in Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow (1998, vol. 4A, p. 29 n.17). 
131 As noted previously, the 2004 EU guidelines are quite similar, including a recognition of an efficiencies defense 
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may be permitted to form a joint venture limited to that purpose but not allowed on this ground 
to go forward with an otherwise anticompetitive merger of all of their operations. 
Farrell and Shapiro (2001) explore which efficiencies should qualify as being merger specific, 
recognizing that in the presence of economies of scale firms can grow internally to reduce their 
average costs.  They distinguish between efficiencies based solely on scale economies and 
efficiencies that reflect the combination of specific, non-tradable assets owned by the merging 
parties, which they consider true merger-specific efficiencies, or synergies.  They argue that 
many claimed efficiencies are not in fact merger-specific. 
There is a deeper problem underlying many disputes about whether efficiencies are merger 
specific.  Often, the parties will claim that the merger is necessary whereas enforcers will 
question why the purported benefit cannot be achieved through some more limited form of 
contractual arrangement.  Under what circumstances there exist benefits from combining 
activities under the direction of a single firm that cannot be achieved through contracting is, of 
course, a core issue in the theory of the firm, one whose exploration was launched by Coase 
(1937), extended by Williamson (1975, 1985), and explored in subsequent work by Grossman 
and Hart (1986), Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995), among 
many others.  Since the findings of this literature are often subtle, depending on factors that may 
not be readily and reliably ascertained in the course of an antitrust dispute, there will be an 
inevitable area of uncertainty.  The level of theoretical sophistication reflected in modern 
analysis of contracts and the firm has yet to make significant inroads in merger analysis.  In 
practice, the agencies tend to look at the forms of collaboration short of merger that are actually 
used in the industry to determine whether certain claimed efficiencies are merger specific. 
In the end, enforcers do and should have a healthy skepticism about self-serving efficiency 
claims made by competitors seeking to merge.  As we noted in Section C, acquiring firms often 
seem to overestimate the benefits of an acquisition, and the overall record regarding merger 
efficiencies is mixed at best.  And it tends to be very difficult for the enforcement agencies or the 
courts to assess whether claimed efficiencies are indeed likely to arise.  Kolasky and Dick (2003) 
examine the treatment of efficiencies in merger cases, arguing that the enforcement agencies and 
the courts have made substantial progress over the past twenty years incorporating efficiencies 
into merger analysis.
132 
Suppose that synergies can be quantified, or that in a particular case the enforcement agency or 
the court has done its best in determining the matter.  The important remaining question is how 
efficiencies and anticompetitive effects are to be balanced.  Should the decision depend on total 
economic welfare—the sum of consumer and producer surplus—the standard normative 
economic approach?  Should it instead turn solely on consumer surplus—whether prices rise or 
fall—that is, whether the efficiencies are sufficiently passed on to consumers to at least offset 
any price increase that would otherwise ensue due to anticompetitive effects?  Or should some 
other standard be used, which seems to be the approach in earlier cases like Brown Shoe? 
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This set of questions brings to mind the discussion in subsection III.E.2 on the meaning of the 
rule of reason.
133  Recall that the Chicago Board case and subsequent decisions define 
reasonableness in terms of what promotes versus suppresses competition.  Yet there remained 
ambiguity concerning the meaning of competition. 
Under a process-oriented view, which has support in many modern cases, one might be 
concerned with protecting rivalry per se, which might imply a strict merger policy.  That view 
seems consonant with the 1960s merger decisions and language such as that quoted above from 
Brown Shoe (the latter part, referring to the merits of protecting competitors and preserving 
decentralization) or that in Philadelphia Bank referring to the preservation of a “traditionally 
competitive economy.”
134  Under this approach, not only would one condemn a merger from 2 
firms to 1, 3 firms to 2, and 4 firms to 3, but also, it might seem, from N firms to  1 N − , no 
matter how large was N.  But as discussed previously, even when this view of merger policy was 
dominant, smaller mergers were permitted.  Although efficiencies were not recognized as a 
defense and were sometimes viewed as an evil in larger mergers, the threshold for challenge was 
high enough to allow countless mergers to go unchallenged.  Furthermore, modern cases such as 
BMI interpreting the rule of reason and the bulk of lower court cases on mergers, as well as the 
Merger Guidelines, accept more explicitly that efficiency counts positively, and in particular that 
better serving customers, notably, through lower prices, is desirable.
135 
Thus, at present the main contest seems to be between consumer welfare and total welfare, that 
is, whether efficiencies should be credited when they increase producer surplus rather than being 
passed on to consumers.  The influence of merger synergies on price depends on both the manner 
in which the firms’ cost function is altered by the merger and on the nature of firms’ interaction.  
At one extreme, if a merger produces no (or negligible) cost reductions but reduces the number 
of competitors in a Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly, and N is not very large, prices will rise 
nontrivially and the reduction in consumer welfare will be approximately equal to the fall in total 
welfare.  No tradeoff needs to be considered.  To take another possibility, suppose that two firms 
merge to monopoly and that all the savings are in fixed costs; then prices will rise (unless there 
was perfect collusion previously) because fixed costs do not ordinarily affect pricing decisions.  
However, if the increase in deadweight loss is not that great but the savings in fixed costs is 
large, then consumer welfare may fall while total welfare rises.  For a further contrast, consider a 
merger of two firms in a setting with many firms and assume that the cost saving involves a 
reduction in marginal cost; then the merged firm may price sufficiently more aggressively to 
bring prices down, in which case both consumer surplus and total welfare would rise.  Viewed 
                                                 
133 The rule of reason, note, arose in interpretation of Sherman Act Section 1, which is also one of the statutes 
applicable to horizontal mergers.  Thus, as a formal legal matter, one might say that the rule of reason is the 
Sherman Act standard for horizontal mergers.  However, courts have generally considered mergers separately, and 
as noted, increasingly without regard to which statute is invoked in a particular case.  Nevertheless, given the 
growing convergence in approaches under all of the antitrust statutes, one should expect some congruence between 
courts’ analyses of horizontal mergers and of what are denominated as rule of reason cases. 
134 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). 
135 Other jurisdictions, with different laws and histories, might give weight to other objectives in addition to or 
instead of economic welfare (whether consumer welfare or total welfare).  For example, antitrust policy in the 
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more broadly, the analysis in Sections A and B above (the latter of which drew on Section III on 
collusion) elaborates conditions under which prices may be expected to rise or fall and how those 
conditions depend on the manner in which a merger may affect firms’ costs. 
Accordingly, although many mergers raise both consumer and total surplus or reduce them both, 
there will exist a notable subset of mergers that increase total surplus but reduce consumer 
surplus.  The resulting need to choose between consumer welfare and total welfare as guides to 
merger policy was presented sharply by Williamson’s (1968) classic discussion of the tradeoff 
between market power and efficiencies and, in particular, his demonstration in a basic case that 
even modest gains in productive efficiency could exceed the losses in allocative efficiency from 
price increases.
136  Recent contributions to the debate about the proper objective of antitrust 
policy include Farrell and Katz (2006), Heyer (2006), Kolasky and Dick (2003), and Salop 
(2005). 
The precise language of the various statutes—which as prior discussions indicate are not taken 
literally or interpreted independently—gives conflicting guidance in determining the underlying 
principle.
137  Clayton Act Section 7’s prohibition on mergers that may substantially lessen 
competition or create monopoly might be interpreted to prohibit any mergers that reduce rivalry 
or at least those leading to high concentration, and certainly to a single firm serving the market.  
Yet it is possible that even a merger to monopoly could raise both total welfare and consumer 
welfare.  The Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade is interpreted under the rubric of 
the rule of reason, which has been explained to contain substantial ambiguity even after being 
translated into the promote/suppress competition test and refined through modern applications.  
The FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair” competition is vague and question-begging on its face. 
That said, the modern trend in the United States seems to be toward a consumer welfare standard 
when considering the efficiencies defense, although the legal authorities have not elaborately 
rationalized this view, specifically by defending it against the alternative of total welfare.  The 
Merger Guidelines’ discussion of efficiencies at one point refers to those that “likely would be 
sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, for 
example, by preventing price increases in that market.”  Likewise, a number of lower courts 
                                                 
136 In a market where prices are initially at a competitive level, the benefits from productive efficiency are a 
rectangle (assuming a uniform downward shift in the marginal cost curve) whereas deadweight loss is the familiar 
triangle, which for small price increases will be a much smaller quantity.  However, if price is nontrivially above 
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137 The legislative histories, however, are clearer.  When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, it is unimaginable 
that the legislators appreciated modern concepts of efficiency and deadweight loss, which were unknown even to 
most economists at that time.  Legislators did seem to care about high prices and also about the protection of small 
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considering the issue have indicated the need for the merging firms to demonstrate that 
efficiencies be passed along to consumers.
138 
From an economic point of view, however, it would seem that in principle total welfare should 
be the standard.
139  Producers have owners who are people, just like final consumers.  One might 
nevertheless favor consumers on distributive grounds because owners are on average richer than 
consumers (although obviously the groups overlap substantially).  However, it is usually more 
efficient to achieve distributive objectives directly, through the income tax and transfer 
system.
140  In addition, one should add that, in antitrust, the protected class is often producers.  
This is patently so when the merging parties sell intermediate goods (although savings to 
purchasing firms that operate a competitive market will ultimately be passed on to subsequent 
consumers).  Furthermore, antitrust law treats buying cartels and horizontal mergers that create 
monopsony power similarly to the way it treats price-fixing and the creation of market power by 
sellers.
141  Yet lower input prices can, to a degree depending on market structure and other 
factors, translate into lower prices to final consumers.  If only consumer welfare mattered, 
increases in buyer power through horizontal mergers and otherwise might be praised, not 
condemned. 
Pragmatic considerations may, however, provide justification for cabining efficiency defenses in 
various respects, including perhaps a focus limited to consumer welfare.  For example, adopting 
a consumer welfare standard may induce firms to undertake deals that obtain potential synergies 
while causing less harm to competition, leading to even higher total welfare than would a total 
welfare standard.  In any event, the previously-noted difficulties of ascertaining merger-specific 
efficiencies in individual mergers, ex ante, counsels caution, which is already reflected in the 
Merger Guidelines and also seems evident in court decisions.  Indeed, this may explain why 
average efficiencies heavily influence the thresholds for anticompetitive effects, both generally 
and in specific industries, while at the same time efficiencies are often given short shrift in 
examining particular cases, absent an unusually strong demonstration.  But once sufficiently 
persuasive proof of atypically great efficiencies is offered, it is not clear that a requirement of 
                                                 
138 See Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow (1998, vol. 4A, pp. 37-38 n.1). 
139 A total welfare standard is also consistent with maximizing worldwide welfare.  When there are multiple 
jurisdictions with authority over mergers with international spillovers, different jurisdictions might find it in their 
national self-interest to adopt different standards.  For example, a country that is weighted toward consumers in 
sectors most influenced by antitrust policy might want to be stricter and use a consumer welfare standard, whereas a 
country with stronger producer/owner representation among its citizens might prefer total welfare or even a focus on 
productive efficiency.  See Guzman (1998).  Some have suggested that a mix of national bias and protectionism—
rather than (or in addition to) differences in underlying approaches—may explain the (few) instances (the most 
notable being the proposed but ultimately abandoned merger of G.E. and Honeywell and the ultimately approved 
merger of Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, subject to some conditions) in which the U.S. and EU antitrust 
authorities have taken different views of mergers or other practices. 
140 See, for example, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Kaplow (2004).   
141 For example, the Merger Guidelines state: “The exercise of market power by buyers (‘monopsony power’) has 
adverse effects comparable to those associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.  In order to assess 
potential monopsony concerns, the Agency will apply an analytical framework analogous to the framework of these 
Guidelines.” Antitrust, Page 89 
pass-through to consumers makes the agencies’ or courts’ task easier rather than harder.  On one 
hand, determining pass-through requires resolution of an additional, challenging issue.  On the 
other hand, in some instances the best evidence of a merger’s effects will be from observed 
pricing behavior that may reflect a combination of anticompetitive effects and efficiencies.  For 
example, in Staples, evidence of higher prices in more concentrated markets presumably 
reflected the combined impact of concentration and whatever pass-through of efficiencies may 
have been occurring.  Note that reductions in marginal cost are generally passed through to some 
degree to consumers, even by a monopolist, although the pass-through rate can be sensitive to 
the shape of the demand curve and the nature of oligopolistic interaction.
142 
There are also longer-run concerns relating to dynamic efficiency.  Some degree of competition 
has often been thought conducive to firms’ running a tight ship, better serving customers, and 
being more innovative.  The relationship between competition and innovation has proven 
difficult to establish as a general theoretical matter.
143  In any event, if the process of competition 
itself—which seems to have been favored by the drafters of antitrust legislation and earlier courts 
and commentators—is of some value, but this value is difficult to measure, it makes sense to tilt 
the balance against concentration.  This might be done by making the threshold for challenge 
lower—requiring less demonstration of anticompetitive effects—or through other means, such as 
being less generous in considering efficiencies in justifying otherwise problematic mergers.  
Greater stinginess might be accomplished by raising proof burdens or by imposing additional 
requirements, such as by requiring savings to be passed along to consumers.  The optimal 
manner of incorporating these sometimes subtle and typically unpredictable dynamic concerns 
into horizontal merger policy is not obvious.  
E. Market Analysis Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The Merger Guidelines are utilized to evaluate specific proposed mergers, requiring one to move 
from abstractions and general theories to decisions about a concrete case.  To motivate this 
problem, consider the recent proposed merger of US Airways and Delta Air Lines.  In November 
2006, US Airways made an unsolicited offer to acquire Delta, which at the time was in 
bankruptcy.  Predicting the effects of this merger on airline passengers is highly complex.  First, 
one must identify the routes on which US Airways and Delta are significant direct rivals.  Then 
one seeks to determine whether there will be a unilateral or coordinated price increase on those 
routes.  Diversion ratios and gross margins are certainly relevant to this inquiry, but many other 
factors enter into the picture as well.  Will competition from other carriers, including low-cost 
carriers, prevent the merged entity from profitably raising fares?  Given the complex fare 
structures that are used in the airline industry, will the merger have different effects on fares for 
different classes of customers, such as leisure versus business travelers?  How do frequent-flier 
programs affect the analysis?  Will the merger generate substantial efficiencies based on running 
                                                 
142 Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) derive an expression for the pass-through rate for a monopolist.  Shapiro (1989) 
discusses pass-through rates in various oligopoly models. 
143 Competition generally enhances innovative incentives, as firms seek to gain ground on their rivals by introducing 
new and improved products.  But a competitive market structure can cause problems for innovation if firms have 
difficulty appropriating the returns from their innovative efforts, for example, due to rapid imitation by rivals. Antitrust, Page 90 
a larger network of flights at a single airline?  In evaluating these efficiencies, how does one 
factor in the role of airline alliances, a less complete form of collaboration than a merger?  If 
efficiencies lead to lower fares on some routes, but if the reduced competition leads to higher 
fares on other routes, how does one balance these diverse effects on different sets of consumers?  
Since one is looking ahead a year or more, is the industry changing in significant ways, such as 
through the growing role of regional jets and low-cost carriers, that make it appropriate to 
discount historical experience when making predictions?  Lastly, how strong a competitor will 
Delta be if it is not acquired by US Airways, especially given the frequency of bankruptcies in 
this industry? 
In this Section, we will consider only some of the core, recurring issues.
144  The first step in the 
analytical framework provided by the Merger Guidelines is defining the relevant market, 
typically a relevant product market along with a relevant geographic market.  Then, as previously 
described in subsection D.2, the government determines whether there is a likely competitive 
risk based on the post-merger HHI and the increase in HHI due to the merger.  If there is, it 
considers entry and other forms of supply response (as well as efficiencies, already discussed in 
subsection D.3, and the possibility that one of the firms is failing).  In this section, we describe 
this approach and relate it to the preceding economic analysis and further work. 
1.  Market Definition: General Approach and Product Market Definition 
In evaluating methods used to define the relevant market, one should ask whether the resulting 
measures of concentration are reasonably probative of anticompetitive effects in instances in 
which concentration is high and notably increased by the merger.  This question is particularly 
pressing because, as we explained in subsection II.D.2.b, the common approach of defining 
markets and looking to market shares is just one of many, not necessarily the most reliable, and 
rather indirect and incomplete—indeed, sufficiently so that it does not play a central role in 
economists’ analysis of market power. 
It is useful to begin by revisiting the precise relevance of market definition and market share.  A 








which is to say that the firm’s margin is inversely related to the magnitude of its own, firm-
specific elasticity of demand.  In the model of a single, dominant firm pricing with a competitive 
fringe, this firm-specific elasticity is given by equation (2),  
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extensively in the Merger Guidelines.  Most others are noted in passing or would be admissible in light of various 
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Thus, we recall that the firm’s market share, S, is relevant for two reasons.  First, a higher share 
means that there are fewer competitors, so for a given elasticity of supply response, the total 
response will be smaller.  (Hence the 1 S −  in the numerator.)  Supply response will be 
considered further in subsection 3.  Second, a higher share indicates that the firm captures a 
greater proportion of the industry profits due to a price increase. 
Expression (2) also indicates, as we emphasized previously, that the firm-specific elasticity of 
demand depends on the market elasticity of demand, which raises complex problems for an 
approach that first defines a market and then looks to market share.  If the market elasticity of 
demand were the same in every properly defined market, then (setting aside issues concerning 
rivals’ supply response) shares would have clear implications for market power.  However, this 
is certainly not the case (and, if it were, no one has ever suggested what that common market 
elasticity is).  Generically, an approach that defines the relevant market (whatever that might 
mean) and then looks only at market share can be highly misleading.  As we explained, a high 
share does not imply substantial market power if market demand is highly elastic, and a low 
share does not imply a lack of significant market power if market demand is sufficiently 
inelastic. 
At best, markets can be defined so as to minimize these concerns, although as we explained, one 
often needs to know the right answer—that is, how much market power exists—in order to know 
which market definition is best.  A major factor that contributes to this difficulty is the all-or-
nothing nature of market definition: products (or regions) are either “in” or “out.”  Moreover, we 
discussed how even good substitutes, in the sense of having a high cross-elasticity of demand 
with the firm’s product, may impose little restraint, notably, if they are a small share of 
consumers’ expenditures, whereas a group of mediocre substitutes might, taken together, impose 
substantial restraint. 
Nevertheless, the Merger Guidelines in fact utilize an approach that relies heavily on defining 
markets, and the outcome of litigated merger cases often turns on how the relevant market is 
defined.  Accordingly, it is important to consider how this task is presently accomplished and 
how it might be improved.  For the case of product markets (the analysis of geographic markets 
is analogous), the Merger Guidelines (§1.11) specify the following procedure: 
Absent price discrimination, the Agency will delineate the product market to be a 
product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that 
was the only present and future seller of those products (“monopolist”) likely 
would impose at least a “small but significant and nontransitory” increase in price 
[SSNIP]. . . . Specifically, the Agency will begin with each product (narrowly 
defined) produced or sold by each merging firm and ask what would happen if a 
hypothetical monopolist of that product imposed at least [an SSNIP], but the 
terms of sale of all other products remained constant.  If, in response to the price 
increase, the reduction in sales of the product would be large enough that a 
hypothetical monopolist would not find it profitable to impose such an increase in 
price, then the Agency will add to the product group the product that is the next-
best substitute for the merging firm's product. . . . The price increase question is 
then asked for a hypothetical monopolist controlling the expanded product group. 
. . . This process will continue until a group of products is identified such that a Antitrust, Page 92 
hypothetical monopolist over that group of products would profitably impose at 
least [an SSNIP], including the price of a product of one of the merging firms. . . . 
In attempting to determine objectively the effect of [an SSNIP], the Agency, in 
most contexts, will use a price increase of five percent lasting for the foreseeable 
future.
145 
This approach focuses on the ability of a hypothetical monopolist to raise prices, but the question 
at hand is a merger, and typically not a merger to monopoly.  The behavior of the hypothetical 
monopolist seems most relevant when considering the possibility of coordinated effects.  In the 
theory of collusion that we discussed in Section III, we implicitly assumed that we knew the 
group of firms in the market that might collude.  If, regarding the merger under examination, that 
group of firms corresponds to the firms in the market just defined, then the Merger Guidelines 
approach will (supposing for the moment that it works) have indicated that successful collusion 
by the firms in the industry would indeed have a significant anticompetitive effect.  If not—if, 
say, the market properly includes firms producing products very different from those of the 
merging firms, where heterogeneity or other factors are such that collusion is unlikely to be 
feasible—then the analysis would suggest that coordinated effects are probably not a concern.  
The second question with coordinated effects is, assuming that collusion would be profitable, 
how much does the present merger increase the likelihood of successful collusion?  We 
examined this question in Section B, above, where we discussed various reasons that higher 
concentration and greater increases in concentration bolster collusion but also noted some 
reservations (namely, that if collusion is sufficiently likely short of monopoly, it is possible that 
further increases in concentration would not have much incremental anticompetitive effect).  
The role of market definition is less clear, however, under a theory of unilateral effects, where 
the profitability of a price increase for the merged entity depends on the demand system and on 
such factors as the gross margins and the diversion ratios that measure the proximity of the 
merging firms’ products, not on drawing lines between products that are in or out of the relevant 
market.  However, in the particular case in which there is a logit demand structure, the elasticity 
of demand for the inside products as a group is relevant to calculating unilateral effects.  If the 
merged entity would have only a small share of the relevant market, calibrated and defined using 
the SSNIP test, unilateral competitive effects in excess of the amount used to define the SSNIP 
are relatively unlikely, but such effects may well arise if the firms have a large combined share in 
the relevant market.  Defining markets in this way thus allows the government to meet its 
presumption under a unilateral effects theory if the combined share of the merging firm exceeds 
                                                 
145 When price discrimination is feasible and profitable, the Merger Guidelines (§1.12) allow for separate “price 
discrimination markets” “consisting of a particular use or uses by groups of buyers of the product” for which an 
SSNIP would be profitable.  For example, in a railroad merger, the hypothetical monopoly rail carrier on a given 
route may be able to price discriminate between shippers who have the ability to ship by water versus those whose 
next best alternative to rail service is trucking.  See Varian (1989) on price discrimination generally and Stole (2007) 
on its relationship to imperfect competition.  In some circumstances, the hypothetical monopolist may be able to 
engage in price discrimination even if such discrimination is not observed prior to the merger because it is 
undermined by competition among the suppliers in the proposed relevant market.  However, Hausman et al. (1996) 
point out that price discrimination can be unprofitable if the methods used by the hypothetical monopolist to price 
discriminate are imperfect. Antitrust, Page 93 
some threshold.
146  Also, in industries where products are fairly homogeneous and capacities are 
important, such as in some chemical and energy markets, using the Merger Guidelines to define 
a relevant product and geographic market, and making inferences about unilateral effects based 
on concentration measures, fits reasonably well with the theory of Cournot equilibrium. 
Now consider how, as a practical matter, one might implement the Merger Guidelines’ approach 
to defining markets.  For simplicity, consider a symmetric situation in which the pre-merger 
price of each product is P , the pre-merger output of each product is  X , and the marginal cost of 
producing each product is a constant, MC , so the pre-merger gross margin is  ( )/ mP M C P ≡− .  
In this case, the SSNIP test reduces to a very simple formula.  Suppose that the hypothetical 
monopolist raises the price of one of the products by a factor G, to  (1 ) PG + .  (The same 
calculation could be done for a price increase applied to all of the products.)  If the price increase 
would cause no decline in unit sales, it obviously would be profitable, whereas if it would cause 
unit sales to drop to zero, it would not be profitable.  Since profits are continuous in sales, there 
exists an intermediate level of sales for which the price increase would break even.  The largest 
percentage reduction in sales such that this price increase is just barely profitable is referred to as 






.  This expression comports with intuition: a larger loss of sales is tolerable if the price 
increase is greater, but the acceptable loss of sales is smaller, the larger is the initial profit 
margin.  For illustrative purposes, suppose that the magnitude of the SSNIP is 10%, so we are 
considering  0.1 G = , and that the pre-merger margin is 30%; then  0.3 m =  and we get  0.25 L = . 
These calculations are directly relevant to the SSNIP test in the Merger Guidelines.  Consider a 
cluster of products that is being tested to see if the group of products are sufficiently inclusive to 
form a relevant market.  Suppose that the pre-merger gross margin on each product is the same 
and, furthermore, that one is asking about a uniform price increase for all of these products and 
all customers.  That hypothesized SSNIP will be profitable, and hence the products will form a 
relevant market under the SSNIP test, if and only if the actual loss of sales is less than the critical 
loss.  Thus, in the foregoing example above, the hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable 
to impose a 10% price increase so long as the resulting actual loss would be less than 25% of the 
initial level of sales.  Using simple arithmetic, we have thus translated the SSNIP test into a very 
well-defined economic question regarding the (arc) elasticity of demand facing the hypothetical 
monopolist.  (Keep in mind, however, that this analysis is applicable to a uniform price increase 
in all products in the market, not to whether two merging firms would find it profitable to 
unilaterally increase the prices on one or both of their products.) 
                                                 
146 The Merger Guidelines provide that “Where market concentration data fall outside the safe harbor regions of 
Section 1.5, the merging firms have a combined market share of at least thirty-five percent, and where data on 
product attributes and relative product appeal show that a significant share of purchasers of one merging firm's 
product regard the other as their second choice, then market share data may be relied upon to demonstrate that there 
is a significant share of sales in the market accounted for by consumers who would be adversely affected by the 
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Katz and Shapiro (2003) and O’Brien and Wickelgren (2003) show how one can go beyond the 
simple arithmetic underlying critical loss to use pre-merger equilibrium relationships to sharpen 
the SSNIP test.  Their work is motivated by the observation that the critical loss falls if the 
margin is higher.  In the example just given, if the gross margin rises from 0.3 to 0.4, the critical 
loss falls from 25% to 20%.  Based on this observation, merging parties whose products are sold 
at large gross margins have been known to argue for the inclusion of many products in the 
relevant market, based on the fact that the critical loss is small.  However, these articles show 
that such logic is incomplete and can be highly misleading.  The reason is that the existence of 
high pre-merger margins itself indicates that the pre-merger firm-specific elasticities of demand 
must be relatively small, and this of course has direct implications for the elasticity of demand 
facing the hypothetical monopolist in the post-merger market.   
To see how the logic works, consider imposing the percentage price increase G on one product in 
the symmetric case just discussed.  Since the firm-specific elasticity of demand for that product 
is the inverse of the margin, the percentage of sales lost for this product will be approximately 
/ Gm  when G is small.  Katz and Shapiro define the aggregate diversion ratio D for a given 
product as the fraction of the overall sales lost by that product that are captured by (diverted to) 
any of the other products in the candidate product market.
147  Therefore, the hypothetical 
monopolist who raises the price of this product effectively only loses a fraction (1 ) D − of the 
sale that are lost by that particular product.  As a consequence, the actual loss of sales for the 
hypothetical monopolist is only  (1 )( / ) AD G m =− .  The price increase is profitable if and only if 
the actual loss is less than the critical loss of  /( ) LG Gm = + .  With a few steps of algebra, it can 
be shown that  A L <  if and only if DL > .
148 
Where applicable, this formula tells us that a group of products will form a relevant market when 
the aggregate diversion ratio is larger than the critical loss.  To illustrate, suppose that the pre-
merger gross margins are 40% and that one is considering a 10% SSNIP, so the critical loss is 
20%.  Now imagine that the price of one of the candidate group of products is raised.  If more 
than 20% of the lost sales are diverted to other products in this group, rather than outside the 
group, the group forms a relevant market.  Katz and Shapiro (2003) stress that this test can lead 
to relatively narrow markets, especially in cases where the pre-merger margins are large.  
O’Brien and Wickelgren (2003) argue that critical loss analysis has often been done incorrectly, 
in a way that is inconsistent with the pre-merger equilibrium conditions, which they illustrate 
                                                 
147 In the symmetric case with N products, the aggregate diversion ratio is equal to  1 N −  times the diversion ratio 
between the product in question and any one of the other products.  More generally, the aggregate diversion ratio is 
the sum of the diversion ratios for all of the other products being considered.  
148 Katz and Shapiro (2003) show how the calculations change if the pre-merger margins differ for the different 
products in the candidate market.  In such cases, the Merger Guidelines ask whether the hypothetical monopolist 
will raise the price of any of the products sold by the merging firms.  It may be profitable to raise the price of a 
product with an especially low margin because diversion of sales to other products will actually raise the profits of 
the hypothetical monopolist, offsetting sales that are not diverted to other products in the candidate group.  Antitrust, Page 95 
with two litigated merger cases, FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., a hospital merger, and FTC v. 
Swedish Match, a merger involving loose leaf chewing tobacco.
149 
2.  Geographic Market Definition 
The Merger Guidelines approach to geographic market definition formally parallels its approach 
to product market definition.  To illustrate how the analysis would proceed, consider BP’s 
acquisition of Arco.  These two companies were the leading producers of Alaskan North Slope 
crude oil, the vast majority of which was sold to refineries on the U.S. West Coast.  These 
refineries required crude oil to make refined products, notably gasoline, so the relevant product 
was clearly crude oil.  To determine the geographic market for the supply of crude oil to U.S. 
West Coast refineries under the Merger Guidelines, one starts with the merging firms’ 
production locations, Alaska.  One asks whether a hypothetical monopolist over Alaskan crude 
oil could profitably impose an SSNIP, taking as given the price of crude oil supplied from other 
locations to the West Coast refineries, which in this case included California and a variety of 
countries from which crude oil was shipped to the U.S. West Coast by tanker.  If substitution to 
California crude oil would defeat a price increase imposed only on Alaskan North Slope crude 
oil, then California must be added to Alaska and the exercise repeated for foreign sources.  In 
this case, since many West Coast refineries had demonstrated the ability to shift to imported 
crude oil in response to small price changes, the relevant market was arguably worldwide.
150 
For the purposes of geographic market definition, it is common to look at the patterns of imports 
and exports across a given geographic boundary.  However, care must be taken, for otherwise 
this method can be misleading.
151  A prominent way of examining imports and exports is the 
method advanced by Elzinga and Hogarty (1973), which has been widely used in recent years in 
hospital merger cases.
152  Basically, one starts with a narrow geographic market (typically a 
                                                 
149 FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev’d, 186 F. 3d 1045 (8
th Cir. 1999); FTC 
v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000). 
150 See Bulow and Shapiro (2004) and Hayes et al. (2007) for further analysis of geographic market definition in this 
case. 
151 One might wonder how it can be widely recognized that nontrivial product substitution is consistent with the 
existence of significant market power whereas geographic market substitution (imports and exports) is so often 
viewed as strong presumptive, if not conclusive, proof of the lack of market power.  The common reasoning seems 
to imagine a case of homogenous products where the only distinction involves transportation costs, which are 
identical for all consumers at a given location.  Think about supplies of fungible intermediate goods to firms.  If a 
fraction of local firms is already importing its supply, all local producers must be indifferent between local 
purchases and imports at current prices, so an increase in local prices would cause substitution limited only by the 
extent to which foreign supply net of foreign demand slopes upward.  But this reasoning is inapplicable when 
products are not homogeneous or consumers’ locations or transportation costs vary (the latter of which is often true 
when the consumers rather than the goods must travel).  Then, the relevant analogy is to markets with differentiated 
products, as will become apparent in the discussion to follow in the text.  See, for example, Kaplow (1982). 
152 See Frech et al. (2004) for an extensive discussion of how these tests have been used in hospital merger cases.  
Capps et al. (2002) emphasize problems with using patient flow data to define markets in hospital mergers and 
suggest an alternative approach based on estimating a logit model of hospital demand.  They find that mergers that 
would be permitted by relying on patient-flow data may easily fail according to the SSNIP criterion under all three 
approaches that they examine; indeed, such data were largely uncorrelated with SSNIP except in extreme cases.   Antitrust, Page 96 
modest radius around the locale of two merging hospitals) and then progressively expands the 
candidate geographic market to include more distant hospitals until two conditions hold: (1) 
some large fraction of the merging hospitals’ business comes from the candidate geographic 
market, and (2) some large fraction of the individuals resident in the candidate geographic 
market use hospital services within that region. 
While such measures of imports and exports can be informative for the hypothetical-monopolist 
SSNIP test, and for estimating the competitive effects of mergers, they cannot substitute for 
evidence regarding the ability and willingness of consumers to substitute products supplied 
outside versus inside a candidate geographic market in response to price changes.
153  To see the 
problem, consider the case in which the two merging hospitals are nearby, with no other 
hospitals in the immediate area.  Unless the fraction θ  of the customers served by these hospitals 
that comes from the local area is very high, the proposed approach would draw the market more 
broadly.
154  How does this reasoning relate to whether an SSNIP could profitably be imposed by 
the merged entity, which is in fact a monopolistic supplier in the local area?  Suppose that the 
elasticity of demand from local customers is  L ε  and the elasticity of demand from customers 
who must travel further is  T ε .  If the local customers can be identified and discriminated against 
by the merged entity, the fraction of customers coming from outside the local area, 1 θ − , is of 
little or no relevance to an SSNIP targeted at local customers, so there is no reason to believe that 
the test gives a meaningful answer.  How does this test perform when price discrimination is not 
possible, and when more distant customers exhibit more elastic demand?  The elasticity of 
demand facing the hypothetical monopolist is given by  (1 ) LT θεθ ε + − .  With  TL ε ε > , this is 
decreasing in θ , that is, the elasticity is greater, the more patients come from outside the local 
area.  But this hardly answers the SSNIP question, which requires information about the pre-
merger margins, the critical loss, and the actual loss, which depends on  (1 ) LT θεθ ε +− .  In fact, 
the methods of Katz and Shapiro (2003) and O’Brien and Wickelgren (2003) discussed above 
tell us that the local area is a local market if and only if the diversion ratio from one hospital to 
the other is greater than the critical loss.  These measures, in turn, bear no necessary relationship 
to measures of the fraction of demand coming from local residents or the fraction of services 
local residents obtain outside the proposed narrow market.  That is, a local geographic area may 
well constitute a relevant geographic market, under the SSNIP test, even if a significant number 
of patients served by the local hospitals come from outside the area and even if a significant 
number of patients who live locally use more distant hospitals. 
                                                 
153 Whinston (2006, pp. 92-93) comments on the “serious flaws” that can arise by defining relevant markets based 
on transshipment patterns. 
154 In practice, this fraction will depend on the type of service.  For example, markets for emergency care or 
maternity care may well be more local than markets for elective surgery.  The geographic market definition exercise 
must, in principle, be performed for each separate relevant product, at least if these products are priced separately, 
although sometimes the focus is on the average for all services, which is systematically misleading.  (In our 
example, it may be that a high fraction who have unusual or extreme conditions travel a good distance, to major 
medical centers, whereas travel would not be worthwhile for most other medical needs.)  Another practical difficulty 
is that consumers’ locations are usually measured from the zip code that appears in admission records, but some 
individuals live part of the year elsewhere or they may work far from their residence, so for them a more distant 
facility may be less inconvenient (or may be the only one available under their employer’s health plan). Antitrust, Page 97 
Looking at import and export data can also readily lead to the opposite error: incorrectly 
concluding that a local region is a relevant market.  Recall our example in subsection II.D.2.b of 
a trucking company that served 100% of a particular route, yet a slight price increase would lead 
nearby trucking companies to offer their services.  To consider a more substantial example, 
return to the BP/Arco merger and ask whether Alaska and California constitute a relevant 
geographic market for crude oil.  As long as transportation costs are not essentially zero and 
product differentiation is minimal, one would expect oil supplies to flow to the nearest refineries.  
Suppose that the supply of crude oil from Alaska and California is sufficient to supply 95% of 
the needs of refineries on the U.S. West Coast and that more than 95% of crude oil from Alaska 
and California is used at West Coast refineries.  The Elzinga-Hogarty tests would indicate that 
Alaska and California qualify as a relevant geographic market.  But this result would be incorrect 
if there is an elastic supply of crude oil from other locations at the current price, or at a price just 
above the current price but less than the price after the SSNIP, which would be true if the costs 
of importing oil from more distant locations were not significantly greater than that of 
transporting oil from Alaska.  In fact, there is strong evidence that the supply of imported crude 
oil to the U.S. West Coast is highly elastic, with prices set by transportation arbitrage conditions. 
3.  Rivals’ Supply Response 
As we noted (reminded) in subsection 1, the ability to raise price depends not only on market 
share—and on the market elasticity of demand—but also on rivals’ supply response, the subject 
of subsection II.D.2.c.  The Merger Guidelines explicitly take this dimension into account.  They 
distinguish between “uncommitted entry” and “committed entry.” 
Uncommitted entrants are firms that would likely enter the market in response to an SSNIP in 
less than one year and without the expenditure of significant sunk costs.  They are counted as 
market participants.  That is, in computing market shares, their capacity is taken into account.
155  
For example, a firm that currently makes few sales in the relevant market would be assigned a 
large share if that firm would greatly expand its sales in response to an SSNIP.  By defining 
market share in this manner, the supply responses of all market participants to an SSNIP are 
incorporated into the analysis.  This approach helps to adjust for the fact that the Merger 
Guidelines define the relevant product and geographic markets solely on the basis of demand-
side considerations.  If the government’s prima facie case is established using these shares in 
markets thus defined, there is a presumption that current competitors’ ability to expand is not 
sufficient to alleviate concerns associated with the merger. 
However, it is also possible that the prospect of additional, committed entry, which might take as 
long as two years and require the expenditure of costs that then would be sunk, will either deter 
any post-merger price increase or insure that it is short-lived.  In order for the anticompetitive 
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principle is that “Market shares will be calculated using the best indicator of firms’ future competitive significance.”  
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effects of a highly concentrating merger to be negated by the prospect of entry, the Merger 
Guidelines require that such entry be timely, likely, and sufficient to counteract the competitive 
effects of concern.  Werden and Froeb (1998) explain how entry may well not be profitable if the 
pre-merger equilibrium reflects the sunk costs associated with entry.  They also show that, if 
entry does occur, it can make mergers unprofitable unless they generate synergies.  Baker 
(2003b) discusses the role of entry in recent merger cases. 
F. Predicting the Effects of Mergers 
In practice, myriad factors can come into play when predicting the competitive effects of 
mergers.  Every industry has its own unique attributes, be they scale economies, the role of 
advertising and reputation, networks effects, consumer switching costs, product compatibility, 
technological change, regulations, intellectual property rights, or trade barriers.  Virtually any 
topic in industrial organization economics can come into play in merger analysis.  We confine 
our attention here to the two leading techniques used to predict the price effects of mergers, with 
the caveat that to use these methods reliably in any given case one must have a thorough 
awareness of industry-specific factors. 
1.  Direct Evidence From Natural Experiments 
In some cases, a reduced-form approach is possible, under which empirical evidence is presented 
showing directly, through “natural experiments,” that the merger will lead to higher prices.  The 
Staples case is an excellent example of the successful use of this approach by the government.
 156  
In this case, the FTC successfully challenged the proposed merger between Staples and Office 
Depot, two of the three leading office superstore chains (the other being OfficeMax).  As 
explained by Baker (1999), the FTC presented econometric evidence showing that the prices 
charged by Staples at stores facing competition from nearby Office Depot stores were lower than 
the prices charged by Staples at stores without nearby Office Depot stores.  The FTC offered 
further expert testimony showing that these price differences were not caused by other factors 
that happened to be correlated with the presence or absence of nearby Office Depot stores. 
Economists might say that the FTC’s reduced-form approach, by going directly to the likely 
effects of the merger, reduced or even eliminated the need to define the relevant product market.  
In practice, however, this evidence was used in no small part to establish that “the sale of 
consumable office suppliers through office superstores” was a relevant product market, rather 
than the broader market for retail sales of office supplies, as alleged by the merging parties.
157 
To take another example, in the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific railroad merger, the DOJ 
opposed the deal, arguing that freight rates would rise as the number of carriers on many routes 
declined from 3 to 2 or even 2 to 1.  The DOJ supported its claims by presenting cross-sectional 
regression models showing how freight rates varied with the number of carriers on a route, along 
with other factors.  Based on these reduced-form estimates, freight rate increases of about 20% 
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were estimated on routes going from 2 to 1 carrier, and freight rate increases of about 10% were 
estimated on routes going from 3 to 2 carriers.
158 
More generally, reduced-form methods ask about the relationship between market structure (such 
as market concentration or the presence of certain companies) and prices or other measures of 
market performance, without specifying a structural model of the market.  These methods require 
variation in the data on market concentration or competition, and to obtain reliable results one 
must be careful to correct for other factors that may influence price.  Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) 
provide a broad discussion of the use of reduced-form estimates to predict the effects of 
horizontal mergers. 
2.  Merger Simulation 
A small industry has arisen in recent years that uses simulation methods to estimate the effects of 
mergers in markets involving differentiated products.  Merger simulation has most commonly 
been employed to study mergers involving consumer products, for which highly disaggregated 
retail scanner data on prices and sales are often available.  This approach to merger simulation is 
described in detail and surveyed by Werden and Froeb (2007).  Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001, 
2004) also provide a very useful discussion of the merger simulation methodology.  
There are two steps to simulating mergers.  First, a demand system for the differentiated products 
must be specified and estimated.  Werden et al. (2004) emphasize that the weight given to 
merger simulations should depend on how well the specified model fits the industry, based on 
historical evidence.
159  Estimating a demand system for differentiating products can be highly 
complex and require a great deal of detailed data.  A number of methods have been developed to 
limit the number of parameters that must be estimated.  One is to build a model in which demand 
for the various differentiated products depends on their underlying characteristics, an approach 
pioneered by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), with application to the 
automobile industry.  Nevo (2000a, 2001) applies similar methods in the ready-to-eat cereal 
industry, and Nevo (2000b) provides a practitioners’ guide.  Another approach is explored in 
Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), who employ a multi-stage budgeting procedure, under 
which products in a market are sorted into sub-groups based on their characteristics and demand 
is then estimated using this additional structure.  Werden and Froeb (1994) use a logit model, 
which imposes a great deal of structure but requires the estimation of relatively few parameters.  
Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001) advocate use of the “Proportionality-Calibrated Almost Ideal 
Demand System” (PCAIDS) model for calibrated demand simulation, which they consider 
superior to other calibrated-demand models, including the logit model. 
Second, the post-merger equilibrium is simulated using the structural model that was fitted to 
pre-merger data.  This involves solving the post-merger equilibrium conditions using the 
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industry evidence from 2001, several years after the merger, that shippers on the 2 to 1 routes were paying a 20% to 
30% premium, consistent with the DOJ’s estimates. 
159 For example, one can check to see if the estimated firm-specific elasticities of demand are consistent with the 
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parameters estimated based on pre-merger conditions.  Note that this approach assumes that the 
same model of oligopoly, a Nash equilibrium in prices, applies before and after the merger, so 
the method is only capable of estimating unilateral effects, not coordinated effects.  Peters (2006) 
evaluates the performance of these methods using data from the U.S. airline industry. 
V.  Monopolization 
Whereas Section III addressed collusion—when a group of competitors act in the manner of a 
single firm—and Section IV examined horizontal mergers—when competitors join to form a 
single firm—here we analyze how competition policy limits the behavior of a preexisting single 
firm.  As mentioned in Section II.E, the offense of monopolization under U.S. antitrust law has 
two requirements: monopoly power and exclusionary practices.
160  Accordingly, we begin by 
elaborating on the element of monopoly power from an economic perspective, drawing on our 
broader discussion of market power in Section II and its application to horizontal mergers in 
section IV.E.  Then we consider antitrust law on monopolization, with regard to both monopoly 
power and the exclusionary conduct requirement, viewed generally.  Finally, we examine the 
economics and law as applied to certain important practices, predatory pricing and exclusive 
dealing, in this relatively controversial realm of competition policy.
161  Myriad additional 
practices, some the subject of substantial literatures, are not considered here, although some of 
the principles adduced in our discussions of predatory pricing and exclusive dealing are 
pertinent.
162 
                                                 
160 EU competition policy regulates abuse of a dominant position, which is analogous to the anti-monopolization 
provision in U.S. law and will be mentioned below, mostly in notes in Section B. 
161 Crandall and Whinston (2003) argue that significant consumer benefits did not result from the remedies ordered 
in a number of the most visible government enforcement actions under Sherman Act Section 2 (the monopolization 
provision) during the twentieth century.  Even if these results are accepted, their approach does not tell us about the 
deterrence benefits that result from inducing changes in the behavior of monopolists.  In a companion piece, Baker 
(2003a) reviews evidence of anticompetitive outcomes before the enactment of the Sherman Act, during the 1890-
1910 period when enforcement of Section 2 was often ineffectual, and from other countries without comparable 
laws. 
162 The practice of tying, under which a firm requires customers who are purchasing product A also to purchase 
product B, has received a great deal of attention in the economics literature and in the law.  Nalebuff (2003) 
provides a clear and accessible explanation of the complex economic issues that arise when evaluating the effects of 
tying as well as multi-product discounts, also known as bundling.  Tirole (2005) provides a practitioner-oriented 
introduction to some of the issues that arise in the area of tying.  Whinston (1990) examines the strategic use of 
tying to foreclose competitors in an imperfectly competitive market for the tied good.  Refusals to deal, under which 
a vertically integrated firm refuses to sell its upstream input to its downstream rivals, are another practice that has 
been studied extensively.  Rey and Tirole (2007) examine a range of strategies of what they call “vertical 
foreclosure,” including the denial to rivals of access to a bottleneck input, as well as “horizontal foreclosure,” 
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A. Monopoly Power: Economic Approach 
1.  Rationale for Monopoly Power Requirement 
The monopoly power requirement under U.S. monopolization doctrine is that, as a prerequisite to 
liability, there must exist a significant degree of market power—how much is required will be 
considered in subsection B.1.  The rationale for market power thresholds has been addressed 
previously.  In Section II.E, we identified the screening function, that is, the reduction of false 
positives.  The value of a significant market power screen is particularly important with regard to 
monopolization for two interrelated reasons: single-firm behavior (which is obviously 
ubiquitous) is being regulated, and it often is ambiguous whether that behavior is anticompetitive 
(and most is not).  These points deserve some elaboration. 
At the heart of a market economy is the principle that firms have free reign to compete 
aggressively to win business and earn profits, possibly vanquishing their rivals in the process.  If 
one firm does gain a dominant position, that is the firm’s just reward for best serving the interests 
of consumers.  Imposing liability on companies that compete most effectively, perhaps to the 
point of driving their rivals out of business, would contravene the fundamental workings of a 
market economy.  Furthermore, the argument goes, government intervention is unnecessary 
because even the most successful companies must continually face the gales of creative 
destruction, as new and innovative rivals challenge their positions.  (And, in exceptional cases of 
natural monopoly, some form of industry-specific regulation is the answer, not broad-based 
limits on competitive practices.) 
Even most who accept strong forms of this laissez-faire view would embrace rules against 
collusion and horizontal mergers to monopoly.  A much greater danger, however, is raised when 
various practices of individual firms are challenged by the government—and, in some 
jurisdictions like the United States, private plaintiffs (often unsuccessful rivals).  Here, even 
those highly skeptical of extreme laissez-faire recognize the potentially high costs of litigation, 
of erroneous condemnation of benign or affirmatively beneficial practices, and perhaps most 
importantly of chilling routine competitive behavior.  As noted, the risks are especially great 
because it is often difficult to distinguish exclusionary from pro-competitive conduct, a subject to 
which we will return in Sections B-D. 
Fortunately, for most firms in most industries, the danger of socially costly anticompetitive 
behavior is negligible because the firms lack significant market power or any serious prospect of 
acquiring it even using the challenged practices.  Accordingly, for such firms, there is likely to 
be little benefit from examining in detail the effects of their conduct, whereas substantial costs of 
administration, mistaken prohibition, and inhibition of competitive vigor can be avoided by in 
essence granting them immunity.  To give a concrete example, imposing a monopoly power 
screen in the area of predatory pricing avoids potentially enormous costs that could arise if every 
firm contemplating an aggressive low-price strategy had to fear a possible predatory pricing 
challenge from its rivals. 
The monopoly power requirement is similar to the rule examined in subsection IV.D.2 that 
horizontal mergers must exceed some threshold level of anticompetitive effects as a prerequisite 
to liability.  With mergers, some level of synergies are presumed to exist in typical cases, so Antitrust, Page 102 
scrutiny is only triggered when anticompetitive effects are nontrivial.  With monopolization, the 
threshold is ordinarily understood to be much higher, not so much because single-firm practices 
are ordinarily far more valuable than mergers, but rather because of the more substantial problem 
of false positives and related chilling effects. 
Another point bearing on the value of a monopoly power requirement concerns the magnitude of 
incremental harm if prices do rise.  If there is no technical market power as defined in Section II 
(that is, if price is at marginal cost), the marginal loss in total surplus as price begins to rise is 
zero.  The greater the extent of initial market power—that is, the higher the initial margin—the 
greater is the marginal distortion from further price increases.  Note, however, that this 
observation is pertinent under a total welfare standard rather than a consumer welfare standard, 
on which see subsection IV.D.3.  After all, the marginal reduction in consumer surplus is highest 
when price rises from the point at which it equals marginal cost; the higher is the initial price, the 
smaller is the incremental reduction in consumer surplus.  (The incremental reduction per unit of 
price increase is just the quantity demanded, which falls with price.) 
Application of a monopoly power test raises a number of issues.  First, how high should the 
market power requirement be?  Unfortunately, this question is difficult to answer because it is so 
hard to measure most of the costs and benefits of a higher threshold, notably, the level of chilling 
effects and the relative proportions of beneficial and undesirable practices among those that are 
deterred.  As we suggested in Section II.E, it seems optimal for the threshold to depend on the 
practice: for those obviously undesirable, little or no threshold seems necessary; for those more 
questionable, some intermediate standard; and for those sufficiently likely to be beneficial, an 
extremely high one—at some point being tantamount to deeming the practice legal per se.  
Again, to compare with horizontal mergers, many economies that may be realized through 
mergers can, although perhaps more slowly and at somewhat greater cost, be obtained through 
internal growth.  But if innovation or aggressive, competitive pricing by individual firms is 
deterred, alternative outlets seem unavailable. 
Another factor bearing on the height of the monopoly power threshold concerns the cost and 
potential for error in the market power inquiry itself.  As discussed in Section II.D (and 
elaborated in Sections IV.E and IV.F with regard to horizontal mergers), there are numerous 
means of assessing a firm’s market power that vary greatly across markets in their feasibility and 
reliability.
163  If a practice seems fairly clearly evil, it neither saves enforcement costs nor 
significantly reduces false positives to impose much (or any) market power requirement. 
We also discussed how conduct itself may be highly probative of market power in cases in which 
the conduct would not be rational in its absence.  Requiring proof of power without taking into 
account such conduct makes little sense, and if the conduct is, logically, used to infer sufficient 
power, then the monopoly power requirement is not serving as an independent threshold test.  
From an economic viewpoint, this is an appropriate result.  The danger arises when the practice 
is more uncertain regarding whether it is desirable, is in fact being employed, or its use 
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necessarily implies the existence of significant market power.  (These points are usefully 
reconsidered in the case of predatory pricing, taken up in Section C.) 
2.  Application to Challenged Practices 
Subsection 1 addresses the purpose of a market power threshold in monopolization cases.  We 
have not yet, however, revisited the important question that we raised in Section II.E about 
whether the requisite monopoly power is that which exists but for the challenged practices or in 
light of them, and what if any is the relevance of the difference between these two levels of 
market power.  For horizontal mergers, recall from subsection IV.D.2 that the Merger Guidelines 
(in the United States, and similarly in the European Union) impose a two-part test that requires 
both that the post-merger HHI be sufficiently high and that the increase in HHI due to the merger 
be at least of a certain magnitude (which itself depends on the former measure).  The analogue 
for monopolization would be to require that there exist monopoly power with the challenged 
practices and also that the practices contribute appreciably to that power.  We defer discussion of 
the current state of the law to subsection B.1; here, we consider what economic analysis has to 
say about these issues. 
At first glance, it might appear that only the increment should matter, for what is challenged is a 
set of practices, not the means by which the firm had previously gained its position.  Thus, if a 
firm with a valid and powerful patent engages in a practice that slightly increases its monopoly 
power, ordinarily all that would be enjoined would be the illegitimate practice; likewise, fines or 
damages would be based on the addition to power, not the whole of profits legitimately 
attributable to the patent itself.  Accordingly, it seems that the key question is not the 
disembodied query “How much economic power does the defendant have?” but rather “Will the 
challenged practices harm competition?” or “Will the challenged practices enhance the 
defendant’s market power?”  That well-defined economic question often can be usefully recast 
as: “Will the challenged practices significantly remove or relax constraints on the defendant’s 
pricing?” 
Our analysis in subsection 1, however, suggests that this should not be the sole inquiry regarding 
market power.  The screening function and the related problems of false positives and chilling 
effects indicate that we probably should not freely allow challenges in industries where there is 
little market power or against particular firms with little power (although if the increment were 
sufficiently large, say, all the way to a monopoly, that would be another matter).  Also, if prices 
are near marginal cost, price increases cause little deadweight loss.
164 
Taken together, for many practices (setting aside those that are unambiguously undesirable), it 
may make sense both to insist that the firm possess some significant level of market power and 
that the challenged practices contribute importantly to it.  Regarding the former, it often would 
not much matter whether the overall level of market power was measured with or without the 
challenged practices, unless they had a very large impact.  In such cases, it probably makes sense 
to consider power with the practices, although if power is quite low without them and the 
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practices themselves are ambiguous, one may be skeptical of their effects and much of the 
screening function would be lost if extravagant claims were permitted against firms that had little 
market power.  This assessment, however, imagines a prospective challenge against practices 
that have not yet had their (alleged) impact.  If, instead, the practices have had time to take effect 
and the result is substantial market power, it hardly seems sensible to excuse the defendant that 
asserts its power would be small without the practices, for that would be an admission of large 
anticompetitive effects. 
Consider further the notion that the challenged practices themselves should be shown to 
contribute significantly to the firm’s market power.  Just as in the case with horizontal mergers, 
if there were no possible benefits that might accompany the practices, it would seem that any 
increment (perhaps beyond a de minimis level) should be condemned.  There are two important 
reservations to this conclusion in the monopolization context.  First, as with horizontal mergers, 
some practices that may have anticompetitive effects may also promote efficiency.  Consider, for 
example, the possible tradeoffs that may be involved with exclusive dealing, as we discuss in 
Section D.  Then, one would need to balance the two, and how that balance should be conducted 
would importantly depend on whether the standard is limited to consumer surplus or is defined in 
terms of total economic welfare, as we discussed in subsection IV.D.3.  Second, there is again 
the problem of uncertainty and false positives.  If we are uncertain about whether challenged 
practices are undesirable at all, then depending on our Bayesian prior about the likelihood of 
different effects and the evidence before us, it may well be that the appropriate loss function is 
minimized by requiring that apparent anticompetitive effects be above some magnitude before 
condemning the practices. 
Of course, applying this additional test regarding the increment to market power is not without 
cost because such an inquiry requires additional information about the conduct at issue.  When 
practices are ambiguous—which is when screens tend to be must helpful—it will often be 
uncertain whether there is any anticompetitive effect, so one might wonder how its impact might 
be quantified.  An answer is that sometimes it can be quantified conditionally; that is, one can 
assume that the practices have some specified type of effect and then attempt to quantify what 
that effect would be. 
To apply these suggestions more concretely, it is useful to return to the framework introduced in 
Section II on market power and consider an example.  In subsection II.D.2.b, when discussing 
substitutes, we derived equation (5), showing that the elasticity of demand for a given product 
(product 1 of the N products) is equal to one plus the sum of the cross-elasticities of all the other 












=+ ∑ .  According to equation (1), the profit-maximizing markup for a single firm 
producing product 1 is given by  11 1 1/ m ε = .  The expression for the elasticity of demand 
captures the familiar idea that the firm’s market power is increased if the ability of consumers to 
shift to certain substitutes is reduced.  Practices that reduce a number of these cross-elasticities 
1 i ε  reduce the magnitude of the elasticity of demand for the product in question,  11 ε , giving the 
firm greater market power and thereby raising the firm’s profit-maximizing price. Antitrust, Page 105 
Suppose that the practices at issue are alleged to reduce the attractiveness of some of the 
substitutes to the firm’s product.  For example, predatory pricing might eliminate one or more of 
the substitute products from the market.  In principle, a full inquiry would allow us to determine 
that the practices reduce the cross-elasticity of demand with substitute i at preexisting prices 
from  1 i ε  to  11 ˆii ε ε ≤ .  The full inquiry thus would tell us that the practices reduce the magnitude 
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Since  11 11 ˆ ε ε < , the firm’s profit-maximizing price will rise as a consequence of the 
practices.
165 
Now return to our questions about levels of market power versus changes in power due to the 
challenged practices.  Regarding the monopoly power threshold, if the magnitude of the 
elasticity of demand facing the firm without the challenged practices,  11 ε , is sufficiently high, 
no liability can arise if the test looks to preexisting power.  As noted, the rationale would be that 
a firm without significant market power initially cannot profitably create such power by 
engaging in the practices at issue, leading us to be skeptical about the alleged 
anticompetitiveness of the practice.  Under this approach, if  11 ε  is sufficiently high, one need 
not look at  11 ˆ ε .  Alternatively, if the question is power with the practice—which is more natural 
to employ if the practice has existed for awhile—the question would be whether  11 ˆ ε  is 
sufficiently high. 
We also considered the relevance of the extent to which the practices at issue may plausibly 
enhance the firm’s market power, which focuses on the difference between  11 ˆ ε and  11 ε , not on 
the level of either in isolation.  To see how this difference might be measured, suppose that the 
challenged practices only affect a certain subset of substitutes, J.  At worst, the practice would 
eliminate those substitutes as alternatives available to consumers, which is equivalent to setting 
1 0 j ε =  for all  j J ∈ .  Without these substitutes, the magnitude of the firm’s elasticity of demand 
at preexisting prices would fall to  11 1
1






=+ ∑ ; of course  11 11 ˆ ε ε < .  If the gap  11 11 ˆ ε ε −  
is small, so the challenged practices only modestly reduce the magnitude of the firm’s elasticity 
of demand at preexisting prices, then these practices, even if effective, cannot lead to a 
significant increase in market power.
166 
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using the substitute products that results from the challenged practice.  When we study exclusive dealing in Section 
D, we explain how a firm’s conduct can make substitute products less attractive and whether there are offsetting 
benefits to consumers.  Efficiencies could be included in this analysis by allowing the practices at issue to reduce the 
firm’s marginal cost as well as its elasticity of demand, so the firm’s price might fall even as its markup rises. 
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B. Legal Approach to Monopolization 
As we noted in Section II.E on market power, under U.S. Sherman Act Section 2 “[t]he offense 
of monopoly . . . has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
167  
Here we consider each in turn. 
1.  Monopoly Power 
The central legal question is how much market power is denoted by “monopoly power.”  The 
just-quoted authoritative statement from the Supreme Court does not answer this question.  
Unfortunately, even those cases that offer quantitative statements are far less illuminating than 
meets the eye.
168 
Most famous is the pronouncement in Alcoa that a ninety percent share (in the market for 
aluminum) “is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent 
would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not.”
169  The difficulty in interpreting this 
statement is that two distinct issues are conflated: how much market power was thought to exist 
in that case? (a fact question distinctive to that industry under the then-existing conditions), and 
how much market power is deemed sufficient to constitute monopoly power? (a legal/policy 
question, the answer to which may be entirely independent of the particular case or, if not, its 
dependence requires specification that was not offered).  For example, might the court have 
thought that monopoly power consists of the ability to sustain a margin of at least 20%, that a 
90% share conferred the power to price 35% above cost, a 33% share only 10% above cost, and a 
60-64% share somewhere near 20%?  Or might it have thought that monopoly power required 
only the ability to sustain a 10% margin, but that the power implied by each of the stated shares 
was only half as high? 
This ambiguity is fundamental because in future cases, not in the aluminum industry (under the 
conditions prevailing at the time of Alcoa), a given share, whether 33%, 90%, or some other 
figure, may convey much more or significantly less power than did a similar share in Alcoa.  But 
we know neither how much power over price Alcoa required nor how much power was thought 
to exist for any given share in that industry.  Hence, even if both parties’ experts in a subsequent 
                                                 
167 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).  We focus here on the antitrust violation of 
monopolization; attempted monopolization, which is noted briefly below, is similar but places less weight on the 
defendant’s current (versus prospective) monopoly position.  We also note that in the European Union Article 82 
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168 For prior discussion and questions, see Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin (2004, §3.B). 
169 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).  Although this was a Court of 
Appeals case, it was decided by a prominent panel of judges, the opinion was written by the famous Judge Learned 
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case agree that, say, the sustainable margin was 16%, there is no way to tell from Alcoa which 
side wins on the element of monopoly power. 
The same opacity characterizes all statements that a given market share is or is not adequate 
under any market power test—that is, unless one accepts that a given share in a properly defined 
market conveys the same market power, regardless of the market.
170  But this supposition is 
emphatically false.  Instead, as developed in Section II.B and reemphasized in subsection IV.E.1 
on market definition in horizontal merger cases, in the basic case a firm’s price-cost margin is 
the inverse of the firm-specific elasticity of demand,  F ε ,which in turn is given by equation (2), 








Thus, in addition to the market share S, both the market elasticity of demand,  D ε , and the 
elasticity of supply response,  R ε , are important, and we have seen that it is quite possible for a 
high share to be associated with low market power and a modest share to be associated with 
substantial market power. 
Furthermore, as discussed at some length in subsection II.D.2.b, there is no means of defining 
markets in such a way as to circumvent this problem.  Assuming some hypothetical, benchmark 
market in which a stipulated level of market power is associated with each market share, it would 
only be by chance that there would be a readily available market definition in any given case that 
would yield a share that indicates the correct amount of market power.  This inability relates to 
the all-or-nothing nature of market definition—products or regions are either “in” or “out”—and 
the fact that the market elasticity of demand is, as noted in subsection A.2, one plus the (revenue-
share) weighted sum of the cross-elasticities of all products, rather than being determined solely 
(or even primarily) by the cross-elasticities of one or two products.  Note also that, even if one 
could match every actual market to such a hypothetical benchmark market, we have no way of 
knowing how the aluminum industry in Alcoa or other industries and markets in other antitrust 
cases relate to that imaginary market.
171 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the foregoing problem does not bear on the utility of 
the standard practice of determining market power by defining a relevant market and then 
measuring the firm’s share in that market.  As we discussed, consistent with the formula for a 
dominant firm’s elasticity of demand, these steps need to be supplemented.  At best, courts tend 
                                                 
170 In the European Union, there is an even greater tendency to rely on market share in cases alleging abuse of a 
dominant position, although if its merger law is any indication of a general trend, there seems to be a tendency to 
move toward a more economic approach to the assessment of market power, as we note in subsection IV.D.2.  In 
any event, EU cases suggest that a 50% market share may well be enough, and for some practices even lower shares 
might be accepted. 
171 As should be clear, the problem we identify is not unique to Alcoa.  Consider any case that states, say, that a 50% 
market share is required.  If that statement is to be associated with the market power that exists in the case at hand, 
then our discussion of Alcoa applies directly.  If it is to relate to the level of power that exists in a “typical” market, 
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to do this indirectly.  Thus, they attempt to define the relevant market such that the market 
elasticity of demand is not so great that high market shares in that market are consistent with 
negligible market power.  Additionally, they check for the presence of some entry barriers, an 
aspect of possible supply substitution.  Even if this is done well, however, and even if there is no 
better way to determine market power in a given case, one still needs to know how much market 
power is required, which is the question at hand. 
Another problem with the failure to state the underlying market power threshold explicitly is that 
there is no way to relate the many other means of measuring market power that we examined in 
Section II.D to pronouncements about market share.  In this regard, one can contrast the 
approach under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines under which “the Agency, in most contexts, 
will use a price increase of five percent lasting for the foreseeable future” to define the SSNIP.  
See subsection IV.E.1.  Under such an explicit approach, it is possible to use the sorts of 
empirical techniques described in section IV.F to ascertain market power, such as in the Staples 
case where the government presented and the court was persuaded by evidence of price 
differences across regions with different numbers of competitors.  As already noted, even if both 
sides were to agree on the level of market power in a monopolization case, we cannot tell from 
existing statements whether monopoly power would be deemed to exist.  And since no 
quantitative threshold has been stated, there is no way of determining whether it reflects an 
appropriate balance of screening benefits, litigation costs, and so forth. 
Consider next the relationship between the monopoly power requirement and the challenged 
practices.  One issue is whether exclusionary conduct may be used as a basis for inferring 
monopoly power.  Courts seem to contemplate that nearly any relevant evidence will be admitted 
but nevertheless are reluctant to find a violation unless the monopoly power requirement is 
established through proof of a relevant market in which substantial power exists.  On one hand, it 
is rational to insist on proof of power—given the purpose of the monopoly power screen, to 
avoid false positives and related chilling effects—in cases when there is ambiguity about the 
practices under scrutiny.  As we mentioned in a note in subsection II.D.3 on inferring power 
from conduct, the Supreme Court’s insistence in Spectrum Sports that a plaintiff in an attempted 
monopolization case must independently prove the requisite power may reflect the fact that the 
challenged act involved terminating the plaintiff distributor in favor of another, a practice that 
hardly evidences such power (although it seems to have convinced a jury).
172  Requiring 
independent demonstration of a predator’s ability to recoup losses, to be discussed in subsection 
C.3, also seems to reflect skepticism about whether truly predatory pricing can confidently be 
identified.  As already noted, however, if a practice is unambiguously exclusionary, there is 
reason to infer some market power, and there is little reason to impose a strong filter.
173 
                                                 
172 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993). 
173 It is independently problematic that courts often seem to insist on defining a relevant market, which we have seen 
is only an aspect of one means of inferring market power—and not always the best means—although we also have 
noted that more recently courts have tended to accept more direct evidence when it is offered and found to be 
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We also addressed whether it makes economic sense to focus on extant market power (whether 
with or in the absence of the challenged practices) rather than on how much practices contribute 
to that power.  The monopoly power requirement itself seems focused on extant power.  
However, in showing that practices are exclusionary—on which more in subsection 2—it is 
required that they have contributed to that power.  This demand is viewed as part of the 
determination of the second monopolization element rather than as part of the first.  To illustrate 
the relevance of increments to market power, in the U.S. government’s settlement with Microsoft 
in the first wave of enforcement activity in the mid-1990s, the DOJ agreed to modest conduct 
remedies (which some commentators and intervenors viewed as too lax) precisely because DOJ 
insisted that only a moderate portion of Microsoft’s market power in operating systems was 
attributable to the challenged conduct.
174  The issue also arises in claims of attempted 
monopolization.  To demonstrate the required dangerous probability of success, it is necessary to 
show that the practices will contribute appreciably to market power since the defendant in such 
cases is not yet imagined to have monopoly power. 
In subsection A.2, we also briefly discussed whether monopoly power is to be gauged with or 
without the challenged practices.  In many cases, the practices have been in place sufficiently 
long that the status quo plausibly reflects their effects (if any).  This setting has sometimes led to 
confusion, most notoriously in the du Pont (Cellophane) case.
175  In defining a broad market—
not just cellophane but also other flexible wrapping materials—the Supreme Court was heavily 
moved by the fact that many customers already used various alternatives to cellophane.  As we 
explained in Section II.E, however, such a view implicitly asks whether the firm could profitably 
raise prices significantly above present levels.  The answer to that question will almost certainly 
be negative even if power is great, for if higher prices were profitable, they would already be 
observed.  Furthermore, if the firm-specific elasticity of demand is less than one, it is necessarily 
profitable to raise price, and to keep doing so until one hits a region of the demand curve that is 
more elastic.  (The margin, given in expression (1), equals the inverse of the magnitude of the 
firm’s demand elasticity; since the margin is  () / mP M C P ≡ − , a finite P implies that the 
magnitude of the elasticity must exceed 1.)  Since supply substitution was limited in Cellophane, 
it must have been that price was in an elastic region of the demand curve for cellophane; hence, 
profit-maximization implies that price must have been high enough that significant substitution 
occurred.  This problem, the so-called “Cellophane fallacy,” reflects that, although courts have 
long viewed market power in terms of the ability to elevate price, they have only gradually 
incorporated economic analysis that bears on how the degree of market power is determined.
176  
We also note that, to a substantial extent, the fault does not lie with the courts but rather with 
                                                 
174 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
175 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
176 Consider also our discussion in subsection IV.E.2 of geographic markets concerning patient flows in hospital 
merger cases and imports more broadly.  For example, with homogenous goods, common production costs, and 
positive transportation costs, the presence of imports implies that local producers’ mark-up equals transportation 
costs, which may be significant; the absence of any imports implies that the mark-up is less than transportation 
costs, suggesting that the elasticity of local demand or rivals’ supply exercises more of a pricing restraint.  Hence, it 
would be a mistake to infer that the existence of imports—a readily observable form of substitution—implies less 
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litigants who have not made full, cogent use of economic teachings.  In cases such as Staples in 
which courts have been offered direct and persuasive evidence and analysis, they often seem 
ready to accept it, even if their decision is still articulated using more traditional rubrics (in that 
instance, by defining a narrow market upon being presented evidence of sufficient market 
power).
177 
2.  Exclusionary Practices 
Most economic analysis of exclusionary practices focuses on particular types of conduct, such as 
predatory pricing and exclusive dealing, which we take up in Sections C and D, respectively.  
Before considering specific applications, however, it is useful to consider the law’s general 
formulation of the second element of a monopolization claim, with an eye to how it might be 
given an economic interpretation.  Unfortunately, this aspect of monopolization law is also rather 
obscure. 
The sort of authoritative statement with which this section began illustrates the problem.  The 
quoted Supreme Court language refers to “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historical accident.”
178  The latter portion of this clause does clearly indicate 
that the term “exclusionary practices,” often used to capture this requirement, cannot be taken on 
its face, for superior products and business acumen tend to exclude inferior competitors from the 
market.
179  Thus, the test refers only to some subset of practices that exclude.  But what subset?  
The quotation speaks of power acquired or maintained willfully, but that limitation is most 
unhelpful, for it suggests that only accidental or mistaken behavior is exonerated. 
Another common formulation distinguishes between competition that is on the “merits” and that 
which is not.  The reference to merits, however, is patently question-begging.
180  The use of the 
term competition is suggestive of the rule of reason’s test of whether arrangements promote or 
suppress competition.  As we discussed in subsection III.E.2, that test seems often (but not 
always) to suggest a process orientation toward the meaning of competition rather than a focus 
on the results of competition in terms of economic welfare.  Given that the rule of reason is 
employed under Sherman Act Section 1 and that monopolization is prohibited by Section 2 of 
                                                 
177 Another issue is the extent to which monopolization policy is guided by factors other than considerations of 
economic welfare (in total or that of consumers alone), a topic considered further in our discussion of the law on 
exclusionary practices that follows.  This consideration is probably of greater contemporary importance under EU 
law on the abuse of a dominant position.  See Hawk (1988). 
178 As elsewhere, our focus will be in U.S. antitrust law; the EU prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position 
suffers similar ambiguity.  Additional specifications under EU law suggest a broader scope that, if taken literally, 
might include the ordinary monopoly behavior of elevating price and reducing output.  Although the EU’s 
prohibition does seem to be interpreted more broadly than Sherman Act Section 2, it is not given such breadth. 
179 The term is also under-inclusive.  A horizontal merger by a firm with monopoly power may be considered to be 
an act of monopolization, but it would not ordinarily be characterized as exclusionary (although one could state that 
the formerly independent firm has thereby been excluded from the market). 
180 Similarly problematic are statements regarding the EU “abuse” requirement that it refers to other than “normal” 
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the same Act, as well as the growing convergence of interpretation in the United States under all 
of its antitrust statutes, this possible connection between these two locutions is worth keeping in 
mind. 
Commentators have recognized the ambiguity of the exclusionary practices requirement (both in 
the U.S. law of monopolization and the most closely corresponding EU law on abuse of a 
dominant position), and they have proposed a variety of ways to give meaning to the second 
element of monopolization charges.
181  These alternatives are often of a more explicitly 
economic nature.  Suggestions include a focus on consumer welfare, an inquiry into whether a 
firm has sacrificed short-term profits, an examination of whether a practice makes no economic 
sense but for its effect of excluding a rival, and an assessment of whether more efficient rivals 
are or can be excluded. 
To obtain an overview of some of the choices involved in picking a general test, it is useful to 
consider briefly the core question of what price a monopolist is permitted to charge (anticipating 
somewhat our discussion of predatory pricing in Section C).  To begin, it is well established that 
a monopolist is generally permitted to charge the classically defined monopoly price.  Since this 
price tends to minimize both consumer and total surplus (relative to lower prices, that is), this 
broad permission seems inconsistent with (indeed, in contradiction to) an economic welfare 
standard. 
There are two primary justifications for allowing monopoly pricing, and they provide insights 
into how one should think about the exclusionary practices requirement.  First, monopoly profits 
often reward socially valuable ex ante investments, such as in innovation, cost-cutting, or 
generally running a tight ship.  Thus, a dynamic view of welfare is adopted.  Note, however, that 
this view is embraced broadly; defendants are not required to prove in particular cases of high 
pricing that their profits are efficient ex post rewards for prior good behavior.  Second, price 
regulation is not thought to be in the institutional competence of courts or generalist antitrust 
regulators.  To be sure, in certain cases (notably, natural monopoly), comprehensive price (and 
other) regulation is employed, but under the supervision of specialized agencies.  These points 
are mutually reinforcing in that it is thought to be inefficient for inexpert institutions to 
intrusively interfere with single-firm behavior at the risk of dynamic efficiency.  But the points 
are also in tension, for if the pertinent calculus is a complex, dynamic one, and the agencies and 
courts charged with the antitrust task have limited skills, how are they to identify which practices 
should be prohibited? 
Having set aside the notion that a pure, general welfare test (whether total or consumer welfare) 
is to govern, some of the other proposed tests can be placed in context.  Inquiring solely into 
whether there is a short-run profit sacrifice is obviously problematic, because any investment, 
whether in innovation, new plant, or even routine employee training, involves sacrificing short-
run profits for long-term gain.  Asking whether a practice is profitable but for its exclusionary 
effects is similarly deficient, for better products and superior service are profitable in significant 
part due to their tendency to capture business from rivals.  (A firm researching a new cure would 
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anticipate no revenue if no consumers would switch from existing treatments.)  In addition, not 
all anticompetitive practices involve a short-term sacrifice.
182  Banning only practices that keep 
out more efficient rivals might be consistent with maximizing productive efficiency but gives no 
weight to consumer surplus and accordingly would often permit practices that reduce total 
surplus as well.
183  The contrast is nicely posed by a case we will consider in Section C: if a 
firm’s pricing strategy drives out (or deters) slightly less efficient entrants, with the result that 
prices are substantially higher and consumer and total welfare significantly lower, should a 
violation be deemed to occur?  Better results may be possible by refining or mixing these tests, 
such as by insisting that a practice be profitable but for the possible additional price increment 
one can charge if a rival has been excluded from the market rather than hypothetically remaining 
and continuing to offer its product. 
No simple solution is readily apparent.  Any general test—or, in its absence, particular tests for 
particular practices—should probably be grounded in concerns for long-run economic welfare 
and a recognition of courts’ and agencies limited capacities.  As we discussed earlier, the rule of 
reason’s focus on whether arrangements promote or suppress competition—often applied with a 
process rather than outcome orientation—is rationalized in part by the view that, although we 
care about the results of competition, it may often be easier for antitrust authorities to assess the 
process.  Accordingly, we mentioned that courts often respond to arguments for exceptions—
assertions that challenged behavior, despite being anticompetitive, is socially valuable—by 
stating that they should be addressed to the legislature (or, in some jurisdictions, to the 
enforcement agency that is authorized to promulgate exceptions).
184  In addition, the rule of 
reason is sometimes interpreted to imply more specialized rules, such as the per se prohibition on 
naked price-fixing.  Likewise, for monopolization, it may readily be optimal to employ different, 
more specific tests for certain practices, wherein those tests as well as the general rule applicable 
when no such test has been developed are derived from broader guiding principles.
185 
Competition policy is not seen as comprehensive regulation but as merely offering what may be 
viewed as rules of the competitive game.  Antitrust law does not dictate players’ specific moves, 
but certain types of behavior are prohibited.  When such prohibitions can be stated in simple, 
general terms—like prohibitions on naked price-fixing—this strategy works well.  When firms’ 
behavior is more complex and subtle, often involving dynamic considerations—a common state 
                                                 
182 We offer an example below in subsection D.3 when discussing exclusive dealing. 
183 One also notes the inconsistency with the tendency to focus solely on consumer surplus in the horizontal merger 
context, as discussed in subsection IV.D.3. 
184 In the United States, where cases are often decided by lay juries who one supposes may find conflicting expert 
testimony to be confusing, there is added pressure to limit which cases can reach juries for fear of excessive false 
positives.  Many court decisions in recent decades seem in part motivated by this consideration.  Yet this approach 
raises problems because there is a single antitrust law that is equally applicable to decisions by the FTC, a 
specialized agency.  Given that the FTC is independently authorized to enforce its own statute, courts could draw 
distinctions that give the FTC more flexibility, but they have tended not to do so.  In other countries, where juries 
are not used and decisions in the first instance are typically made by competition authorities rather than general 
courts, the appropriate legal rules may well differ. 
185 And it indeed seems to be the case that rules on different exclusionary practices vary, as illustrated by our 
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of affairs in monopolization cases—the task is more daunting.  The challenge is especially great 
because, as we emphasized in our discussion of the monopoly power requirement, the law seeks 
to avoid excessive administrative costs, false positives, and perhaps most importantly the chilling 
of socially valuable business activity, objectives that are not easily achieved when the law is 
highly uncertain.  Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty in defining and identifying exclusionary 
conduct that is seen as justifying the monopoly power screen that we examined in subsection 
1.
186 
C. Predatory Pricing 
Predatory pricing is one of the most storied areas of antitrust law.  Indeed, the Sherman Act 
resulted in no small part from concerns about predatory practices, and predatory practices were 
central to the 1911 Standard Oil case, which breathed life into §2.
187  After a century of debate, 
the antitrust treatment of predatory pricing still elicits strong reactions.  Supporters of tough 
limitations on predatory pricing believe that they are necessary to prevent large, powerful firms 
from using their market positions and financial strength to deter entry and to drive existing 
smaller, weaker rivals from the market, thus fortifying their monopoly power.  Skeptics argue 
with equal vigor that price cutting is the essence of competition, that imposing antitrust liability 
on a firm for setting its prices too low should only been done with great caution if ever, and that 
successful predation, if it happens at all, is extremely rare.  Here we consider the relevant 
economic theory, empirical evidence, and appropriate legal test. 
1.  Economic Theory 
McGee (1958) initiated the Chicago School attack on traditional concerns about predatory 
pricing by strongly challenging, as a factual matter, whether Standard Oil had in fact engaged in 
predatory pricing, as was commonly believed at the time.  McGee also argued, as a theoretical 
matter, that predatory pricing would only be an optimal strategy under very stringent conditions 
that are rarely if ever met.  First, he emphasized that it will typically be more profitable for a 
monopolist to acquire its rivals than to drive them out of business.  However, this argument fails 
because such horizontal mergers would likely violate the antitrust laws (see Section IV) and, 
even if permitted, the monopolist might be able to acquire its smaller rivals on more favorable 
terms if it can establish a reputation as a predator (a possibility that McGee discounts).  Second, 
                                                 
186 The discussion in the present subsection has emphasized difficulties in defining the standard, whereas in practice 
difficulties in proving what actually happened are often more daunting.  These problems will be addressed 
somewhat in the discussions to follow of predatory pricing and exclusive dealing.  In attempting to differentiate 
efficient from anticompetitive behavior (however defined), most attention will be devoted to evidence bearing on the 
consequences of the practices under scrutiny.  Another channel of proof, which is promising but also fraught with 
pitfalls, involves examining the defendant’s internal decision making, which is sometimes done under the rubric of 
inquiries into intent.  The promise is that many complex strategies with anticompetitive or efficiency-enhancing 
effects (or both) cannot be analyzed and implemented in a large firm without extensive communications that seem, 
in modern times, difficult to undertake without leaving paper and/or electronic trails.  The pitfall is that, especially 
with decision-making by lay juries, aggressive rhetoric (“we will crush the competition”) that is logically quite 
consistent with efficient behavior (for example, trimming costs, improving quality, marketing, and service) can, 
taken out of context, be mistaken for evidence of anticompetitive designs. 
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McGee pointed out that a monopolist might well lose more money than its smaller rivals during a 
period of predation because it is selling more units.  This is an important point, but it does not 
eliminate the possibility of profitable predation, especially predation that involves price 
discrimination, with price cuts targeted at the prey’s customers, or predation that establishes a 
reputation.  Third, McGee noted that driving a rival from the market might do little to increase 
the predator’s market power if the prey’s productive assets remain intact and available to a new 
entrant.  Lastly, McGee asked why the prey could not credibly survive the predation by drawing 
on internal funds or borrowing as needed. 
Subsequently, there has arisen a burgeoning literature on the economics of predation, which has 
been surveyed by Ordover and Saloner (1989).  We briefly note a few highlights.  The early 
theory of predatory pricing was based on the superior financial resources of the incumbent 
monopolist in comparison with a smaller rival/entrant.  Under this “deep pocket” theory, as 
formalized by Telser (1966) and later Benoit (1984), the smaller firm would earn positive profits, 
if not for the predation, but the smaller firm had a limited ability to sustain losses before it must 
exit the market.  By depleting the rival’s financial resources, or credibly threatening to do so, the 
predator can induce exit or deter entry.  This theory assumes, however, that the prey cannot 
obtain the financial resources necessary to sustain itself despite the prospect of positive profits 
that await if it can survive the predation.  This assumption would not be justified if a firm with 
substantial financial resources could enter the market in question or if the smaller firm could 
obtain a large line of credit to finance its operations.  Either prospect would deter predation, and 
the financial resources would not in fact need to be drawn upon.  Yet economic theorists have 
also explained how asymmetric information between potential lenders and the firm that seeks to 
borrow funds may interfere with this possibility.  Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show how deep-
pocket predation can occur even if the prey and its lenders are sophisticated. 
Much theoretical work on whether predation can be economically rational focuses on 
asymmetric information and uncertain time horizons in attempting to formalize the intuition that 
predators can develop a reputation that will not only drive the current prey from the market but 
deter others from entering.  To frame the problem, consider the following simple game between 
a potential entrant and an incumbent firm.  First, the entrant decides whether to incur the sunk 
costs necessary to enter the market.  Next, the incumbent decides whether to accommodate entry 
or engage in predation.  Suppose that the entrant will make positive profits if the incumbent 
accommodates entry but will lose money if the incumbent engages in predation.  Following the 
Chicago School critique, suppose further that, viewing the problem as a one-shot game, 
predation is unprofitable—that is, the threat to predate is not credible—for whatever reason; 
perhaps the entrant will fight for a long period of time before exiting, or perhaps accommodation 
is quite profitable for the incumbent, so the opportunity cost of predation is high.  The only 
subgame-perfect equilibrium is for the potential entrant to enter the market and for the incumbent 
to accommodate entry.  Furthermore, if this game is repeated in a finite sequence of distinct 
markets involving the same incumbent, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is for the 
potential entrant in each of these markets to enter and for the incumbent to accommodate every 
time.  Following Selten (1978), this (formerly) counter-intuitive backward-induction argument is 
known as the “chain-store paradox.” 
A body of subsequent work has shown that the chain-store paradox may well dissolve when any 
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that the paradox is an artifact of the known, finite number of potential entrants: predation 
becomes credible so long as there always remains a sufficient probability that future potential 
entrants will arrive.  And even with a finite number of periods, predation based on reputation is 
rather easily supported using game theory.  Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson 
(1982), in highly influential work, demonstrate the power of reputation and signaling to support 
credible predation.  These papers rely heavily on the presence of asymmetric information, the 
essence of predation based on reputation being that the predator is signaling its willingness to 
engage in predation (for example, predatory behavior may signal low marginal cost).  Scharfstein 
(1984) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) show how predation can also work by disrupting the 
ability of the entrant to determine whether remaining in the market will be profitable. 
Collectively, these papers establish that predation can, in theory, be profitable for an established 
monopolist in a variety of plausible circumstances.  This body of sophisticated theoretical work, 
however, cannot resolve the debate about whether predatory pricing is in fact a widespread threat 
to competition that must be met with vigorous antitrust enforcement or instead constitutes a 
phantom practice that rarely if ever occurs. 
2.  Empirical Evidence 
The empirical evidence on predation has been hotly disputed since at least the 1950s.  Regarding 
the landmark Standard Oil case, McGee (1958, p. 168) writes: “Judging from the Record, 
Standard Oil did not use predatory price discrimination to drive out competing refiners, nor did 
its pricing policies have that effect.”   Ever since then, Chicago School proponents have 
complemented their theoretical attack on the economic logic underlying predatory pricing with 
the empirical claim that predatory pricing is either extremely rare or nonexistent.
188  In this 
tradition, Koller (1971) examines 26 cases , ranging from 1907 through 1965, in which he was 
able to obtain a substantial trial record and the defendant was found guilty of engaging in 
predatory pricing.  By his count, only seven of these cases involved below-cost pricing with 
predatory intent; four of these seven cases involved predation to eliminate a rival, and three 
involved predation to acquire a rival or improve market discipline.  Koller considers the 
predation to have been successful in only four cases. 
The response to McGee and Koller began with Yamey (1972), who argued that predatory 
practices may not be nearly as rare as McGee suggests and provided an example of predation in 
the China-to-England ocean shipping business around 1890.  Zerbe and Cooper (1982) update 
and expand on Koller’s study.  Based on their examination of 40 predatory-pricing cases from 
1940 through 1981, they recommend a modified version of the Areeda and Turner (1975) rule 
(see just below) to prevent predatory pricing, finding that it performs much better than a rule of 
per se legality.  In this tradition, a significant empirical literature identifying instances of 
successful predation has emerged over the past twenty years.  Burns (1986) presents evidence 
that predation by the tobacco trust enabled it to acquire its rivals—those who were targets of the 
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predation and others based on reputational effects—on more favorable terms.  Ordover and 
Saloner’s (1989, p. 545) survey directly challenges McGee’s conclusions; citing Standard Oil 
documents, they state: “There is little doubt, however, that Standard Oil at least attempted to use 
pricing as a weapon to drive its rivals out.”  Weiman and Levin (1994) argue that the Southern 
Bell company engaged in predation to protect and build its telephone monopoly.  Morton (1997) 
finds related evidence of deep-pocket predation in merchant shipping.  Genesove and Mullin 
(2006) find evidence of predatory pricing in the U.S. sugar refining industry before World War I.  
Bolton et al. (2000) assemble and discuss the body of empirical evidence of predatory pricing.
189 
In the end, whether this evidence is sufficient to conclude that strong rules against predatory 
pricing are needed to protect competition is difficult to say.  The rarity of predatory pricing 
convictions in the United States may simply indicate that the law is working well to deter this 
practice.  On this score, it is interesting to note that many of the documented instances of 
predatory pricing are either prior to 1911, when the Standard Oil case put teeth into the Sherman 
Act, or from outside the United States 
3.  Legal Test 
The contemporary discussion of rules to control predatory pricing can be dated to a highly 
influential paper by Areeda and Turner (1975).  They expressed concern that the treatment of 
predatory pricing in the cases and in the literature did not clearly and correctly delineate which 
practices should be illegal and that fears of predatory pricing were overblown.  Areeda and 
Turner were sharply critical of the case law, stating (p. 699): “Courts in predatory pricing cases 
have generally turned to such empty formulae as ‘below cost’ pricing, ruinous competition, or 
predatory intent in adjudicating liability.  These standards provide little, if any, basis for 
analyzing the predatory pricing offense.”  Areeda and Turner proposed a test for predation based 
on whether prices were below average variable cost.  A cost-based test gradually won favor in 
the courts, most explicitly through the Supreme Court’s endorsement in Brooke Group, which 
insisted on “some measure of incremental cost” although without choosing a particular 
measure.
190  A cost-based test is also employed in the European Union, but the approach is less 
strict.
191 
                                                 
189 Isaac and Smith (1985) report results from a laboratory experiment designed to see if predatory pricing would 
arise.  In their experiment, a subject controlling a large firm competed against another subject controlling a smaller 
firm.  The firms produced with economies of scale, with the larger firm being more efficient and having superior 
financial resources. They also included sunk entry costs that would need to be incurred again in the event of exit.   
Despite these conditions, arguably favorable to predation, the subjects did not employ predatory pricing.  On the 
other hand, Jung et al. (1994) find frequent predation in their experiment, in which a single monopolist plays a 
sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants. 
190 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).  Our discussion in the text 
implicitly refers to monopolization claims under Sherman Act Section 2; claims are also possible under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, but Brooke Group greatly reduced the differences in the Acts’ requirements (moving the 
Robinson-Patman Act test closer to the Sherman Act monopolization test). 
191 In addition to declaring prices below average variable cost by a dominant firm that eliminates competitors as 
abusive, prices above average variable cost but below average total cost that eliminate competitors might also be 
reached.  Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, Case C-333/94P [1996] ECR I-5951, ¶ 41; ECS/Akzo II, Antitrust, Page 117 
A vigorous debate ensued over workable rules to control predatory pricing without generating a 
large number of false positives.  Scherer (1976) criticized Areeda and Turner’s analysis, 
Williamson (1977) and Baumol (1979) offered alternative tests, and further critical commentary 
was offered by Joskow and Klevorick (1979) and Ordover and Saloner (1989).  More recently, 
there has been a further round of proposals and criticisms, including Bolton, Brodley, and 
Riordan (2000), Edlin (2002), and Elhauge (2003b).  See also Areeda and Hovenkamp (2002, 
vol. 3). 
To illuminate this controversy, it is useful to relate the question of the appropriate legal test for 
predatory pricing to two of our previous discussions.  First, our survey of the economic theory in 
subsection 1, in explaining how predatory strategies could credibly deter entry or in some 
instances drive out rivals, made no reference to any cost-based test.  The literature neither 
suggests that pricing below some particular concept of cost is a necessary condition nor that it is  
a sufficient one.  (Indeed, many proposed alternatives are motivated by a belief that stringent 
cost-based tests are under-inclusive, that is, that they would exonerate much predatory behavior.)  
Also it should be kept in mind that the literature does not for the most part specifically indicate 
the effects of predatory pricing on consumer surplus or total welfare, which would be necessary 
to translate its results into a normative rule, but rather is focused on the circumstances in which 
predatory strategies are credible.  In addition, the literature is not addressed to benign or 
beneficial price reductions in a variety of settings and thus does not indicate whether insisting 
that pricing be below a certain cost measure is a good way to avoid penalizing or chilling 
desirable behavior.  Many believe that a cost-based test, perhaps one that uses average or 
marginal variable cost, would be a reasonable and administrable manner of identifying 
dangerous conduct while immunizing other conduct.  It must be admitted, however, that this 
view reflects more a set of hunches than any precise combination of formal analysis and 
empirical evidence. 
Second, different views on predation standards to a large extent track different perspectives on 
the proper antitrust standard toward exclusionary conduct generally (see subsection B.2), many 
of which were developed with predatory pricing in mind.  For example, tests that condemn price 
cuts if and only if they are below marginal or variable cost are often defended because they 
reward productive efficiency, on the ground that in certain simple settings only less efficient 
rivals or entrants would be kept out of the market.  This argument is consistent with defining 
exclusionary practices as those that reduce productive efficiency.  As noted, however, a price 
reduction above this cost standard might still drive out slightly less efficient competitors whose 
presence might raise both consumer and total welfare.  This sort of case motivates many of the 
proposed alternative predation rules, such as determining whether a defendant has made a short-
run profit sacrifice or would not have engaged in a practice but for its effect of excluding rivals. 
Another argument favoring a narrow prohibition on predatory pricing advanced by courts and 
commentators alike is that price cuts are a move in the right direction.  This view does reflect a 
concern with consumer and total welfare.  Of course, it is also a static view.  Predatory pricing is 
problematic precisely because of a concern that higher prices will follow, a move in the wrong 
                                                                                                                                                             
Decision of the Commission, December 14, 1985, 1985 OJ L 374/1; Hilti, Decision of the Commission, December 
22, 1987, 1988 OJ L 65/19. Antitrust, Page 118 
direction.  The important truth underlying this argument is that most price cutting in the economy 
is desirable, and thus it is a reminder that false positives and related chilling effects are 
particularly costly when contemplating punishment of low prices. 
The overall balance between false positives and false negatives (and corresponding ex ante 
effects of each) depends in significant part on how one assesses the empirical evidence and the 
quality of the system of adjudication.  If predatory pricing really is rare, as some Supreme Court 
pronouncements (based on partial and dated evidence) suggest, then the optimal test should 
reflect a disproportionate concern with false positives.
192  The brief survey in subsection 2 does 
not support this view, but it remains the case that beneficial price cuts will vastly outnumber 
predatory ones, so heavy attention to false positives is nevertheless sensible.  Of course, this is an 
important motivation for the monopoly power screen, as we discussed in Sections A and B.1. 
Another important factor that we noted regarding exclusionary practices generally is the 
sophistication of decision-making.  In the United States, predatory pricing is usually assessed by 
lay juries, who one might imagine would find conflicting expert testimony to be confusing and 
who might be sympathetic to a small firm driven out of business by a monopolist.  Leading court 
opinions in the United States seem quite concerned about this matter and accordingly are 
reluctant to allow cases to proceed unless certain hurdles are overcome.  Arguably, less caution 
is required if only the government (and not also disgruntled competitors) may initiate suit and if 
more expert agencies are responsible for applying tests for predation. 
Additional complexity lurks beneath seemingly simple cost-based tests.  Determining firms’ 
costs in most settings is notoriously challenging, as we discussed in subsection II.D.1.a on the 
difficulty of measuring market power by observing the difference between price and marginal 
cost.  One puzzle concerns the allocation of common costs.  Even with a marginal cost test, 
common costs are often influenced at the margin, the only problem being that the extent of this 
phenomenon is difficult to measure.  For example, how does one measure the cost of an 
additional employee?  After including salary and fringes, one must think about secretaries and 
other support staff, rent and utilities on the space taken by the employee and others (keeping in 
mind that there are opportunity costs, as the space may well not otherwise remain vacant), and 
various central functions (time spent by the human resources department in searching for and 
hiring the employee, support from the computer department, and so forth).  For nontrivial 
changes in output, which often are involved if a firm significantly lowers price in response to 
entry, these are just some of the complications in determining the cost of additional employees 
directly involved, say, in production, not to mention other costs.  Note that the practice of 
ignoring myriad indirect costs tends systematically to underestimate marginal or variable cost 
                                                 
192 In Brooke Group, the Court merely recalled its remark in Matsushita on “the general implausibility of predatory 
pricing.”  509 U.S. at 227.  Matsushita, a 1986 decision, in turn cited analytical arguments by legal commentators 
(but none of the literature mentioned in subsection 1 on modern economic analysis of predation) and the empirical 
papers by McGee and Koller but not that of others, such as Zerbe and Cooper, who study more cases.  Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986).  As we have noted elsewhere, 
however, one should be generous in the assessment of court decisions when much of the relevant economic analysis 
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and by a sufficiently great magnitude to make tests requiring prices to be below those costs 
highly permissive in many settings. 
Other factors cut in the opposite direction.  For example, there may be learning by doing, in 
which case a proper analysis of current marginal costs suggests that a lower figure should be 
employed because account must be taken of how present output reduces the cost of future 
production.  See Arrow (1962) and Spence (1981).  Another difficulty concerns 
complementarity: selling more automobiles may increase future revenue from spare parts, 
increasing flights between destinations A and B may increase traffic on other routes to and from 
points A and B on the same airline, or added sales may improve familiarity with a brand shared 
by other products.  None of these factors is easy to measure. 
Yet another set of complications involves capacity and other forms of investment.  In American 
Airlines, American placed additional flights on routes served by the entrant.
193  The appellate 
court focused on whether fares covered marginal costs on those flights.  However, many of those 
passengers would otherwise have taken other American flights already serving the route, so true 
incremental revenue was less than appeared to be the case.  Moreover, one supposes there was a 
substantial opportunity cost of diverting planes to the route in that, wherever they had previously 
been deployed, they probably contributed net revenue sufficient to justify American carrying the 
additional capacity. 
Another possibility is that American might have maintained excess capacity precisely so that it 
could be deployed in response to new entry (and to the extent capacity is observable by 
prospective entrants, it would tend to discourage entry).  More broadly, firms can invest in 
capacity to deter entry by making it easier to reduce price quickly, and they might make 
investments that lower future marginal costs, which may never be recovered directly but would 
allow them to charge lower prices in response to subsequent entry, which boosts credibility and 
also helps to avoid running afoul of predation tests based on variable costs.  See Spence (1977) 
and Dixit (1979, 1980).  
These latest examples begin to blur the distinction between predatory pricing and exclusionary 
practices more broadly.  Ordover and Willig (1981) bridged this gap by offering examples of 
what they described as predatory product innovation, such as investments designed to make a 
product more attractive than a rival’s product (while setting a price gap below the incremental 
value) or to make the products of a dominant incumbent firm incompatible with those of rivals or 
prospective entrants.  Likewise, one can think of high expenditures on R&D designed to come up 
with a patented product that has low marginal cost.  In all of these cases, ignoring prior 
investments gives a misleading picture of firms’ possibly predatory behavior.  On the other hand, 
subjecting complex investment, research, and product design decisions to intensive antitrust 
scrutiny may be quite dangerous.  How is one to distinguish the firm that makes substantial 
expenditures in a new product or service that it hopes will have a huge ultimate payoff (think of 
Amazon.com, eBay, or Google) from the firm making a predatory investment?  Hindsight is 
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th Cir. 2003).  For an analysis, see Edlin and Farrell (2004). Antitrust, Page 120 
often twenty-twenty, but risky legitimate investments often fail, so it will usually be difficult to 
distinguish the cases even after the fact. 
Returning to the law on predatory pricing proper, U.S. law (but not that in the European Union) 
has recently added an additional requirement, that a party alleging predation prove that it is likely 
that the defendant will ultimately recoup its interim losses.
194  On one hand, this requirement is 
certainly logical, for if recoupment is implausible, there will be no (or less than complete) 
ultimate loss of consumer or total welfare, and more importantly the inability to recoup casts 
doubt on whether predation has in fact occurred.
195  On the other hand, the requirement seems 
redundant.  First, the monopoly power screen exists to distinguish cases in which anticompetitive 
conduct is plausible from those in which it is not.  A firm would be unlikely to recoup its losses 
in situations in which there are close substitutes for its products or entry, supply substitution, and 
the like would impose significant constraints on price increases.  But it is precisely these factors 
that negate the existence of monopoly power.
196  Second, if one is reasonably confident that 
predation has in fact occurred, that very fact gives rise to a logical inference of recoupment.  
After all, the firm would not sustain losses out of charity, so its own analysis suggests that 
recoupment is likely (more precisely, that on an expected basis, it will occur).  It seems 
implausible that courts’ or agencies’ assessments in the context of litigation would be more 
accurate than those of the firm with its own funds on the line. 
The main explanation for this seeming puzzle is the concern for false positives combined with 
uncertainty about the other legal elements for a monopolization claim.  Doubts about the proof of 
predation are certainly understandable in light of the above discussion, but this uncertainty was 
the justification for a strong monopoly power screen, and it is harder to understand how the 
recoupment requirement supplements rather than repeats this screen.  The central problem is to 
improve the ability to distinguish true predation from legitimate price-cutting.  Yet alternative 
explanations for below-cost pricing—namely, promotion of new products (which can involve 
periods of sustained losses, which the above Internet examples illustrate)—also presuppose 
recoupment.  That is, a firm will only be willing to suffer substantial losses in promoting an 
innovative product if the quasi-rents from subsequent above-marginal-cost pricing (discounted 
for time and probability) are greater.  If there are close substitutes or ready prospects of entry 
(imitation), the costly campaign would not be undertaken. 
In reflecting on the recoupment requirement, it is notable that it was announced in the Brooke 
Group case which involved an unfavorable setting in many respects.  The case was brought by a 
competitor, which raises suspicions.  The alleged recoupment was to be through oligopoly 
                                                 
194 For U.S. law, the requirement is announced in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209 (1993).  For EU law, see Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, Case C-333/94P [1996] ECR I-5951. 
195 The discussion in the text assumes that the pertinent cost test is one under which there are losses that need to be 
recouped. 
196 The degree to which this statement is true depends on how the monopoly power requirement is interpreted.  If, as 
we suggest in subsection A.2 and throughout, it is interpreted with regard to the danger posed by the practice under 
consideration, then the recoupment requirement indeed seems fully redundant.  Put another way, the recoupment 
requirement might be understood as a warning to assess monopoly power less in a vacuum and more in light of the 
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pricing, about which the Court expressed skepticism.
197  Finally, the finding of liability was 
made by a lay jury.  In all, the Court’s strong concern about false positives may have been 
warranted, but the logic of an independent recoupment requirement in addressing this concern 
remains unclear. 
D. Exclusive Dealing 
We now turn to exclusive dealing, an important form of non-price conduct that a monopolist 
might be able to use to fortify its dominant position.  Exclusive dealing involves a supplier’s 
conditioning its sales on its customers’ refusal to purchase from its rivals.
198  In addition to being 
important in its own right, analysis of exclusive dealing illuminates the economics of a variety of 
other practices that we do not take up explicitly.  We begin by considering possible 
anticompetitive effects, then briefly examine efficiencies, and finally discuss the legal test, 
illustrating the principles with a number of cases. 
1.  Anticompetitive Effects 
We focus here on exclusive dealing imposed by an upstream monopolist, M, on downstream 
customers.  In the scenario most common in antitrust cases, M imposes exclusivity on 
wholesalers or retailers (rather than on final consumers).  Clearly, any customer who has agreed 
to deal exclusively with M cannot purchase from M’s rivals.  In this mechanical sense, those 
rivals are excluded from selling to customers.  But this would be formally true to some extent 
even without exclusivity because every unit bought from M is a unit that otherwise may have 
been purchased from M’s rival.  To consider anticompetitive effects, it is necessary to introduce 
strategic considerations.  Our analysis of these draws heavily on Whinston (2006, Chapter 4), a 
major contributor to the recent game-theoretic literature in this area, who provides a masterful 
treatment of exclusive dealing and other exclusionary vertical contracts. 
Anticompetitive exclusion most plausibly arises when M requires its dealers to purchase only 
from itself, these dealers constitute a large proportion of the market, and profitable entry or 
continued survival requires the rival to achieve a scale greater than is possible if sales must be 
                                                 
197 This skepticism may not have been warranted, for oligopoly pricing is hardly rare—and had previously been 
documented in the industry in Brooke Group, tobacco—and as we discussed in Section III punishments through 
price cuts are an important means of sustaining collusion. 
198 We generally will write in terms of explicit exclusive dealing but note in passing that a variety of seemingly 
distinct contractual arrangements, without explicit exclusivity, can have very similar economic effects.  Consider, 
for example, a quantity discount in the form of a two-part tariff with a large fixed fee and a per-unit price that equals 
marginal cost.  This pricing structure reduces the customer’s incentive to purchase from alternative suppliers relative 
to the case in which the supplier charges a uniform price above marginal cost.  Consider also discounts to buyers 
that purchase a large fraction of their needs from the incumbent supplier, such as was present in LePage’s, Inc. v. 
3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).  (In the limit, if the price is prohibitively high for a buyer who purchases less than 
100% of its needs, the contract is economically equivalent to an exclusive dealing arrangement, but similar effects 
might be achieved far before this limit is reached.)  A further variation on exclusive dealing arises when a buyer 
requires its suppliers not sell to its rivals.  This was the fact pattern in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).  Because the economic principles and analysis are similar, we only 
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limited to dealers not subject to exclusive-dealing contracts.  A leading criticism of the 
possibility of anticompetitive exclusive dealing (and, as we shall discuss, of other allegedly 
anticompetitive contractual practices) comes from the Chicago School.  In essence, the argument 
is that the dealers are harmed by anticompetitive exclusion because, if successful, the dealers will 
then be confronted by a monopoly; accordingly, it will be against their interests to enter into 
arrangements resulting in anticompetitive exclusion.  As a corollary, if practices like exclusive 
dealing are nevertheless observed, it must be because they generate efficiencies rather than 
produce anticompetitive effects.
199  These views (and other criticisms of claims of 
anticompetitive exclusion) were initially launched in the 1950s by Director and Levi (1956) and 
were followed by a wave of related commentary, the most elaborate being Bork (1978).
200 
Over the course of this subsection, we will consider many aspects of this argument.  We begin 
with the response that is probably most important in antitrust challenges to exclusive dealing: the 
presence of multiple (often very large numbers of) buyers, which leads to a free-rider problem in 
attempts to foil M’s anticompetitive design.
201  This point is elaborated informally in Kaplow 
(1985, pp. 531-36) and elsewhere, and it has been developed formally in subsequent work by 
Rasmusen et al. (1991), Innes and Sexton (1994), and Segal and Whinston (2000b). 
To make this idea explicit, suppose as already hypothesized that a prospective entrant E must 
attract some critical mass of buyers to cover its fixed costs, and imagine that M attempts to enter 
into exclusive agreements with more than enough buyers so that E cannot profitably enter by 
serving those remaining.
202  None of these buyers would be pivotal, that is, none of them alone 
can induce E to enter by refraining from agreeing to exclusivity with M.  Therefore, each would 
                                                 
199 As noted by Farrell (2005), however, one could equally well conclude that exclusivity must generate some 
anticompetitive effects not captured in the simple model advanced by the Chicago School.  Farrell (p. 468) 
characterizes the Chicago School argument on exclusive dealing as “a Rorschach test, and the inference often drawn 
from it is mere spin.” 
200 For further references, discussion of objections in addition to the argument emphasized in the text, and critical 
commentary, see, for example, Kaplow (1985).  To give some flavor of the Chicago School critique, consider 
Bork’s (1978, pp. 306-07) remarks on Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922):  
“Standard can extract in the prices it charges retailers all that the uniqueness of its line is worth.  It cannot charge the 
retailer that full worth in money and then charge it again in exclusivity the retailer does not wish to grant.  To 
suppose that it can is to commit the error of double counting. . . .  If Standard finds it worthwhile to purchase 
exclusivity from some retailers, the reason is not the barring of entry but some more sensible goal, such as obtaining 
the special selling effort of the outlet.”  Bork goes on to say (p. 309): “A seller who wants exclusivity must give the 
buyer something for it.  If he gives a lower price, the reason must be that the seller expects the arrangement to create 
efficiencies that justify the lower price.  If he were to give the lower price simply to harm his rivals, he would be 
engaging in deliberate predation by price cutting, and that, as we have seen in Chapter 7, would be foolish and self-
defeating behavior on his part.” 
201 Note that the Chicago School argument and the multiple buyers/free-rider response are applicable to a wide range 
of exclusionary practices, including predatory pricing (where the argument has also been raised, although less 
frequently). 
202 How many buyers E needs to serve depends on a number of factors, including M’s and E’s cost functions, the 
nature of demand for their products, and the mode of competitive interaction (in formal models, the extensive form 
of the game being studied).  The basic argument in the text, however, depends only on this number being positive 
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in fact agree to exclusivity in exchange for a very small additional payment.  This argument 
supports an equilibrium in which all buyers agree to exclusivity, in exchange for an arbitrarily 
small transfer, and E is excluded from the market.
 203  Furthermore, this result follows even if E 
is more efficient than M.  The key element that makes this equilibrium possible is a lack of 
coordination among the buyers: individual buyers, or even groups of buyers too small to offer the 
entrant enough business to enter profitably, cannot gain by refusing to sign exclusive contracts 
with M.
204  But these contracts do harm all of the buyers and cause inefficiency.  Enabling 
competition from E is a public good, and M can induce buyers to free ride, undermining that 
competition. 
Subsequent work has explored the robustness of this exclusionary equilibrium.  Whinston (2006) 
points out that this outcome might seem fragile since there arguably is another equilibrium in 
which none of the buyers agree to exclusivity.  If M is constrained to make nondiscriminatory 
offers to the various buyers, and if the buyers can coordinate to the extent of selecting their 
Pareto-preferred equilibrium, none will agree to exclusivity in exchange for a de minimis 
payment.  However, Segal and Whinston (2000b, 2003) show that exclusion is a robust outcome 
if M can make discriminatory offers to the various buyers.  They also show that exclusion is 
easier to support if M makes sequential offers to the various buyers.  As stated by Whinston 
(2006, p. 146): “More generally, the ability of the incumbent to approach buyers sequentially 
both reduces the cost of successful exclusion, and makes it more likely that the incumbent will 
find exclusion profitable.  In fact, as the number of symmetric buyers grows large, so that each 
buyer becomes a very small part of aggregate demand, the incumbent is certain to be able to 
exclude for free.”
205 
Consider further how these ideas generalize to settings that often arise in practice in which 
exclusive dealing targets M’s existing rivals, not just potential entrants, and products are 
differentiated.
206  Suppose now that E is an existing rival that, despite the presence of scale 
economies and its smaller relative size, is able to survive due to M’s high price and product 
differentiation, with E’s product especially well suited to some customers.  In this scenario, M 
may successfully enter into exclusive arrangements with most dealers, thereby limiting E’s 
                                                 
203 Note that, since the required payment per buyer is trivial, it is essentially costless to M to sign up more buyers 
than necessary, insuring that no buyer will believe that there is any real possibility that it would be pivotal. 
204 It is conceivable that a large group of buyers would attempt to agree not to deal with M, or at least not 
exclusively.  In addition to the free-rider problem in organizing and enforcing such an agreement, it should be noted 
that it may well be illegal under the antitrust law.  See subsection III.E.2.  Typically, antitrust law does not allow 
buying cartels and other otherwise illegal arrangements to be justified on grounds that they create countervailing 
power. 
205 Another counter-strategy would be for E to create or induce the entry of additional dealers or to bypass dealers 
and directly serve customers at the next level in the distribution chain.  Often this will be infeasible or impose 
substantial costs on E; think of products sold primarily through department stores, drug stores, or full-line 
wholesalers, where E supplies only one or a few of those products.  This issue arose in the Dentsply case, discussed 
in subsection 3. 
206 See also Salop and Scheffman (1983) and Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), who consider a variety of strategies 
designed to elevate rivals’ costs, which may or may not induce exit, and the survey of this work in Ordover and 
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ability to expand.  Each of M’s customers would prefer to be free to deal with E but nevertheless 
may find it very costly to resist M’s exclusivity policy since this would require foregoing all 
purchases from M.  In many settings, a wholesaler or retailer would find it difficult not to stock 
M’s products, which by assumption dominate the market.  As a result, E may indeed conclude 
that making the necessary investments to expand its product line, manufacturing capacity, sales 
and distribution network, or advertising would not yield a sufficient return.  M’s exclusivity may 
render unprofitable a strategy under which E gradually increases its share at the retail locations 
where M has traditionally been dominant.  Many individual retailers choose to purchase from M 
on an exclusive basis, but collectively the retailers, and final consumers, are harmed in the long 
run by M’s exclusive dealing.
207 
Additional variations and qualifications should be mentioned.  Most notably, one or a few large 
buyers may find it profitable to support entry.  If there is a single buyer, the free-rider problem 
does not arise, and with only a few the problem is attenuated, especially if one is large enough to 
support an entrant—although note that its behavior may still convey a positive externality on 
others, so its incentives may not be sufficient.  Fumagalli and Motta (2006) show, however, that 
if the buyers compete against each other, one or a few might grow large enough to support entry 
if they can obtain more favorable terms from E than their rivals did by signing exclusive 
contracts with M.  Even if entry does not occur, the threat of large buyers to sponsor entry might 
induce M to offer them better deals, reducing M’s market power.  On the other hand, as shown 
by Simpson and Wickelgren (2004), one buyer may have little incentive to resist anticompetitive 
exclusion of an upstream entrant so long as its rivals are equally disadvantaged; if all suffer 
similarly, higher input costs will largely be passed on to the next level, and it is those customers 
who will suffer from M’s continued monopoly.  Yet another possibility, along the lines of 
Aghion and Bolton (1987), discussed further below, is that M might find it more profitable to 
sign contracts with stipulated damages that lead to entry by only the relatively more efficient 
potential entrants.  Segal and Whinston (2000b) show that this outcome can arise in a model with 
multiple buyers.
208  Finally, it should be noted that even when an incumbent monopolist can 
profitably exclude a rival using exclusive dealing, the welfare analysis is further complicated 
because some profitable entry is inefficient, as shown by Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
209 
                                                 
207 As we will discuss below and illustrate with cases in subsection 3, formal exclusivity contracts are not necessary 
for this result.  Similar effects may arise from pricing strategies (such as quantity or loyalty discounts) or threats 
(implicit or explicit) of reduced services or a complete cut-off if dealers also sell E’s wares. 
208 Another interesting but complex strand of the literature examines situations in which there is direct competition 
between buyers to sign contracts that may be exclusive.  Exclusive contracts can affect oligopolistic competition 
even if no firms are excluded from the market as a result.  See Besanko and Perry (1993, 1994).  Bernheim and 
Whinston (1998) study the effects of banning exclusive dealing in a number of distinct models, stating (p. 64): “We 
demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.”  For further discussion of the 
complexity and potential ambiguity of these models, see Whinston (2006, pp. 152-78).  This literature overlaps with 
a broader literature on vertical integration and vertical contracting.  See, for example, Hart and Tirole (1990), 
O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and the survey by Rey and Tirole (2007). 
209 The possible tradeoffs raise the question of the objectives of antitrust law and general principles governing 
exclusionary practices, discussed in subsection B.2. Antitrust, Page 125 
Although the case of multiple buyers is central to most antitrust cases involving exclusive 
dealing, it is useful to consider more briefly the Chicago School argument about buyer resistance 
to exclusivity in the single-buyer case, one that has received substantial attention in the contract 
theory literature.  Begin with a simple case in which the incumbent monopolist M has a constant 
marginal cost above that of the potential entrant E, who also bears a fixed cost to enter.  In the 
case of interest, E enters if no exclusive dealing contract binds the sole buyer B to M, and we 
suppose that the price after entry is determined by Bertrand competition and thus equals M’s 
marginal cost.
210  Suppose further that M wishes, before E is on the scene, to bind B to buy from 
M even if E should enter, and also suppose that the proposed contract does not specify the 
price.
211  In that case, B expects to pay the monopoly price, which is higher than what B would 
pay in the absence of the exclusive dealing contract.  B’s loss in surplus from exclusivity is 
simply the sum of M’s gain in producer surplus and the deadweight loss, and this total is 
obviously less than M’s gain, by the amount of the deadweight loss.  The most that M would pay 
for exclusivity is less than the least B would accept, so the Chicago School claim is valid under 
these assumptions.  As pointed out by Whinston (2006, p. 139), this result does not rely on any 
specific bargaining model but rather reflects what he calls the bilateral bargaining principle: “if 
two parties (i) contract in isolation, (ii) have complete information about each others’ payoffs, 
and (iii) lump-sum transfers are possible, then they will reach an agreement that maximizes their 
joint payoff.”  Readers will also recognize this claim as a version of the Coase theorem.  Here, 
the joint payoff of M and B is reduced—by the amount of the deadweight loss—if they sign an 
exclusive contract.  But this is not always the case, even with only a single buyer.
212 
An important set of extensions allows for other types of contract between M and E.  Aghion and 
Bolton (1987) examine an exclusive contract that stipulates the price P but allows B to breach 
and purchase instead from E (at whatever price E might offer) upon payment of damages G to 
M.
213  Aghion and Bolton show how M and B can select G to extract rents from E.  Since B must 
pay G to M if it wishes to buy from E, E needs to offer B a better deal than if there were no 
exclusionary contract.  It is in M and B’s joint interest to raise G just to the point that fully 
extracts E’s profits, sharing this gain between themselves.  Note that this outcome is efficient and 
does not exclude E, which is by assumption more efficient than M. 
However, Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that this relatively benign rent-shifting result does not 
generalize to situations in which there is uncertainty about E’s costs.  In that case, perfect 
extraction from E is not possible since M and B do not know ex ante how much may be 
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lower, but the conclusion to follow in the text will still hold. 
211 This incompleteness may arise for the usual reasons, such as future uncertainty and problems of verifiability.  If 
the contract did specify price—as allowed by Aghion and Bolton (1987), discussed below—then we might suppose 
that the price would equal M’s marginal cost with all rents extracted through an ex ante fixed charge. 
212 In addition to the variations considered in the text to follow, Farrell (2005) points out that the conclusion does not 
even generalize to alternative models of post-entry duopoly between M and E.  With Cournot duopoly, exclusion can 
be profitable and inefficient. 
213 Many of the ideas elaborated in this literature first appeared in Diamond and Maskin (1979).  See also Chung 
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extracted.  Setting G involves a familiar sort of tradeoff: raising G increases extraction from 
potential entrants with sufficiently low costs that they still enter but loses entry and thus forgoes 
extraction from those with higher costs.  Thus, the privately optimal level of G will partially 
extract surplus from relatively efficient entrants and will exclude entrants that are not so efficient 
(but still more efficient than M).  Through the contract, M and B act somewhat like a 
monopsonist purchasing from a distribution of potential entrants with different costs.
214  Even in 
this case, note that the buyer is not harmed by the use of stipulated damages on an ex ante basis.  
As emphasized by Farrell (2005), harm to the buyer from exclusivity is not possible in this 
simple setting because the buyer can always “just say no” by not agreeing to grant exclusivity to 
M.  This result contrasts with that in the previously discussed models with multiple buyers. 
The Chicago School argument about buyers’ resistance to exclusive dealing is an application of a 
broader critique applied to a wide range of exclusionary practices that is referred to as the “one-
monopoly-profit theorem” and under related rubrics.  The essence of the wider attack draws on 
the idea that monopolists, no matter how powerful, cannot get something for nothing.  That is, 
the argument holds there is some level of profit or rent that inheres in a given monopoly position, 
and monopolists cannot extract other concessions (potentially anticompetitive ones or otherwise) 
without giving up something in return. 
This general point and many of its applications served as a useful corrective to superficial 
arguments that used to be prominent in both court opinions and commentary.  A monopolist 
cannot generate monopoly returns on related products or in other markets—in addition to the 
monopoly profits it already is earning through charging the monopoly price –simply by 
threatening to withhold the product on which it enjoys the monopoly.  Monopoly prices do not 
rise without limit, as we elaborated in Section II.  Rather, there is an optimal price characterized 
by the property that a slightly higher price loses as much profit due to lost sales as is gained by 
the heightened margin on retained sales.  Buyers who would be lost are, by definition, at the 
margin.  Therefore, demanding other concessions, if they impose any positive cost, will lose 
these buyers as well unless price is reduced or other countervailing inducements are offered. 
Despite the important element of truth in this proposition, it is now well known that there are 
substantial qualifications.  Indeed, the so-called “one-monopoly-profit theorem” literally holds 
only in very special cases not often thought to be realistic, such as when a monopolist ties its 
product to another that is used in fixed proportions and is available competitively.
215  Within a 
static framework, the extent of monopoly profits may depend on practices that facilitate price 
discrimination or that limit substitution, such as by tying the sales of a monopolized product to 
sales of partial substitutes at an appropriate margin when otherwise the substitutes can be 
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themselves to the terms of their initial contract; perfect and costless renegotiation between them after E enters would 
undermine their ability to extract rents from E.  However, Spier and Whinston show that this sort of contract would 
nevertheless benefit M and B through its influence on incentives to undertake investments before E arrives on the 
scene. 
215 Many of these limitations have long been well known.  Some are discussed and further references are offered in 
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obtained at competitive prices.  Many such practices have indeterminate effects on consumer and 
total welfare. 
In a dynamic framework—especially when one also introduces externalities (which may be 
common with regard to effects on competition), asymmetric information, and other strategic 
dimensions—there are many more possibilities, including ones with anticompetitive effects.  
Moreover, most claims about exclusionary practices are expressly of a dynamic character.  
(Consider, for example, many proposed tests for exclusionary practices that we discussed in 
subsection B.2, such as whether a short-run sacrifice is involved or whether a practice would be 
profitable but for its ultimate effect of excluding rivals.)  The point that analysis can change 
qualitatively in such dynamic settings is well illustrated by the foregoing discussion of exclusive 
dealing with multiple buyers and also by our examination of credible predation in subsection 
C.1.  Indeed, substantial bodies of literature in industrial organization over the past few decades 
have been devoted to settings in which the one-monopoly-profit theorem does not hold.  In any 
event, we have seen that it does not negate the anticompetitive potential of exclusive dealing. 
2.  Efficiencies 
That exclusive arrangements can promote efficiency may be inferred from their use in situations 
where meaningful market power is clearly absent, such as in many employment contracts.  
Employees or members of a partnership may be forbidden from working elsewhere in order to 
avoid diversion of effort and to limit their ability to take personal advantage of opportunities 
developed by the enterprise.  Marvel (1982) developed these notions in a context more pertinent 
to exclusive dealing arrangements challenged under the antitrust laws.  For example, a 
manufacturer that makes investments to attract customers to a retailer may be concerned that the 
retailer would free ride by diverting these customers to competitors’ products if not precluded 
from doing so by some form of exclusivity.  As another example, Masten and Snyder (1993) 
revisit the famous United Shoe case, arguing that the contractual provisions inducing shoe 
manufacturers to exclusively use United Shoe’s machines protected the investments made by 
United Shoe in training shoe manufacturers to organize their production processes more 
efficiently.
216 
Subsequent literature on contract theory has refined our understanding of the underlying 
mechanism.  In Segal and Whinston’s (2000a) model, a buyer and seller, subsequent to entering 
into a contract, independently make noncontractible investments, after which they bargain over 
the terms of trade.  If the initial contract is not exclusive, the buyer has the option of turning to an 
alternative supplier of the product.  In a model in which the buyer only needs one unit and the 
seller can make investments that are specific to the relationship with the buyer—that is, they 
provide no value to either buyer or seller if the two do not end up dealing with each other—Segal 
and Whinston show that exclusivity has no effect on the seller’s investment incentives.  
Exclusivity reduces the buyer’s threat point and thus raises the seller’s ex post payoff, but in a 
way that is unaffected by the seller’s investment. 
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This result suggests that pro-competitive justifications for exclusivity based on free riding and 
investment incentives require investments that are not entirely relationship specific.  Segal and 
Whinston (2000a) show that exclusivity promotes seller investments that are also valuable to the 
buyer when dealing with third parties, but discourages seller investments that raise value to the 
buyer from remaining with the seller relative to switching to third parties.  Opposite results apply 
for buyer investments.  The previously noted examples of seemingly efficient exclusive dealing 
fit this pattern in that they involve seller investments that the buyer can exploit in dealing with 
alternative suppliers.  Although Segal and Whinston’s analysis solidifies our understanding, they 
also point out that the full welfare analysis is more complex because increased investment need 
not mean increased welfare. 
3.  Legal Test 
It has long been believed that exclusive dealing contracts and related arrangements have the 
potential both to be anticompetitive and to promote efficiency.  Accordingly, U.S. law has 
applied a balancing test along the lines of that under the rule of reason, which we discussed in 
subsection III.E.2.
217  As a further legal note, contractual exclusivity may be challenged under a 
variety of U.S. antitrust provisions.  In addition to monopolization under Sherman Act Section 2, 
it may be reached under Section 1 since an agreement is involved, under Clayton Act Section 3’s 
prohibition on contract provisions that anticompetitively restrict dealings with competitors, and 
under FTC Act Section 5’s broad proscription against unfair methods of competition.  The same 
is true of a variety of other forms of vertical restraints, including tying.  As we noted in 
subsection IV.D.1 in connection with horizontal mergers, however, there has been a growing 
convergence in treatment regardless of the particular statutory provision invoked. 
To state that the law applies a balancing test or, more particularly, applies a rule of reason, does 
not convey a very clear sense of how it actually operates, so it is useful to consider some cases.  
The Standard Stations decision in 1949 reflects the much stricter attitude of the Supreme Court 
at that time period.
218  Standard Oil had exclusive supply contracts with 16% of the retail outlets 
in the geographic market, most of which were terminable at 6 month intervals upon giving 30 
days notice.  Although this arrangement does not seem to constitute an insuperable barrier to an 
entrant or a rival seeking to expand (despite the fact that other suppliers also used similar 
arrangements), the Court affirmed a determination that it was anticompetitive.  A stronger case 
was presented in Lorain Journal, where an incumbent newspaper with a local news and 
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arrangements were potentially efficient even though it judged Standard Oil’s arrangements harshly.  Subsequent 
cases, including some of the others discussed below, have required a greater demonstration of anticompetitive 
effects and also have more clearly acknowledged that efficiencies count, even if they were unconvinced by those 
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equivalent price. 
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advertising monopoly (in 1948) was found guilty of attempted monopolization for refusing to 
carry ads of those who also advertised on the newly entered radio station.
219 
More recently, variations on the exclusivity theme have appeared in many phases of the litigation 
involving Microsoft.  In the mid-1990s, the government challenged and Microsoft ultimately 
agreed to cease the use of per-processor licensing fees for its operating system.  Computer 
manufacturers who had wished to load Microsoft’s operating system on some of their computers 
were charged for loading it on all of the computers they shipped, as a condition for dealing with 
Microsoft.  Although not literally barred from dealing with competitors, computer manufacturers 
were discouraged from doing so since they had to pay for Microsoft’s operating system even on 
computers shipped with an alternative operating system (or with none).  Subsequent litigation 
successfully challenged other features of Microsoft’s contracting and operating system design 
that exhibited some exclusivity.
220  In another recent case, Dentsply, the leading supplier of 
artificial teeth with a 75-80% market share was found to have violated §2 for imposing 
exclusivity on its dealers.
221 
A number of features of these cases are notable.  First, all involved multiple buyers, although 
two of the dealers in Dentsply did have substantial market shares.  Also, except for Standard 
Stations, the defendants seemed to possess monopoly power, and successful entry and ultimate 
expansion would seem to have required significant scale.
222  These features are consistent with 
the analysis of anticompetitive effects presented in subsection 1.  Regarding efficiencies, none 
seemed apparent in Lorain Journal, and efficiency justifications offered by Microsoft and 
Dentsply were found to be unconvincing. 
Like other allegedly exclusionary practices, exclusive dealing presents potentially difficult 
problems of balancing, raising both factual questions and issues about the precise content of the 
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legal test, the subject of subsection B.2.
223  A further challenge is raised by the possibility (as in 
horizontal merger cases) that both anticompetitive effects and efficiencies may be present 
simultaneously, given that the logics underlying the two considerations are essentially 
independent.  Accordingly, it is also possible that a highly anticompetitive exclusive arrangement 
would involve no short-term profit sacrifice by the monopolist.  As explained in subsection 1, 
with large numbers of buyers, exclusivity that has no efficiency consequences might be secured 
at a trivial cost; hence, even the slightest efficiency benefit would produce immediate (even if 
modest) gains, along with more substantial future profits due to anticompetitive effects.  Note 
that in such cases any issue of recoupment would likewise be moot. 
One way that the law addresses the problem of distinguishing legitimate and harmful exclusive 
dealing is through the monopoly power screen, which readily filters out a vast proportion of 
exclusive arrangements that may be efficient.  Think of routine employment contracts, 
exclusivity provisions in partnerships, and most of the countless products sold (typically but not 
always without exclusivity provisions, in fact) in department stores and drug stores and 
distributed by wholesalers of all sorts.  Relatedly, in subsection A.2 we discussed how, in 
addition to the traditional monopoly power requirement, one can also assess whether a 
challenged practice has any prospect of significantly damaging competition by stipulating that it 
has the alleged anticompetitive effect and then determining how large that effect could be.  In 
addressing efficiencies, courts’ approach has a feature analogous to the requirement in horizontal 
merger cases that efficiencies be merger specific (see subsection IV.D.3).  Thus, for purported 
benefits of exclusivity and other restrictive contractual features, courts typically ask whether 
there exists a less restrictive alternative.  For example, if the manufacturer provides some service 




Having surveyed several key economic underpinnings of antitrust policy and applied the lessons 
to the core features of existing regimes, we have seen that economics has had a tremendous 
influence on the law, but also that there is still much unfinished business for economists and 
lawyers alike.  For each of our four main topics, we have noted that modern antitrust law in the 
United States—and to a substantial degree in the European Union—is aimed in large part at 
economic objectives and heavily employs economic tools in achieving them.  At the same time, 
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in every field there appear to be notable divergences, and ones that cannot fully be explained by 
administrative convenience or limitations on institutional competence.  Some discrepancies may 
be the product of conscious choice; others no doubt reflect the inevitable lag in the dissemination 
of economic principles. 
At least as important for economists, our primary audience, are the many ways that existing 
theoretical work and empirical methods, valuable as they are, do not yet adequately address 
many of the questions that those who formulate and apply competition policy need to answer.  
For example, we noted that antitrust law on collusion seems quite interested in forms of 
communication, whereas this matter plays a relatively minor role in economic models and 
empirical work.  In many instances, the problem may be that the legal regime does not ask the 
right questions.  Even in such cases, however, answers would be helpful, if for no other reason 
than to see in what sense and to what extent antitrust decisions have been led astray.  In other 
cases, one cannot expect the law to answer economic questions sensibly, in real time, when 
leading economic research has not yet done so.  One point of particular interest in many areas of 
competition policy is that the law is very concerned with minimizing error, especially false 
positives and associated chilling effects.  But it is difficult to calibrate legal tests without better-
informed priors.  Forming such priors requires, in turn, an empirical and theoretical 
understanding of many legitimate practices as well as of the anticompetitive ones that naturally 
are the focus of legal disputes.  This knowledge is important because, in many actual cases that 
must be adjudicated, these practices are not easily distinguished from each other. 
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